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This paper analyzes the U.S. foreign policy of containment as it was applied to Latin and South 
America, from 1945 through the 1970s, which U.S. policy makers employed to prevent the 
spread of “communism.” The containment policy defines communism as the most significant 
threat to U.S. interests: a threat that directed policy theory and catalyzed policy action. That is, 
when a situation was deemed a “communist threat,” U.S. policy makers responded through a 
variety of options including, but not limited to, the use of covert intervention (such as the 
orchestration of military coups to unseat supposed communist leaders), of economic reprisals 
(such as the removal of U.S. economic aid to a given country), and even of military force. But, 
through my study of the containment policy, I realize that the way U.S. policy makers 
characterized a “communist threat” was not always consistent, for they did not always react to 
similar circumstances in similar ways. I contend that how U.S. policy makers viewed world 
events, that is, how they judged and perceived those events (for example, land reform in a given 
country) was not always congruent from situation to situation. In this light, the purpose of this 
paper, then, is to explain why this discrepancy in perception occurred, and therefore to explain 
the evolution of American foreign policy and action from the late 1940s through the early 1970s.  
First, I contend that U.S. policy perspective (a term I coined to describe how U.S. policy 
makers judged world events) and U.S. foreign policy evolved from 1945 through the 1970s, 
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causing U.S. policy makers to define threats in different ways across time. In layman’s terms, 
U.S. policy makers were not as anti-communist by the 1970s, which caused them to be less 
critical, and perhaps more practical, when judging a situation to be a “communist threat.” 
Second, I will argue that whether or not a regime was democratic or dictatorial was significant, 
in that U.S. policy makers favored dictatorial regimes as the best defense against “communist 
threats” in the Western hemisphere. As a result, U.S. policy makers were more sensitive to 
“communist threats” in democratic regimes and more likely to investigate such regimes with 
greater scrutiny for the possibility of these threats. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE 
In order to focus my discussion, I refer to three case studies—Guatemala 1944 to 1954, Chile 
1970 to 1973, and Peru 1968 to 1975—which, when compared, will outline the “discrepancy in 
perspective” to which I have alluded. In two of these cases—Guatemala 1954 and Chile 1973— 
U.S. policy makers helped plan coups d’état because they believed that each regime was a 
“communist threat.” 
In the first case of Guatemala, I evaluate the Presidencies of Juan Arevalo (1944 to 1950) 
and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1950 to 1954). U.S. policy makers labeled Arevalo as a potential 
“communist threat” as early as 1945, but did not respond through intervention because the threat 
had not yet gone beyond a threshold or standard that would require U.S. action at that time.  The 
perception of a threat grew under the Presidency of Jacabo Arbenz who, in 1950, succeeded 
Arevalo. Although U.S. policy makers initially supported Arbenz prior to his election, soon after, 
they believed he and his regime to be a threat. By 1952, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
of the U.S. had formed plans to overthrow Arbenz, plans that were later carried out in 1954 by 
Guatemalan rebels, with the aid of CIA propaganda and with U.S. air support. The “communist 
threat” in Guatemala had become substantial enough in the minds of U.S. policy makers to act.  
The second case refers to the Chilean Presidency of Salvador Allende from 1970 to 1973. 
As early as the 1950s and throughout Allende’s career, U.S. policy makers considered Allende a 
“communist threat.” Consequently, U.S. policy makers engaged in covert anti-Allende 
 14 
propaganda campaigns, including the bribery of various Chilean politicians in the 1964 Chilean 
Presidential elections and during Allende’s successful campaign in 1970. Thereafter, the U.S. 
government formed plans to overthrow Allende, and on September 11, 1973, Allende’s regime 
was ousted in the ensuing coup d’état.  
And, in the third case, I evaluate General Juan Velasco’s authoritarian military regime in 
Peru, from 1968 to 1975. Velasco and his regime were never considered to be “communist 
threats” by U.S. policy makers, but perhaps they should have been. 
In light of these three cases studies, I have chosen two “positive” cases (Guatemala and 
Chile) and a “negative” case (Peru). The term positive refers to instances when U.S. policy 
makers considered the regimes (i.e. those of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende) to be “communist 
threats,” while the term negative refers to instances when U.S. policy makers did not view a 
regime (i.e. Velasco) to be a “communist threat.” Thus the reader might posit:  
1) Why is the Peruvian case important? Why should it have been considered a 
threat?  
 
2) If Peru should have been considered a threat, why was the Peruvian regime never 
perceived to be a threat by U.S. policy makers? 
 In response to these questions, I contend that U.S. policy makers intervened in the 
Guatemalan and Chilean states because they considered specific variables (e.g. land reform in 
Guatemala) to signify that a “communist threat” was present in each case. The case of Peru is 
significant because the variables in Guatemala that led U.S. policy makers to label the Arevalo 
and Arbenz regimes as threatening were, in large part, also evident in similar circumstances in 
Peru from 1968 to 1975, but, as argued, U.S. policy makers did not consider Velasco or his 
regime to be a threat.  The variables that caused U.S. policy makers concern in the case of 
Guatemala were: the expropriation of U.S. business interests (specifically the land reform 
program that seized the land of the United Fruit Company, the largest U.S. company in 
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Guatemala at the time), the communist party’s (CP) control of their respective labor movements, 
and the influence of the CP in government, which U.S. policy makers believed was largely based 
upon the CP’s influence in the labor movement. Also, a major worry for U.S. policy makers was 
that Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes had formed relations with the Socialist bloc. Although 
Arbenz’s regime engaged in only one known arms trade with the Soviet bloc in 1954, U.S. 
policy makers considered the arms sale as an indication that a “communist threat” existed.1 
 In Peru under the Velasco regime, although the CP held virtually no government 
posts, Velasco’s closest advisors were exceptionally radical, favoring state control of the 
economy. Indeed, Velasco’s respective social reform programs were far more advanced than 
Arbenz’s, while Velasco’s government formed extensive bi-lateral trade agreements with the 
U.S.S.R including the Peruvian regime’s purchase of Soviet weapons. Moreover, the CP in Peru 
wielded great influence over the Peruvian labor movement, which become increasingly radical 
and in the final years of Velasco’s tenure a third of the labor force went on strike and violently 
demonstrated.2Nevertheless, U.S. policy makers in the 1970s concluded that the Velasco regime 
was not a “communist threat.” As Kees, Koonings, and Dirk Kruijt, editors of Political Armies: 
The Military and nation building in the age of democracy, argue, “During the Cold-War, US-
related concepts of national security were diffused all over Latin America. In Peru, however, the 
‘normal’ overwhelming anti-communism of the Latin American security thesis was felt much 
less strongly.”3 So, my research question: What caused U.S. policy makers to perceive the 
Velasco regime with a different perspective? 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2 2 See Chapter 2 3 Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt eds. Political Armies: The Military and nation building in the age of democracy. London: Zed books, 2002.   p. 37.  
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The discrepancy in the perception of U.S. policy makers toward the regimes of 
Guatemala and Peru is further complicated by the case of Allende’s Chile from 1970 to 1973. 
The case is a clear instance of U.S. covert intervention in Latin America during the very same 
years of Velasco’s tenure.  Hence, we cannot explain away the Peruvian situation by simply 
arguing that U.S. policy makers were no longer interested in the U.S. Cold War containment 
policy. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, U.S. policy makers feared Allende well before 
his election to the Chilean presidency, actively sought to prevent his election in several instances, 
and were perturbed once Allende was elected on the grounds that he and his eventual regime 
posed an imminent “communist threat” to the Western hemisphere. Once again, the question: 
Why was Velasco’s regime overlooked? And what distinguished Velasco and his regime 
from both Arevalo and Arbenz and their respective regimes in Guatemala and Allende and 
his regime in Chile? 
1.1 SOLVING THE PUZZLE: 
Abstractly speaking, for my first thesis, I contend that U.S. policy makers did not view the 
Velasco regime’s land reform programs, expropriation of U.S. businesses, extensive relations 
with the U.S.S.R, the CP’s control of the labor movement, the fact that Velasco’s closest 
advisors were radical and had a Marxist Socialist orientation, as “communist threats” because 
U.S. foreign policy and the way U.S. policy makers understood international relations had 
evolved from 1944 through the 1970s. That is, the way U.S. policy makers “judged” the world 
fundamentally changed.  Hence, the discrepancy in perspective was not a mere anomaly, but was 
a consequence of this different world outlook. I will also introduce a second thesis: U.S. policy 
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makers favored dictatorships over democracies and thus scrutinized the democratic Arevalo, 
Arbenz, and Allende and their regimes to a much greater extent that Velasco’s Authoritarian 
military government in Peru. Thus, in this light, I contend that U.S. policy makers were more 
likely to judge a situation as threatening in a democracy over a dictatorship.  
In more concrete terms, regarding my first thesis, U.S. policy makers in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s framed virtually every international and domestic issue in the context of U.S.-
Soviet relations and religiously sought to prevent the spread of communism under the auspices of 
the containment policy. Particularly, in the 1950s, U.S. policy makers saw the world as ridden 
with “communist subversion”; they were convinced that the Soviet leadership sought to 
indoctrinate the minds and souls of every individual with communist ideology. Indeed, like so 
many other U.S. citizens, President Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower were consumed 
by the fear of communism and its outward expansion from the U.S.S.R, and they viewed 
international relations in a bi-polar way: U.S. versus U.S.S.R. and democracy (“good”) versus 
communism (“bad”). As a result, the U.S. saw “communism” as a single enemy and anything 
related to “communism” would be considered a threat. Thus, in the early 1940s and 1950s, U.S. 
policy makers believed that every individual instance of communist growth, whether it was a 
growing number of communist members in a given country or a “leftist” reform program that 
U.S. policy makers had associated with the communist agenda, needed to be prevented (a 
universal goal, to say the least). In short, the communist fight was all that mattered from 1945 
through the early 1960s. Indeed, the early 1960s cannot be underestimated because U.S.-Soviet 
tensions were exceptionally tense. For example, the Cuban Revolution and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis occurred in 1959 and 1962 respectively, marking the height of U.S.-Soviet tension, in 
which nuclear war was serious possibility.  
 18 
Yet, by the 1970s, the fear of communism, although it remained present in the minds of 
U.S. policy makers, had subsided in comparison to the hysterical anti-communist political 
atmosphere of the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Many events contributed to this shift in 
perspective. For example, the new anti-communist foreign policy of modernization, under the 
auspices of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program, called for a renewed interest in 
sending U.S. economic aid to Latin America, while simultaneously bolstering Latin America’s 
social reform programs. The land reform program in Guatemala probably would not have caused 
U.S. policy makers concern if it counterfactually had taken place in the 1960s. Also, in the late 
1960s, the Vietnam War forced U.S. policy makers to reconsider their foreign policy goals for a 
variety of reasons. When the U.S. citizenry turned against the War, the crusading efforts to 
prevent communism everywhere fell out of favor. Moreover, as a result of  the Soviet split from 
communist China in 1961—when the Sino-Soviet political and ideological relations worsened, 
which ultimately resulted in China’s complete rejection of the Soviet styled Marxist ideology— 
U.S. policy makers recognized that the Cold War was not defined by neat bi-polar categories. In 
this regard, President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, 
who were both once staunch “anti-communist crusaders,” came to view the world as multi-polar; 
by the 1970’s they lost interest in responding to every instance of communist growth because it 
was not only impractical but U.S. policy makers might be supporting one communist regime 
against another (i.e. Nixon supported China in the 1970’s to combat the threat that the US.S.R. 
posed).Thus, U.S. policy makers adopted a more practical approach of “selective containment.” 
That is, policy makers responded to world issues with a greater degree of understanding in order 
to determine if a situation was indeed a threat rather than automatically categorizing every issue 
in the context of the Cold War. Hence, my first thesis: the evolution of U.S. foreign policy 
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perspectives and U.S. foreign policy explains why U.S. policy makers viewed and 
responded in different ways to similar variables in Guatemala and Peru.4 
1.2 HOW FOREIGN POLICY AND POLICY PERSPECTIVE EVOLVED:  
In light of this explanation, I argue that four variables shaped “U.S. foreign policy perspective” 
from 1945 through the 1970s: (1) international  political context, where world events unfold in 
the present as decisions are being made; (2) U.S. domestic political atmosphere, where the 
general sentiment of U.S. policy makers, the general citizenry, the media, and U.S. business 
interests characterize the general collaborative mood in the United States and interpret global and 
domestic issues; (3) U.S. foreign policy theory, where U.S. policy makers form a theoretical 
response to world issues; (4) foreign policy action, where U.S. policy makers react to world 
issues in light of their view of such issues and the prevailing foreign policy of the time.  
Although the four variables are interdependent, each of them can—and perhaps should 
be—looked at independently. However, the length restraints of this essay make it impossible to 
give each variable its due share of analysis. Nonetheless, I explore each variable in order to 
explain the discrepancy in U.S. perspectives and action across time.  
 I contend that the international context set the stage for how U.S. policy makers formed 
their foreign policy perceptions (i.e. how they viewed the world). Naturally, it would be 
impossible to have a perspective, let alone a foreign policy, without the occurrence of world 
events. Hence, U.S. policy makers interpreted world events and formed a theoretical “game 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 1 for full citations and explanation of this overview.  
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plan” for how the U.S. would react (i.e. foreign policy theory). Yet, foreign policy, in theory, did 
not catalyze U.S. action but merely directed it. Without individual policy makes to employ the 
theory, U.S. foreign policy theory was like a car without a driver. The theory provided the 
vehicle for action, but U.S. policy makers were the ones who had to drive the theory and apply it 
to specific issues. In turn, the actions taken by U.S. policy makers naturally impacted the way 
world events unfolded, but the actions also further defined policy theory and set precedence for 
how later action would subsequently be employed.  The constant influx of world events, the 
variety of perspectives on such events, and the individual application of policy theory to 
individual issues demonstrate that foreign policy was a breathable, malleable, and ever changing 
theoretical outlook. I have created the following chart to illustrate and clarify this cycle.  
 21 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Foreign Policy Perspectives 
 
Although this diagram oversimplifies the entire process of forming U.S. foreign policy 
perceptions, foreign policy theory, and how policy perception and policy theory, when applied to 
a given situation, creates policy action, it nonetheless characterizes the general trend. I argue, 
then, that this “trend” provides sound circumstantial evidence to explain, abstractly, not only that 
foreign policy evolution is possible, for it surely is, but how U.S. foreign policy and the way U.S. 
policy makers viewed the world had evolved and why U.S. policy makers became less anti-
communist from 1945 through the 1970s.  
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1.3 HOW THE CASE OF ALLENDE THREATENS MY THESIS AND WHY THE 
THREAT CAN BE DISPELLED:  
But, if the atmosphere was not so charged, then why was Allende’s regime considered 
exceptionally threatening in the 1970s and, thus, overthrown in a similar manner to Arbenz in 
1954? Furthermore, if Allende’s regime was considered a communist threat at the same time as 
Velasco was in power (and was not seen as a threat), wouldn’t this contest my basic assertion 
that policy and policy perspective had evolved? I submit that such a contention would cause my 
thesis difficulty if U.S. policy makers had considered Allende and his regime to be a “communist 
threat” on similar grounds that rationalized intervention and a perception of threat in Guatemala, 
for U.S. policy makers would have acted similarly in similarly circumstances from 1945 through 
the 1970s and, thus, a change in perception would not be apparent (a basic requisite for my entire 
thesis). Hence, the paper would have to explain through other means—beyond the rational that 
foreign policy and policy perspective evolved— why U.S. perception of threat in Peru was non-
existent. However, my first thesis is not challenged because I argue that the variables of 
expropriation of U.S. business interests, CP in government, trade relations with the U.S.S.R., so 
forth and so on were only auxiliary threats to the main motivating variables that caused U.S. 
policy makers concern with regards to Allende. Indeed, Allende was considered a threat well 
before such variables had come into being for his respective administration. That is, Allende was 
considered a threat, unlike Arevalo and Arbenz, well before he had ascended the Chilean 
Presidency because of variables that transcended the ones seen in Guatemala or Peru: Allende 
self-affiliated as a Marxist Socialist throughout his career and a Marxist Socialist president 
during his Presidential tenure (As my survey shows, “Marxism,” whatever it may have entailed, 
was a label that caused equal consternation for U.S. policy makers in comparison to the label 
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“communism ”);And, Allende had openly affiliated with the international communist movement, 
while idealizing communist leaders, such as the U.S.S.R.’s Premier Joseph Stalin, throughout his 
political career. Hence, these variables substantiate why U.S. policy makers considered Allende a 
threat even into the 1970s 
But, for arguments sake, even if we do take into account similar variables that caused 
U.S. policy makers concern in the case of the Guatemala regimes, it is apparent that Allende’s 
regime included a CP that was more integrated, evolved, and certainly more advanced than the 
CP in Arbenz’s regime and obviously Velasco’s. A quick glance at CP party size, CP 
involvement in government, and CP role in politics as a whole, in Guatemala, Peru, and Chile, 
supports this claim. Thus, even if we ignore the extra variables—Marxist affiliation and 
international communist proponent— that moved beyond those seen in Guatemala (e.g. 
expropriation or CP control of labor),  and focus solely on the variables present in Guatemala, 
Allende’s Chile was simply more “radical” and perhaps more “communist” even by this 
comparison.  In total, U.S. policy makers, despite their new commitment to “selective 
containment” and the presence of less anti-communist atmosphere, could not ignore the threat 
that Allende and his regime posed. Hence, the threat of Allende eclipsed a threshold or standard 
that was much more stringent by the 1970s in comparison to the one utilize to determine threat in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
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1.4 THESIS 2:  
The discrepancy in perspective between the cases of Guatemala and Peru, and  why U.S. policy 
makers considered Allende’s regime a threat in the 1970s, can also be explained by my second 
thesis: U.S. policy makers favored dictatorial regimes over democratic ones because they 
believed that dictatorships were the best defense against communism in the Western 
Hemisphere.  Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende were all democratically elected Presidents under 
constitutional democracies, while Velasco was an authoritarian military dictator who took power 
through a military coup d’état. Hence, I argue that the regimes of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende 
received greater scrutiny from U.S. policy makers because their democratic regime type.  
I hope to show that Allende was investigated and considered a threat well before his 
election and as early as the late 1950s, while Velasco was not “tracked” in this manner. Once 
again, for Allende, U.S. policy makers had not only formed their opinion that he was a 
“communist threat,” but actively pursued a policy of preventing Allende from being elected 
President in both 1964 and 1970. Similarly, U.S. policy makers engaged in an intensive 
investigation of Guatemala as early as 1944, well before any indication of a “communist threat” 
was evident. Contrastingly, in Peru, U.S. policy makers never considered Velasco as more than a 
potential threat, while he was in power, that is, if they considered him a threat at all, and, 
furthermore, they never investigated him for communist “sympathies” or threat prior to his 
tenure. In short, my survey evidences that U.S. policy makers not only concluded that no 
“communist threat” was apparent in Peru, but they did not look in the first place. Yet, another 
important piece of evidence for the second thesis is that U.S. policy makers quickly concluded 
that Velasco was anti-communist shortly into his tenure and, subsequently, utilized Velasco’s 
regime as a non-Marxist revolutionary example to Allende’s Marxist Socialist regime in Chile. 
 25 
Lastly, in my first chapter, I will also touch upon a U.S. report on Guatemala that clearly 
suggests the U.S. favored the Velasco regime because it was authoritarian. Hence, in total, it 
appears that a clear bias directed greater scrutiny of the democratic regimes in the cases of 
Guatemala and Chile.  
In summary, the initial puzzle and discrepancy in perspective that I have touched 
upon to such a great extent can be explained by the shift of U.S. policy makers’ beliefs, 
from 1944 through the 1970s, and the sustained policy that favored dictatorships over 
democracies.  
1.5 ALTERNATIVE THESIS:  
Before turning to the body of work and for the sake of argument, I need to address a pressing 
concern for my entire paper. I initially began my entire discussion by highlighting one key 
premise: U.S. interventions—at least in the cases of Guatemalan and Chile— were motivated by 
the containment policy of stemming communist threats. Indeed, the concern that I must address 
is one that challenges this basic premise.  
Specifically, various historians have argued that the rational for intervention in 
Guatemala and Chile was not entirely based upon the need to stop communism, but, rather, 
stemmed from a much greater concern for U.S. business interests and the protection of U.S. 
business assets in both countries. Thus, in this light, containment was not utilized to stop 
communism, but was used as a rationale to intervene on the behalf of U.S. business interests.  
Stephen Streeter, in “Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, 
Revisionist, and Postrevisionist perspective” further defines this alternative thesis. He argues that 
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there are three scholarly perspectives that have evolved and attempt to explain the rational for 
U.S. intervention in Guatemala: realist, revisionist, and postrevisionist. A quick summary of 
these terms will clarify the difficultly that I am presented with. According to Streeter:  
Realists, who concern themselves primarily with power politics, have generally blamed 
the Cold War on an aggressive, expansionist Soviet empire. Because realists believe that 
Arbenz was a Soviet puppet, they view his overthrow as the necessary rollback of 
communism in the Western Hemisphere. Revisionists, who place the majority of the 
blame for the Cold War on the United States, emphasize how Washington sought to 
expand overseas markets and promote foreign investment, especially in the Third World. 
Revisionists allege that because the State Department came to the rescue of the [United 
Fruit Company] UFCO, the U.S. intervention in Guatemala represents a prime example 
of economic imperialism. Postrevisionists, a difficult group to define precisely, 
incorporate both strategic and economic factors in their interpretation of the Cold War. 
They tend to agree with revisionists on the issue of Soviet responsibility, but they are 
much more concerned with explaining the cultural and ideological influences that warped 
Washington’s perception of the “communist threat”. According to post revisionists, the 
Eisenhower administration officials turned against Arbenz because they failed to grasp 
that he represented a nationalist rather than a communist.5 
 
Hence, the revisionist perspective characterizes the alternative thesis, whereas, the post-
revisionist perspective is more in line with my own thesis. In effect, the revisionist argument 
contends that the UFCO and high ranking U.S. officials, such as the Dulles Brothers, John and 
Allen Dulles, who were the respective Secretary of State and Director of Intelligence, conspired 
to inflate an already present communist threat that was believed to exist in Guatemala in order to 
legitimize Arbenz’s overthrow, not in the name of containment per say, but in the name of 
protecting UFCO assets that were being expropriated. Although Streeter is only referring to the 
case of Guatemala, a similar explanation might be employed to explain U.S. intervention in 
Chile (i.e. one might argue that U.S. policy makers intervened in against Allende and his regime 
                                                 
5 Streeter, Stephen M. “Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives.” The 
History Teacher, Vol. 34, No. 1, p. 62, June 2000. Web. 25 June 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>.  
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because of the threat they posed to U.S. business interests, not necessarily because of the 
“communist threat” they posed.) 
I contend that although the protection of U.S. business interests may have been an 
auxiliary concern in both Guatemala and Chile, the main concern was the communist threat that 
U.S. policy makers believed to exist. Without going too much into the matter, Streeter 
thoroughly articulates how the revisionist perspective evolved in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
but was later refuted and debunked by “archival” evidence of the CIA plans to overthrow Arbenz 
and postrevisionist authors such as Piero Gleijese who wrote his account of the Guatemalan 
intervention in Shattered Hope, published in 1991.6 For example, Streeter contends that 
“Shattered Hope verified the claim of post-revisionist studies that Eisenhower administration 
officials had viewed the Fruit Company’s plight as a “subsidiary” problem, secondary to the 
issue of communism.”  In fact, my account of the U.S. perspective for the Guatemalan case, 
which focuses on the telegram correspondence between the American embassy in Guatemala and 
the U.S. State Department, also thoroughly supports the claim that the U.S. government was 
primarily motivated by the containment policy and the goal of stemming a “communist threat” in 
Guatemala. Indeed, my survey agrees with Streeter that even at the height of Arbenz’s 
expropriation of UFCO’s assets, the “Eisenhower administration officials worried less about the 
impact of Arbenz’s land reform on United Fruit than they did about its impact on the 
countryside.” In other words, U.S. makers, although clearly concerned with the land reform 
program and although concerned about its impact on the UFCO, was ultimately far more 
concerned with how the land reform program related to CP strength in Guatemala and in 
Arbenz’s regime.  
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 66, 67. 
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Moreover, in support of my refutation of the revisionist theory, Louis Halle, the Jr. Policy 
Planning Staff of the State Department, argues that U.S. policy maker’s primary concern was 
communism in Guatemala. In a telegram to the Director of Policy Planning Staff, on May 28, 
1954, and only a month prior to Arbenz’s overthrow, Halle stated:  
The nationalistic and reformist elements in the Guatemalan situation have hitherto 
loomed larger for the Latin Americans than the element of international communism 
.They believe that we exaggerated the latter for our own purposes, and this belief is not 
weakened when we meet it with redoubled protestations... If the above analysis is sound 
the conclusion must be that the time is not ripe for a collective inter-American action.”7  
Thus, Halle fully recognized that certain factions, in this case Latin Americans, were 
suspicious of U.S. intentions in Guatemala and believed that the “threat of communism” was 
really a front to legitimize U.S. intervention that would be enacted to protect U.S. business 
interests. But the tone of this letter indicates that Halle did not favor U.S. intervention because he 
realized how such an intervention would look, that is, it would appear to be an imperialist 
intervention for the sake of protecting U.S. business interests.  Consequently, Halle called for a 
more “relaxed attitude generally” (i.e. non-intervention) because he worried that intervention 
would “turn all of Latin America against us to the advantage of the international Communist 
movement” and if the intervention failed would “strengthen Communism in Guatemala while 
antagonizing Latin American generally.”8 Hence, Halle’s stance on Guatemala was ultimately 
related to how communism was impacting not only the Guatemala state, but Latin America as a 
whole. However, it might be argued that Halle’s point is moot because the U.S. covert 
intervention had been planned for two years prior to Halle’s report letter and the intervention 
commenced a month after the report. Thus, Halle was clearly unaware about the plans, which 
                                                 
7 Halle, Louis Jr. J. “Policy Planning Staff, Memorandum to Director of the Policy Planning Staff (May 28, 1954).” King, John A. and John R.  Vile. Presidents from Eisenhower through Johnson, 1953-1969: debating the issue in Pro and Con Primary Documents. Westport,  CT: Greenwood Press, 2006. p. 46.  8 King, John A. and John R. Vile. Presidents from Eisenhower through Johnson, 1953-1969: debating the issue in Pro and Con Primary 
 Documents. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006. p. 46.   
 29 
would further support a conspiracy theory because Halle’s disposition was not characteristic of 
the more elite policy makers who favored a “collective inter-American action” and actually 
planned and orchestrated the coup.  
 Yet, even if we disregard Halle’s perspective, President Eisenhower’s position on 
Guatemala substantiates that although he may have been concerned about the expropriation of 
U.S. business interests, his overriding concern was the prevention of communist power in the 
Western Hemisphere.  For example, in his book Mandate for Change, the White House Years, 
1953-1956, published nine years after Arbenz’s overthrow, Eisenhower argued:  
The troubles had been long-standing, reaching back nine years to the Guatemalan 
revolution of 1944, which had resulted in the overthrow of the dictator General Jorge 
Ubico. Thereafter, the Communists busied themselves with agitating and with infiltrating 
labor unions, peasant organizations, and the press and radio. In 1950 a military officer, 
Jacabo Arbenz Guzman, came to power and by his actions soon created the strong 
suspicions that he was merely a puppet manipulated by Communists…For example, on 
February 24, 1953, the Arbenz government announced its intention, under agrarian 
reform law, to seize about 225,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land. The 
company lost its appeal to the Guatemalan Supreme Court to prevent this discriminatory 
and unfair seizure…Expropriation in itself does not, of course, prove Communism; 
expropriation of oil and agriculture properties years before in Mexico had not been 
fostered by Communists. 9   
 
Notice how Eisenhower refers to Arbenz’s land reform only in how it related to the 
presence of a possible communist threat in Guatemala, but was not described as threatening for 
its own sake. He even contends that “expropriation itself does not, of course prove communism.” 
Once again, the expropriation was highlighted because it suggested a “communist threat.” 
Eisenhower also supports the claim that the U.S. intervention in Guatemala was motivated by a 
fear of communism when he states: 
In the two months from March to May, 1954, the agents of international 
Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts to penetrate and subvert their 
neighboring Central American states, using consular agents for political purposes and 
                                                 
9 Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change, The White House Years, 1953-1956. Gaiden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963. p. 421-426.  
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fomenting political assassinations and strikes. In Guatemala itself the government 
answered protests by suspending constitutional rights, conducting mass arrests, and 
killing leaders in the political opposition.10  
 
The language here further exemplifies Eisenhower’s focus. When he states the “agents of 
international Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts,” he is clearly supporting the 
claim that U.S. was focused on communism and the threat it posed in Guatemala and to U.S. 
interests! The only way to refute such statements is to suggest that Eisenhower purposely was 
lying in his book in order to frame the Guatemalan situation as a “communist threat” in order to 
cover up the conspiracy.  Perhaps it is not impossible that Eisenhower would lie, but such a 
claim appears highly skeptical, to say the least. Moreover, Eisenhower does not merely suggest 
that containment motivated action in Guatemala, but explicitly outlines this point:  
I considered the matter carefully. I realized well that United States intervention in Central 
America and Caribbean affairs earlier in the century has greatly injured our standing in 
all of Latin America. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to refuse cooperate in 
providing indirect support to a strictly anti-communist faction in this struggle would be 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Caracas resolution (i.e. anti-communist resolution). 
I had faith in the strength of the inter-American resolve therein set forth. 11 
 
In this statement, Eisenhower recognizes the same difficulties that Halle highlighted in 
1953: intervention would have serious ramifications in how Latin American’s would judge U.S. 
action. Nonetheless, Eisenhower favored intervention because he believed the communist threat 
outweighed the importance of catering to the concerns of Latin Americans. Once Arbenz’s 
regime was ousted, Eisenhower concluded, “By the middle of 1954 Latin America was free, for 
the time being at least, of any fixed outposts of Communism.”12 In summary, Eisenhower and 
U.S. policy makers were first and foremost concerned with the “threat of communism.”  
                                                 
10 Ibid.  11  Ibid.  12 Ibid. 
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Aside from Eisenhower’s perspective, according to Streeter, the CIA official who 
orchestrated the plans (i.e. PBSUCCESS) to overthrow Arbenz, Richard Bissell, reported “I 
never heard Allen Dulles discuss United Fruit’s Interests.” 13 Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State 
also told Costa Rican leader Jose Figueres: “Of course, we expected American rights to be 
protected, including the United Fruit Company; but the United Fruit Company’s interests were 
secondary to the main interest.”14 Thus, all of these sources unanimously agree that communism 
was the main issue. Yet again, a refutation to this claim would be to suggest that all of these 
sources conspired to lie.  
 However, to affirm that the main motivation for intervention in Guatemala was to “roll 
back” a communist threat is not to say that the UFCO played no part in causing U.S. officials to 
become more anxious and more aware of a threat in Guatemala. In fact, I grant that U.S. business 
interests and their respective lobbying of the U.S. government and propaganda campaigns, which 
included the hiring of professional journalists to characterize Arbenz and his regime and 
Guatemalan society as a whole as a hot bed for communists, aroused further suspicions that were 
already present for U.S. policy makers. Such efforts were most likely quite effective considering 
the extreme sensitivity to communist threats in the U.S. from 1945 to 1954. Thus, such efforts 
would surely “stoke the fire.” Hence, the issue of economic imperialism and the policy of 
containment were clearly not mutually exclusive from one another. The point remains, however, 
that the underlying motivation for action in Guatemala was rooted on the belief that a communist 
threat was present.   
Moving on to the other case studies—Chile and Peru—I can also say the Allende and his 
regime in Chile were overthrown because of the “communist threat” they posed and not to 
                                                 
13 Streeter, p. 65.  14  Ibid.  
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protect U.S. business interests. As with Guatemala, the “communist threat” may have been 
exacerbated by a concern for U.S. business interests because, like Guatemala, U.S. businesses, 
such as ITT, offered money to combat Allende’s regime and lobbied the U.S. government for 
action. But, still, U.S. policy makers had determined that Allende was a threat well before his 
election and before he posed an economic threat. The fear of Allende’s Marxist orientation 
predated the other concern of possible expropriation, let alone the other variables. Indeed, U.S. 
policy makers labeled Allende a “communist doup” in the 1950s. It would be absurd to suggest 
that U.S. policy makers planned twenty years in advance for how they would combat Allende to 
prevent his potential expropriation of U.S. business interests if he happened to find his way to the 
presidency. Nevertheless, as in the case of Guatemala, containment and the protection of U.S. 
business interests was not mutually exclusive from one another. Hence, once Allende was in 
power, it might be correctly argued that U.S. businesses played a role in furthering efforts for his 
overthrow, but, as in Guatemala, the primary motivation for Allende’s overthrow was ultimately 
linked to the original U.S. concern that Allende and his regimes posed a “communist threat.”  
Lastly, the case of Peru also thoroughly supports the fact that U.S. policy makers were 
not willing to intervene to protect U.S. business interest, especially in the 1970s. As I will argue, 
Velasco and his regime engaged in widespread expropriation on a similar scale to Allende’s 
regime and a much larger scale than Arbenz’s. Yet, U.S. policy makers (although reacting to the 
Peruvian regimes’ respective expropriation of U.S. business interests through economic 
sanctions, such as the Hickenlooper amendment, which called for the removal of U.S. aid to 
countries that expropriated U.S. businesses)  never proposed intervention and thus intervention 
was never an option. In fact, in reference to the expropriation of the U.S. owned International 
Petroleum (IPC) Company in Peru, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
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Covey Oliver responded to the expropriation and reported that “the United States recognized the 
right of a sovereign nation to take territory within its jurisdiction for public purpose.” Oliver did 
clarify, “however…the U.S. also expected fulfillment of the corresponding obligation under 
international law to make prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”15  
Yet, I must note that the ICP did not lobby the U.S. government nearly to the extent that 
the UFCO did in Guatemala. In fact, the IPC actually favored that the entire expropriation be 
kept quiet.  Hence, it might be argued that this lack of lobbying effort or propaganda campaign 
may have been a difference that mattered, that is, because the IPC did not heavily lobby congress 
and did not engage in propaganda campaigns, the U.S. did not intervene. Yet, this is a moot point 
because other U.S. companies in Peru that were expropriated did lobby the U.S. government. For 
example, the Peruvian government expropriated the very same firms that lobbied so heavily for 
Allende’s overthrow in Chile, including Harold Geneen’s ITT, who surely lobbied the U.S. 
government for action.16 
 Moreover, not only was there no intervention, or discussion of one, but U.S. policy 
makers supported the Velasco regime as a non-Marxist revolutionary example to Allende’s 
Marxist-Socialist regime in Chile. 17Thus, although U.S. policy makers were clearly concerned 
with the expropriation of U.S. businesses in Peru, such as the IPC expropriation, and heavily 
focused on this issue in their diplomatic correspondence, they were clearly more worried about 
the Marxist-revolution in Chile, thus substantiating that the main threat was still communism, at 
least in terms of the motivating factor that caused U.S. intervention. In light of this entire 
                                                 
15  “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson: The Peruvian  Situation.” 11 October 1968. Foreign Relations: 1964-1968, Volume 31, 1968. p. 1068. 16 Maurer, Noel. Much Ado About Nothing: Expropriation and compensation in Peru and Venezuela, 1968-75. Working Paper, Harvard Business School, 2011. p. 11.  17 See U.S. perspective on Peru in Chapter 3 
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discussion, the alternative thesis does not refute my most basic claim: U.S. policy makers were 
motivated by the containment policies goal of stopping the spread of communism.  
1.6 HOW THE PAPER WILL PROCEED 
Turning to how the entire paper will argue for my general thesis, I separate my discussion into 
three chapters. Chapter 1 summarizes and articulates how the four variables—international 
political context, domestic political atmosphere, foreign policy theory, and foreign policy 
action—impacted policy perception and how U.S. policy makers respond to individual events. 
Furthermore, this chapter describes how foreign policy and policy perception evolved, which 
explains the discrepancy in perspective between the case of Guatemala and Peru. Also, I will 
explain how U.S. policy maker’s policy of favoring dictatorships over democracy was present 
from 1945 through the 1970s. Chapter 2 will examine the similarities that I argue existed 
between the cases of Guatemala and Peru, which is a very basic prerequisite prior to my 
explanation that a difference in perception existed between the cases (it might go without saying 
that an inconsistency in perception and action would be inconsequential if the variables were not 
similar), a conclusion that I will thoroughly argue for in Chapter 3. Also, in Chapter 2, I will 
provide evidence for my claim that Allende and his regime were considered a threat in the 1970s 
because of extra-variables—Marxist ideology and international communist supporter— beyond 
those seen in the cases of Guatemala and Chile (e.g. land reform). With regards to Chapter 3, I 
will analyze U.S. policy makers telegram correspondence and conversations in the State 
Department, the CIA, and between the respective U.S. presidents and their advisors for all three 
cases, which will provide grounds for my claim that U.S. policy makers viewed the variables of 
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expropriation of U.S. business interests, CP control of labor movement, relations with the 
U.S.S.R., and the respective leaders relations with the CP as indications that a communist threat 
was present in Guatemala. Moreover, the analysis of these telegrams and prime sources from the 
National Security archive will show that U.S. policy makers did not consider Velasco’s regime 
as a threat and never framed the variables considered threatening in Guatemala as a threat in 
Peru. Moreover, I will show how U.S. policy makers were exceptionally concerned about 
Allende well before his election to the presidency and sought to oppose his election both in 1964 
and 1970. I will lastly highlight that such efforts failed and when Allende won the presidential 
election, U.S. policy makers quickly formed plan to overthrow him. In total, all three chapters 
support my general argument that I have proposed up until this point.  
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2.0  CHAPTER 1                                                                                                     
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONTAINMENT POLICY: EVOLUTION OF  
FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I will provide evidence for my basic claim that the four variables—international 
political context, domestic political atmosphere, U.S. foreign policy theory, and U.S. foreign 
policy action—determine policy perception and how it evolved over time, which provides 
explanation for the discrepancy in perspective and foreign policy from 1945 through the 1970s. 
In short, this chapter attempts to show how U.S. policy makers were exceptionally anti-
communist in the later 1940s and early 1950s, but were far less anti-communist by the 1970s.  
2.1 THE COLD WAR BEGINS:  
At the end of the World War II, the Allied powers converged on Berlin, Germany—the U.S.S.R. 
from the East and the remainder of the allied forces from the West. Although the U.S.S.R. and 
allied forces had once united for a common cause, the end of the War resulted in a divided 
Europe: the U.S. and allied forces dominating the Western half of Europe and the U.S.S.R. 
dominating the east.   
According to noted historians Thomas Paterson, Garry Clifford, Shane Maddock, 
Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth Hagan, “As Washington moved to fill the power vacuums left 
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by the defeated Axis and retreating colonial powers, it encountered an obstreperous competitor in 
Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union.”18 Furthermore, Paterson, et al. argue that “The confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union derived from the different post-War needs, 
ideology, style, and power of the two rivals and drew on a history of frosty relations. Each saw 
the other, in mirror image, as the world’s bully.”19  
From the U.S. perspective, and, perhaps, the allied powers alike, Griffin Fariello, in Red 
Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition, recounts that Averell Harriman, U.S. ambassador 
to the Soviet Union, “Warned President Harry Truman on April 20, 1945, that America was 
faced with a ‘barbarian invasion of Europe.’ Truman replied that he was ‘not afraid of the 
Russians’ and intended to be ‘firm.’”20 Likewise, on May 12, 1945, Winston Churchill, the 
former Prime Minister of Britain, telegrammed President Harry Truman and reported that “An 
iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. There 
seems little doubt that the whole of the region east of the line Lubeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be 
completely in their hands.” In the same telegram, Churchill warned that a removal of American 
troops from Europe would bring “Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent 
of the iron curtain between us and everything eastward.”21  
Despite such fears, Paterson, et al. also contends that “The United States emerged from 
World War II a full-fledged global power for the first time in its history. An asymmetry—not a 
balance—of power existed.”22 Likewise, according to Geir Lundestad, in Major Developments in 
International Politics: 1945-1986: “The power base of the Soviet Union was not comparable to 
                                                 
18 Paterson, Thomas, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan. American Foreign Relations: A History 
 since 1895, Vol. 2, Edition 6. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005. p. 228. 19 Ibid., p. 231. 20 Fariello, Griffin. Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition; An Oral History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. p. 31. 21 Churchill, Winston. The Second World War, vi, Triumph and Tragedy. London: Cassell, 1945. p. 498, 499, 523.  22 Paterson et al., p. 228. 
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that of the United States. The U.S.S.R. had suffered enormous losses during the War. Its 
populations had been cut in half. Similar conditions existed in agriculture” and “The Soviet 
Union produced 65,000 cars a year, the United States seven million.”23 Hence, we might posit 
whether or not the anxiety of U.S. policy makers was over exaggerated.  
2.2 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT (LATE 1940S AND EARLY 1950S): 
Yet, much evidence suggests that U.S. anxiety was not unfounded. For example, according to 
Steven Hook and John Spanier in American Foreign Policy Since World War II: 
After Germany’s second defeat in 1945, the Russian threat reemerged. Already the 
heartland power, Soviet Russia extended its arms into the center of Europe, reclaimed its 
dominant positions in northern China, and sought to exploit weaknesses along its 
southern border from Turkey to Pakistan. Thus one reason for post-war conflict was 
geopolitical: Russian land power expanded.24 
 
Hence, the expansion of Russian land power certainly would qualify as an existential 
threat, for it was not an imagined perception, but a tangible, and perhaps measurable, 
phenomenon. Indeed, many other facts and events substantiate U.S. fears. For example, 
Lundestad contends that “The Soviet Union was a superpower primarily in one field, and that 
was in terms of military strength, especially the number of men under arms.”25 Furthermore, 
according to David Painter in The Cold War: An International History, following World War II, 
U.S. efforts to rebuild Europe through the “Marshal Plan” were combatted by the U.S.S.R.26 
Also, the Western European communists attempted to disrupt the Marshal Plan, while the 
                                                 
23 Lundestad, Geir. Major Developments in International Politics: 1945-1986. Stavanger: Norwegian University Press, 1986. p. 18. 24 Hook, Steven W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010. p. 41. 25 Ibid.  26 Painter, David S. The Cold War: An international history. London: Routledge, 1999. p. 22. 
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U.S.S.R. imposed “a blockade on all land and water routes to Berlin (June 1948-May 1949) to 
protest Western plans to unify and rebuild the three Western zones of Germany.”27 Indeed, 
Painter concludes that “both actions increased Western suspicions of Soviet intentions.”28  
 The U.S. also became increasingly alarmed by a series of communist-inspired revolutions 
that transpired worldwide beginning in the mid-1940s that continued into the early 1950s: the 
Greek and Turkish episodes in the mid-1940s, in which communists threatened the security of 
both states; the Soviet backed uprisings in Northern Iran in the mid-1940s29; the communist coup 
in Czechoslovakia backed by the U.S.S.R. in 1948; the fall of China in 1949; and the Korean 
War, beginning in 1950. Also, in 1950, the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China 
concluded a mutual defense treaty.30 Moreover, five years later, in 1955, the Warsaw Pact was 
formed, which “created a joint military command” in control of various communist-run states 
(The Warsaw Pact’s counterpart was the U.S. led coalition: NATO. Axelrod contends that “the 
creation of   NATO and the Warsaw Pact hardened hostile divisions of sides in the Cold War”). 
31 Yet, even further evidence demonstrates that U.S. policy makers had solid footing for 
considering the U.S.S.R., and thereby, communism, as a serious threat. For example, another 
source of U.S. anxiety was the authoritarian nature of Joseph Stalin’s regime, which committed 
vast human rights violations against Soviet citizens within the borders of the U.S.S.R. Caroline 
Kennedy-Pipe argues, in The Origins of the Cold War, that in discussing the origins of U.S. 
anxiety toward the Soviet Union “we cannot and should not be blinded to the great brutality that 
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Stalin’s regime and that of his successor Nikita Khrushchev visited upon the peoples of Eastern 
and Central Europe.”32 
The mounting tensions for U.S.-Soviet relations also resulted from the “arms race,” in 
which both nations built expansive nuclear arsenals to combat each other’s nuclear dominance.33 
The U.S.S.R.’s first successful test of a nuclear bomb occurred in August of 1949.34 Kennedy-
Pipe argues that “it was the Soviet creation of a hydrogen bomb in August 1953, one year after 
American success in this area that really marked its arrival as a superpower at least in nuclear 
terms.”35 According to Dan Lindley & Kevin Clemency, in “Low-cost nuclear arms races,” from 
1951 to 1965 “the United States and the Soviet Union produced a total of 37,737 nuclear 
weapons (31,613 for the United States and 6,124 for the Soviet Union.)”36 The following chart37 
portrays the nuclear arms buildup in the United States from 1951 to 1965:  
 
Figure 2: Gross Increase in Nuclear Weapons Per Year 
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In total, all of these events—the U.S.S.R.’s expansion of territory, Soviet resistance to the 
Marshal plan, world-wide communist revolutions, the authoritarian nature of Stalin’s regime, and 
the arms race— confirms that the fears of U.S. policy makers were substantial and based on hard 
evidence. However, it is interesting to note that the U.S. produced five times as many nuclear 
weapons from 1951 to 1965 than the U.S.S.R. Thus, once again, although the threat was not 
unfounded, was it exaggerated?  
2.3 CONTAINMENT: THE BEGINNING 
In reaction to the international political context and the threat that U.S. policy makers believed 
the U.S.S.R. and communism posed, the policy of containment was born on February 22, 1946, 
when George Kennan, an expert on the U.S.S.R. and a junior diplomat at the American Embassy 
in Moscow, forwarded a telegram to Washington that reflected on his view of the U.S.S.R’s 
growing power and its role in international relations. The telegram summarized Kennan’s view 
that, like former Prime Minister Churchill, Ambassador Harriman, and President Truman, the 
U.S.S.R. and communism were the preeminent threats to U.S interests. Thereafter, in July 1947, 
in Foreign Affairs, Kennan published “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which was originally 
titled “X” article and effectively outlined the original telegram. In these documents and in 
response to the threat that Kennan believed that the U.S.S.R. and communism  posed, he argued 
for “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront Russia with unalterable counterforce at 
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every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable 
world.”38  
According to Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor for President Nixon, 
Kennan’s policy recommendations originated from deep-rooted beliefs: “For Kennan, 
communist ideology was at the heart of Stalin’s approach to the world. Stalin regarded the 
Western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile.”39 Also, according to Kissinger, Kennan further 
believed that the Kremlin sought to expand its territory as a result of Stalin’s increased sense of 
paranoia and that Soviet policy was “to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny 
available to it in the basin of world power.”40  Kenneth Jenson argues that “[Kennan] painted a 
dark picture of a Soviet Union ‘fanatically committed to the belief that with the U.S. there can be 
no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our 
society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state 
broken if Soviet Power is to be secure.’”41 
2.4 THE VAGUE AND ABSTRACT NATURE OF KENNAN’S POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
Nevertheless, Kennan’s policy recommendations failed to explicitly define what the term 
counterforce meant. In fact, my survey of Kennan’s article as a whole reveals that he never 
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explicitly defined how communism  would, in practice, be contained, but, rather, simply 
explained that it should be contained, thus, leaving much of his theory open to interpretation. In 
his book George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, Wilson 
Miscamble agrees with my survey and argues: 
Containment as expressed in the “X” article represented no more than a broad approach. 
It was not a prescription for policy. It did not outline in any detail exactly what the U.S. 
should do. The temptation to characterize Kennan as a Moses-type  figure descending to 
give the law of containment over to a disoriented group of  American policymakers 
should be resisted. Others would play a role in defining and  fleshing out 
containment and the doctrine would come to be understood only  in light of these 
actions.42 
2.5 U.S. POLICY MAKERS AND THE AMERICA PUBLIC’S PERSPECTIVE OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LEGAL-MORALISM: 
Yet, before understanding how U.S. policy makers interpreted the containment policy and 
defined it through action, it is important to understand how U.S. policy makers and the general 
U.S. citizenry viewed international relations at this time and, also, how sensitive they were to 
communism. As argued in my introduction, these beliefs determined how U.S. policy makers 
reacted to world events.   
Jonathan Knight, in George Frost Kennan and the Study of American Foreign Policy: 
Some Critical Comments, argues that American Foreign policy was evolving through a 
“legalistic-moralistic” approach to international politics: an approach that “attempts to substitute 
moral judgment for calculations of the national interest and legal norms for the precarious 
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relations between states.”43 Michael Polley clarifies the “legal-moralistic approach” in A 
Biography of George F. Kennan and contends: 
According to Kennan, most American’s assumed that the legal principles that had 
provided such great stability in American domestic politics could also bring stability to 
international relations…aggressors  and victims, for instance, would be clearly 
defined…In addressing the moralistic component of the American approach to 
international relations, Kennan focused on twentieth-century diplomacy…Ever since the 
first half of the nineteenth century, Americans exhibited a passionate tendency to 
embrace “good” liberation movements and their struggle against “evil” tyrants.44 
 
According to Jerel Rosati and James Scott, in The Politics of United States Foreign 
Policy, what Jonathan Night labeled a “legal-moralistic” was synonymous with “Cold War 
internationalism.” Rosati et al., contend that “Cold War internationalists saw a conflict-ridden, 
bipolar world that pitted the Soviet Union and communism against the United States and 
democracy.”45 Furthermore, Rosati et al. argue:  
One common tendency in world politics…is for the mind to form beliefs and schemas of 
the “other.” The enemy image—according to which “we are good” and “they are bad”—
may be the most simpleminded image of all. Such is the image of the  Soviet Union 
and communism that most Americans acquired during the Cold War. Once formed, such 
an image of the enemy tends to be very rigid and resistant to  change. 46 
 
Perhaps most importantly, according to Kennan (following his service as a foreign 
diplomat) in his personal Memoirs: 1925-1950, published in 1967:  
On many occasions…I have been struck by the congenital aversion of Americans to 
taking specific decisions on specific problems, and by their persistent urge to seek 
universal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify particular actions…to this 
day I am uncertain as to the origins of this persistent American urge to universalization or 
generalization of decision. It was not enough for us, when  circumstances forced us into 
World War I, to hold in view the specific reasons for our entry: our War effort had to be 
clothed in the form of an effort to make the  world  (nothing less) ‘safe for 
democracy’…we did not feel comfortable until we had wrapped our military effort in the 
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wholly universalistic—and largely meaningless—generalities. Something to this 
compulsion became apparent in the post War period in the  tendency of many Americans 
to divide the world neatly into Communist and “free world” components, to avoid 
recognition of specific differences among countries on either side, and to search for 
general formulas to govern our relations with the one or the other.47 
2.6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGAL-MORALISTIC PERSPECTIVE:  
As a result of U.S. policy makers’ and citizens’ perspectives on international relations in the 
post- World War II period, from 1945 through the mid-1950s, Walter Lippmann and Hans 
Morgenthau, in 1947, denounced “the sweeping implications of the containment formula” 
believing that containment entailed commitments without proper limits to U.S. action. 48 
Lippmann and Morgenthau argued that the policy of containment prescribed an unconditional 
U.S. response to “communist threats.” Therefore, they contended that the policy oversimplified 
the complexity of the “communist problem” and one universal answer would never suffice, much 
like one key does not fit all locks.  According to Jerry Sanders, in Breaking out of the 
Containment Syndrome: “those who recommended a course of moderate containment argued for 
measured and reasonable means to achieve ends based on irrational and totalistic premises.”49    
 In an attempt to combat the legal-moralistic perspective, “Morgenthau appealed to the 
American public to forget about ‘the crusading notion that any nation, however virtuous and 
powerful, can have the mission to make the world over in its own image.”50 According to Polley, 
“Kennan [like Lippmann and Morgenthau] turned to the question of how to impose a realist 
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perspective that would modify the shortcomings of legal-moralism, his suggestions were brief, 
but the introduced theme that would recur constantly in his diplomatic writings…a rejection of 
the universal application of American values.”51 
 It might be said that Kennan, Lippman, and Morgenthau were idealizing sentiments that 
were ahead of their time because, as will shortly be discussed, their sentiments were greatly 
accepted by U.S. policy makers and the U.S. citizenry by the 1970s. Nonetheless, from 1944 
through the early 1960s, the legal-moralistic perspective dominated the psyche of U.S. policy 
makers and American citizens.   
2.7 AN ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERAL-CONSERVATISM CONSENSUS AND A 
DEFINING OF KENNAN’S ORIGINAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The legal-moralistic perspective was not limited to one faction or another. Indeed, liberals and 
conservatives alike viewed the world in the legal-moralistic and bi-polar way and sought to 
combat communism wherever it arose. Rosati, et al. contends:  
During the Cold War years, according to Godfrey Hodgson, in America in Our 
Time,  “a strange hybrid, liberal conservatism, blanketed the scene and muffled 
the debate.” The two major aspects of the liberal-conservative were, first, belief in 
a democratic-capitalistic political economy based on private enterprise and, 
second, the fear of communism. Thus, the foreign policy consensus behind 
containing the  threat of Soviet communism abroad was part of a larger ideological 
consensus in  American society.52 
 
Godfrey similarly argues that “since the [anti-communist] consensus had made converts 
on the Right as well as on the Left, only a handful of dissidents were excluded from the Big 
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Tent: Southern diehards, rural reactionaries, the more…paranoid fringes of radical Right, and the 
divided remnants of the old, Marxist, Left.”53 Moreover, Rosati, et al. reports: 
Ideological anticommunism became the glue that bound the consensus among liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives, especially within the elite public. In the words of David 
Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest, “It was an ideological and bipartisan 
movement; it enjoyed the support of the press, of the churches, of Hollywood. There was 
stunningly little debate or sophistication of the levels of  anti-communism. It was 
totally centrist and politically safe; anything else was  politically dangerous. These 
ideological and foreign policy beliefs provided the  foundation for the rise of the national 
security and free market ethos that prevailed in the minds of policy-makers during the 
Cold War years.54   
2.8 THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATS:  
Although a general anti-communist consensus existed, according to distinguished political 
scientist David Cuate, in The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and 
Eisenhower, “in practical terms, in terms of willingness to commit funds, material, even men, to 
the new global policy of ‘containing’ Soviet power, the Fair Deal Democrats of the Truman era 
easily outstripped their Republican critics.” 55 Likewise, Charles DeBenedetti argues in 
“Educators and Armaments in Cold War America”: 
Antirevisionist liberals, fearful of a return to a post-World War I pattern of 
 isolationist pacifism, resorted to a militant, interventionist nationalism which they 
 subconsciously pawned off as idealistic internationalism. These War liberals, who 
 previously championed a leftist cause, were now competing with conservatives for 
 leadership in the battle against communism.”56 
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To the same end, Rosati, et al. contend that “most liberals became strong advocates of 
anti-communism and containment during the late 1940s and 1950s, as Democrats concluded 
‘that never again could they afford to expose their foreign policy to the charge that it was soft on 
communism.’”57 Nonetheless, Rosati, et al., report that “…conservatism and the political right 
were instrumental in pushing society to the right and providing conditions for the establishment 
of a liberal-conservative consensus.”58  
2.9 THE CONTAINMENT POLICY IN ACTION AND THE FURTHER DEFINING 
OF THE “COMMUNIST THREAT”: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE.  
Although it is vital to understand how all walks of American society castigated communism in 
the 1950s, it is equally important to consider how the anti-communist liberal-conservative 
atmosphere and the legal-moralistic approach to international relations would affect U.S. policy 
action in the name of the containment policy. According to my survey, for many U.S. policy 
makers and American citizens, because the threat of communism  was so universal and so feared, 
policy makers interpreted Kennan’s original term counterforce to mean the use of U.S. military 
force and U.S. economic aid to fight the spread of communism  at every point that it arose (such 
a conclusion, according to Sander’s, was not what Kennan originally had in mind, which appears 
logical considering his realist approach to international relations that I have touched upon).59  
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Such a perspective was guided, and perhaps cultivated, by President Harry Truman’s 
“Truman Doctrine” speech on March 12, 194760: “It must be the policy of the United States to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressure.”61 President Truman subsequently contended:  
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of 
several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at 
a number of points… Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and 
self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance.62 
 
Indeed, President Truman’s stance and the employment of U.S. assistance to Greece and 
Turkey set precedence for future actions in the name of the containment policy by articulating 
how Kennan’s counterforce would be interpreted, especially when President Truman argued that 
all international “communist threats” had to be met with U.S. military force, or at least, U.S. 
economic intervention, at every geographical point that the threats arose. To this end, according 
to Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “In November 1947, Truman asked a special session of Congress to 
approve emergency legislation of some $600 million; the alternative he claimed was a 
Communist Europe.”63  
Although specific U.S. actions were employed in Greece and Turkey—such as the 
assistance of American officers and direct financial aid64—the true purpose of the Truman 
doctrine, according to Axelrod, in The Real History of The Cold War, was to take a “precedent 
setting ideological stand.” Axelrod appears to be, at least, partially correct: On July 19, 1948, 
President Truman reflected (in his diary) upon his formulation of the Truman doctrine speech 
and reported that one specific line in the speech read: “I believe that it should be the policy of the 
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United States.” Truman concluded that the line was “halfhearted” and, thus, exclaimed, “…I 
took my pencil, scratched out ‘should’ and wrote ‘must.’” He explained: “I wanted no hedging in 
this speech. This was America’s answer to the surge of expansion of Communist tyranny. It had 
to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.”65  
2.10 ANOTHER DOSE OF KENNAN’S CONTAINMENT THEORY:  
Indeed, Kennan had provided the original “building blocks” and policy recommendations for the 
containment policy in his original “X” article, but a complex molding of the political atmosphere 
within the United States and new policy initiatives, such as the “Truman Doctrine,” applied the 
theoretical policy of containment to specific issues, such as the perceived communist threat in 
Greece and Turkey. Yet, although the Truman doctrine helped define containment, it was still 
based upon the universal premise of stopping communist expansion everywhere. Robert Frazier 
in Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine: “Ironically, universalism later became 
enshrined in public opinion as a fundamental element of American Cold War policy, more as the 
result of Kennan’s own policy recommendations in ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ than 
because of the Truman Doctrine.”66 But, Gati argues that Kennan’s “‘X’ Article—especially 
when read together with the Truman Doctrine—was clearly understood to have signaled the 
assumption of a global or universal task by the United States: the task of opposing Communist 
power everywhere.”67 Regardless of who was more influential— in creating the anti-communist 
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liberal-conservative consensus and legal-moralistic perspective on international relations— both 
Kennan’s article and President Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” were major cornerstones of U.S. 
foreign policy evolution.  
2.11 FURTHER ACTION IN THE NAME OF CONTAINMENT: BUILDING U.S. 
DEFENSES AND “MAKING FRIENDS.” 
Further characterizing the exceptional anti-communist political atmosphere in the United States 
from 1944 to 1954 and in the same month of the Truman doctrine speech, Congress passed the 
National Security Act to form new government agencies that would fight communism both 
domestically and internationally. Paterson, et al., contend that the act “streamlined the military 
establishment…created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC) to 
advise the president, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather and collate 
information.”68 Furthermore, Axelrod argues: 
Unifying what were now three armed services under a single department was more than 
an administrative gesture. It was intended to transform the military into a thoroughly 
coordinated global force under the direct and immediate control of the 
president…Truman’s understanding that, pursuant to his “containment policy”, the U.S. 
military would have to be deftly used on a regular basis as a political instrument  to help 
resolve a number of conflicts arising from communist expansive aggression anywhere in 
the world. 69 
 
Moreover, in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed, in 
direct response to the Czechoslovakia coup in 1948 and the U.S.S.R. blockade of Berlin from 
1948 to 1949, which according to Wayne McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, in The World Since 
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1945: A History of International Relations, was “an alliance that boxed in the Soviet Union 
along its western flank.”70 They argue that NATO was “the military equivalent of the Marshal 
Plan, designed to extend U.S. protection to its allies in Western Europe…Ultimately, it brought 
U.S. air power and nuclear weapons to bear as the primary means to prevent the Soviet Union 
from using its large land forces against West Germany.”71  
2.12 THE BEGINNING OF THE DOMESTIC PURGE OF COMMUNISM.  
Opposing communism everywhere also included the purging of the communist party within the 
United States.  On March 22, 1947, only ten days after the Truman Doctrine was issued, 
President Truman enacted Executive order 9835. In effect, the order created “government review 
boards” that evaluated the “loyalty” of government employees (i.e. to insure they were not 
communists). Albert Fried, editor of McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare, contends 
that the review boards were formed, in part, as President Truman’s reaction to charges brought 
by the Republican party that he was “soft” on communism.72 Indeed, Fried contends that the 
creation of the review boards were the first step in the subsequent American purge of 
communism throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s (both in the U.S. government and 
American society as a whole).73  
Yet, we may question how the review boards impacted government employees. 
According to Griffin Fariello in Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition:  
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Government workers possessed no right to their jobs, that if found disloyal… The 
government review boards] task was to remove Communists. The trouble was that 
Communists were universally acknowledged to be devilishly clever at hiding their 
identities; they did not belong to “subversive” organizations; they could be anyone, 
indistinguishable from the neighbor next door. It was therefore necessary  to seek 
information about suspects from any source, however dubious, and lay the burden of 
proof on them: they had to establish their innocence…The Truman  Doctrine, it will be 
remembered, condemned Communism everywhere  because its adherents subverted their 
governments for the sake of Soviet expansion and conquest. Such being the internal 
danger, it logically followed, all public agencies, state and local, and private institutions 
too for that matter, must create their own loyalty review boards, with or without even the 
modicum of due process that the Truman one did. 74 
 
In this light, Fried reports the experience of a government employee: “The employee in 
this case was a proof reader at the Government Printing Office and had been employed at the job 
for over seven years.” Yet, the government reported: “Specifically, it is charged that you 
continued sympathetic association with a known Communist, read Communist literature and 
made pro-Communist Statements.” Consequently, “the employee was suspended 
immediately.”75  
Also, alongside the creation of the review boards, various bureaucracies, as well as 
Congress, enacted other methods to purge communism from the United States, which, once 
again, epitomizes the extreme hatred of communism and the anti-communist liberal conservative 
consensus in the late 1940s and early 1950s. For example, legislation such as the Taft-Hartley 
Act, passed on June 23, 1947, sought to purge communists from American trade unions. 76 
According to Phillip Deery in “‘A blot upon liberty’: McCarthyism, Dr. Barsky and the Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee”: 
A range of government agencies whose combined force was formidable [in the anti-
communist fight]. The agencies…were the Attorney General’s Department, the Board of 
Regents of the New York State Department of Education, the House Un-American 
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Activities Committee, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Bureau, 
the Treasury Department, the Subversive Activities Control Board and the State 
Department. They were not necessarily working in unison nor were their different roles 
and activates coordinated.77 
 
 In a similar fashion to the way the “review boards” had scrutinized government 
employees, public figures were also investigated.  For example, The House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC), formed through a congressional vote on January 3, 1945, 
investigated and indicted several Hollywood actors, known as the “Hollywood Ten,” in 1947, on 
communist charges. Arthur Eckstein, in “The Hollywood Ten in History and Memory,” contends 
that “HUAC pursued a series of official inquiries into the penetration of the film industry in 
Hollywood by the Communist Party of the United States of America. There were major public 
hearings in 1947 and 1951.”78 Eckstein further argues that as a result of the communist charges, 
the film industry placed actors on a “Blacklist”: a list banning the actors from work. Eckstein 
reports that “the Blacklist functioned in part officially, as shown by the joint public 
announcement of the motion picture firms in November 1947 that henceforth no studio would 
knowingly employ any member of the Communist Party…The blacklist often functioned in 
secret: jobs just dried up.”79  
Likewise, professors and students of major universities were scrutinized under the anti-
communist lens. Kovel reports:  
FBI agents were indeed snooping in American colleges during the inquisition. In fact, by 
formal arrangement the Bureau, no fewer than fifty-six universities had agents stationed 
on campuses, including the whole Ivy League (save brown), MIT, Johns Hopkins, 
Stanford, Michigan, Chicago, UCLA, and the University of Berkeley, in word, the “best” 
schools. 
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The “snooping” and “investigating” clearly had no limit. As my survey indicates, all 
suspicions were carefully analyzed. 
2.13 NSC-68: FURTHER DEFINING THE “COMMUNIST THREAT”: 
Simultaneously, along the foreign policy front, Truman intensified his anti-communist resolve in 
January of 1950, when he ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. military and foreign policy.80 
The review resulted in a government report: NSC-68, published on April 14, 1950, otherwise 
known as the “Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on ‘United States Objectives for 
National Security.’” NSC-68 further characterizes the extreme anxiety that U.S. policy makers 
were experiencing. According to Paterson, “Paul Nitze, who replaced Kennan as head of the 
Policy Planning Staff, wrote most of NSC-68.”81 Thus, Kennan was not as integral to the policy 
making process as he had been previously. Indeed, by the spring of 1950s, Kennan felt totally 
shut out of the American policymaking process.”82  An excerpt from NSC-68 characterizes the 
reports extreme position:  
The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its 
fundamental design…At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men’s 
minds, the conflict is world-wide. At the political and economic level, within states and 
in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the 
military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of 
peace, although using its vast force to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an 
aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in 
favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being 
pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, 
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and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our 
purpose. 83 
 
Paragraphs later, the document explains the view of U.S. policy makers regarding “Soviet 
Intentions and Capabilities:” 
The Kremlin’s design for world domination begins at home…The massive fact of the 
iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political 
purges within the U.S.S.R, and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD are evidence that 
the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that ‘the entire coercive force of the 
Socialist state’ is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over ‘the 
economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people.’84 
 
In reference to the Kremlin’s view on the United States, NSC-68 argues:  
With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin’s strategic and tactical policy 
is affected by its estimate that we are not only the  greatest immediate obstacle which 
stands between it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release 
forces in the free and Soviet worlds, which could destroy  it. The Kremlin’s policy 
toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend  of hatred and fear. Its 
strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex forces in this country, and 
in the rest of the free world, on which our power  is based…The capabilities of the 
Soviet world are being exploited to the full because  the Kremlin is inescapably militant. 
It is inescapably militant because it possesses  and is possessed by a world-wide 
revolutionary movement, because it is the interior of Russian imperialism and because it 
is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis,  conflict and expansion are the 
essence of the Kremlin’s militancy.85 
 
The document finally touches upon the communist role in the Kremlin:  
Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret policy, are an 
outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed 
to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act  abroad as an 
instrument of propaganda, subversion, and espionage…the party, the police and the 
conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to  create an overall 
impression of irresistible Soviet power among people of the free  world.86 
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Furthermore, Polley contends that “NSC-68 placed great emphasis on Soviet Military 
aggression, and predicted that the greatest chance for war would occur in 1954. In order to deter 
the Russians, NSC-68 recommended that the defense budget be tripled, and that a campaign to 
assert the political superiority of Western Values was necessary.”87 Likewise, Richard Melanson 
and David Mayers, in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American foreign policy in the 1950s, contend 
that NSC 68 “urged the adoption of a strategy geared to defend all American interests through 
the application of appropriate military force.”88 
Like Article “X” and the Truman Doctrine, Richard Immerman, in his book The CIA in 
Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, argues that NSC-68 was founded on the basic 
premise that “The world was divided into two antithetical camps, led by the United States and 
the Soviet Union.”89 Paterson, et al. also contend that “The document treated communism as a 
monolith, ignoring differences within the communist community. It spoke of the ‘free world,’ 
overlooking the many undemocratic nations allied with the United States. It made sweeping 
assumptions about Soviet motives and capabilities without evidence. The report, in short, 
exaggerated the ‘threat.’”90 In a similar light, according to Melanson, et al: “In short, NSC 68 
defined the Soviet Union essentially as a moral problem [(i.e. legal moralistic perspective)] so 
immense that traditional geopolitical calculations had lost all relevance.”91 The interpretations of 
NSC 68 suggest that it characterized and hyper-emphasized virtually every fear that Kennan’s 
original “X” article had articulated three years prior, but also perpetuated the anti-communist 
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liberal conservatism consensus and legal-moralistic perspective on international relations. 
Indeed, by 1950, the fear of communism had grown.  
2.14 U.S. PRESIDENTS AGREE WITH NSC-68: “UNIVERSAL CONCEPTIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS” AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. 
GOVERNMENT.  
Several of the Cold War Presidents, including Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson 
shared in the perspective outlined by NSC-68: a bi-polar world, in which the U.S. was “good” 
and the U.S.S.R. “bad.” 92 According to J. Philipp Rosenberg, in “Presidential Beliefs and 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Continuity during the Cold War Era”: (1) President Truman 
held the belief that the U.S. had to react to every instance of Soviet aggression93; (2) Likewise, 
President Eisenhower also lamented that “communism is an ideology that seeks to defeat us by 
every possible means.”94 Furthermore, Eisenhower endorsed the domino theory that if one 
instance of communist aggression succeeded more would follow: “You have a row of dominoes 
set up, you knock over the first one, and…the last one…will go over very quickly”95 (3) Finally, 
President Johnson reported that “the existence of totalitarian Communist power in much of the 
Eurasian landmass-power that continuously threaten to disrupt such order as the world has 
managed to achieved.”96 In summary, Rosenberg concludes, in unison with the legal-moralistic 
conception of international relations, that “all [three Presidents] believed that American foreign 
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policy, like domestic politics, should be played according to moral rules [(i.e. “good” versus 
“evil”)].”97  
2.15 THE COMMUNIST SCARE AND HYSTERIA OF THE 1950S—DOMESTIC 
CONTAINMENT: 
In light of the general anti-communist political atmosphere that surrounded the post-War period, 
from 1944 to 1954, by the early 1950s, America was fully enveloped in the domestic fight 
against communism.98 As was experienced in the late 1940s, anti-communist legislation was 
proposed to stem the “communist threat.” According to Michael Ybarra, in Washington Gone 
Crazy: Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American Communist Hunt, on September 5, 1950, 
Pat McCarran, the democratic Senator from Nevada, spoke in front of the Senate and “explained 
how Congress had spent years drafting and redrafting [anti-communist] legislation.”99 Ybarra 
contends that a final bill—called the “Internal Security Act”— was a combination of several 
previous bills and mandated (among other initiatives): “Communist and front groups register 
with the government and label their literature as propaganda, that Communists not hold passports 
or government jobs, and the new crime of committing any act that might contribute to the 
establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States.”100 In short, and from a far 
removed perspective, the bill was a blatant disregard for the Bill of Rights, a conversation that 
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moves beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, the extreme nature of the bill still highlights that the 
anti-communist political atmosphere and the extensive measures that U.S. policy makers were 
willing to take in the name of containment from 1947 through 1954  
Part and parcel of the government investigations in the late 1940s and early 1950s was 
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s rise to prominence in American politics. Specifically, McCarthy, 
originally elected in the 1946 Congressional elections, emerged as the preeminent “cold 
warrior.” On February 9, 1950, in Wheeling, West Virginia, McCarthy announced “I have a list 
of 205… a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the 
Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State 
Department.”101 In the same speech, McCarthy reported that the Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had supported communists: “He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral 
uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers, are swept 
from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in 
government.”102 Henceforth, the phenomenon known as “McCarthyism” became the new label 
for anti-communism in the United States.  
Ellen Schrecker, in “McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism,” 
argues that McCarthyism originated in Washington: “The federal government was the crucial 
actor here; its activities transformed the Communist party from an unpopular political group into 
a perceived threat to the American way of life.”103 Fried reports:  
In the early 1950s America’s endemic hatred of Communism turned into the great 
American red scare. It was the trauma of those years that led the public to demand a 
response by government and throughout the nation of the radical kind McCarthy  was 
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identified with. So it was that the repression that had begun rather tentatively when the 
Cold War got under way increasingly took on the aspect of a generalized inquisition. And 
in doing so—to repeat the point often made here—it in fact exacerbated the fear that 
called forth and which it was supposed to assuage.104 
 
Likewise, Paterson describes: 
The demagogic McCarthy was the “creature” not the “creator” of the 1950s Red Scare. 
But as the journalist Cabell Phillips wrote, McCarthy “spit in the eye of constituted 
authority, undermined public confidence in the government and leaders,  and tore at the 
nation’s foreign policy with indiscriminate ferocity of a bulldozer. He used lies, slander, 
and innuendo to smash his opponents and to build his own image  of invincibility.’  
 
To the same effect, according to Joel Kovel, in Red Hunting in the Promised Land: “Joe 
McCarthy may not have been the real issue in McCarthyism, but he was not incidental to it 
either. The inquisition was expressed through him, and his character was its embodiment.”105 
Kovel later argues, “McCarthy was a demagogue who tapped deeply the underside of the 
national psyche.”106 
McCarthyism was not simply a one man show, but a general sentiment in government, 
and ultimately, throughout the United States. On March 20, 1954, Carey McWilliams, in his 
editorial Crisis in the G.O.P, published in The Nation, argued that even if McCarthy was 
“repudiated” or silenced, others likeminded politicians would remain who embodied McCarthy’s 
political philosophy. Thus, McWilliams concludes that “‘McCarthyism’ merely highlights a 
division which would still exist if Joe were to drop dead.”107 Such an assertion appears correct, 
for individuals, such as John Foster Dulles, who briefly held a senatorial seat in 1949 and later 
became a pivotal actor in the Eisenhower administration’s “Cold War foreign policy team” as the 
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Secretary of State, mirrored McCarthy’s anti-communist ideology. To illustrate this point, prior 
to Dulles’ service as the Secretary of State, he published War and Peace in 1950 and contended:  
Soviet Communism has a creed, a creed of world-wide import. It is a creed in which the 
hard core of Party members believes fanatically, and which they are spreading with 
missionary zeal throughout the world…. There is no nook or cranny in all the world into 
which Communist influence does not penetrate. When the Politburo is making policies it 
does not say there is no use having a policy for Guatemala or the Union of South Africa 
or the United States or Indonesia because they are too far way and cannot be reached by 
the Red Army or by economic subsidy.108  
 
But, as argued, it was not as if McCarthy and Dulles’ stance on communism was a 
minority perspective in the early 1950s. In fact, according to David Oshinskiy in A Conspiracy 
So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy, apart from the disposition of government officials, the 
American public was also indoctrinated in anti-communism: 
Given the alternatives, most everyone lined up behind the hometown skunk-hunter… 
“Yes,” a farmer told [a reporter], “I guess almost everybody in this part of the country is 
for McCarthy. He’s against Communism —and we’re against Communism.” Said 
another, “I don’t care what Joe has or hasn’t done, he’s against Communism.” A young 
woman in Milwaukee put it this way: “I don’t like McCarthy and I don’t think I would 
ordinarily vote for him, but if he’s beat it would look like a victory for Communism. 109 
In fact, the Doolittle Commission, a government committee that aimed to prevent 
congressional oversight of the CIA,110 supported the anti-communist indoctrination of American 
citizens. In 1954, it released the “so-called Doolittle Report,” and argued:  
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world 
domination by whatever means and by whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. 
Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to 
survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must 
develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, 
sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective 
methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people 
be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant 
philosophy.111 
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As a result of McCarthyism, and the plurality of government actions that had commenced 
prior to McCarthy, any stance opposed to anti-communism was stigmatized and perhaps 
politically unwise. For example, although Paul H. Douglas was a prominent liberal senator 
during the early 1950s and disagreed with McCarthy (and who was described by historian Allida 
Black as “a man whose credentials for liberalism and integrity were heretofore impeccable”), 
Douglass, nonetheless, would not oppose McCarthy publicly because it was politically risky to 
do so.112 Above all, with all of the facts I have presented, anti-communism was exceptionally 
entrenched in American Society. 
2.16 “NEW LOOK” (NSC 162/2): FURTHER DEFINING THE CONTAINMENT 
POLICY 
As the anti-communist political atmosphere became increasingly hysterical, yet another 
government report further defined how the U.S. would respond to communist threats on the 
international scene. According to Nick Cullather, in Secret History: The CIA’s Classified 
Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954: 
In the summer of 1953, the new President encouraged his advisers to revise their 
strategies for fighting the Cold War. In a series of discussion, known as the Solarium 
talks, administration officials explored ways to fulfill Eisenhower’s promises to seize the 
initiative in the global struggle against Communism…The result was NSC 162/2, a 
policy known to the public as the “New Look.” It stressed the need for a cheaper, more 
effective military striking force that would rely more on mobility, nuclear intimidation, 
and allied armies. The new policy placed a greater emphasis on covert action. 
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Eisenhower saw clandestine operations as an inexpensive alternative to military 
intervention113 
 
Yet, what must be noted is that according to Crockatt, in the Fifty Year War, the “New 
Look” policy was the Eisenhower’s administrations reaction to “the supposed negativity and 
passivism of Truman’s containment. Containment held out no hope for rolling back communism 
or creating peace.”114 In other words, the Eisenhower administration believed that 
“containment,” as it had been employed through 1953, was not pro-active in “rolling back” 
communism, but simply hoped to contain it. Thus, the “New Look” program sought to not only 
prevent the spread of communism by halting new communist outgrowths from occurring, but 
also sought push back against communism altogether, rather than simply maintaining the status 
quo balance of power. Crockatt argues that “Taken at face value, the New Look represented a 
radical break with the Truman Years.”115 Still, Crocket highlights that “containment remained 
the cornerstone of U.S. policy.” 116 
2.17 A CHANGE IN TIDES— AWAY FROM MCCARTHYISM:  
Nonetheless, although the anti-communist sentiment had dominated the post-World War II era, 
and although U.S. efforts to stop the spread of communism remained a focal point of U.S. 
foreign policy, McCarthyism and the extreme anti-communist political atmosphere was called 
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into question in the mid-1950s. Several specific events proved to be key turning points.  For 
example, according to George Hodak in “June 9, 1954: the Army-McCarthy hearings”:  
As chair of the Committee on Government Operations, Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy 
cast a wide net in his manic quest to root out subversive elements in government. By the 
fall of 1953, he was investigating vague and varied evidence that the U.S. Army was 
"coddling Communists," a charge Secretary of Defense Charles  Wilson dismissed as 
"damn tommyrot." On March 11, 1954, the Army fired back,  alleging that 
McCarthy and his chief counsel, Roy Cohn, had sought an Army  commission and other 
favors for David Schine, a recent draftee and close friend of Cohn's.117 
 
Hodak contends that subsequent televised senatorial hearings investigated McCarthy’s 
claims. The hearings, according to Michael Gauger in “Flickering Images: Live Television 
Coverage and Viewership of the Army-McCarthy Hearings,” offered:  
The first protracted and televised look at the senator by a national audience…Convened 
on 22 April, 1954, the hearings would be the subject of 18 meetings, followed by a one-
week recess, and 18 more sessions, ending on June 24; in all, they would preempt 35 
days of regular telecasts and consume around 187  hours of airtime118 
 
Guager reports that Newsweek declared: 
 
It seemed that little else was talked about. From coast to coast—in homes, bars, clubs, 
offices, even in GI day rooms—men and women clustered around television sets to watch 
the developing battle between Sen. Joseph McCarthy and the Army  officials. . . . 
And while they looked, they argued among themselves. Who was lying?  Who was 
telling the truth?119 
 
In reference to the hearings, Hodak reports:  
 
For weeks, [McCarthy] was seen badgering witnesses and brandishing doctored 
documents, often appearing inebriated. * When he impugned Boston lawyer Fred Fisher, 
a colleague of Army counsel Joseph Welch's, Welch (at left) disdained: "Have  you no 
sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?" Welch  walked 
out, leaving a bewildered McCarthy to ask, "What did I do?" 120 
According to Gauger: 
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Accepting the assessments of contemporary observers, much of the historiography 
dealing with McCarthy suggests that the confrontation [with Joseph Welch] was the 
pivotal moment of the nationally telecast hearings. According to this position, with the 
senator’s tactics and behavior exposed to the country, much of the public turned  against 
McCarthy, clearing the way for the Senate to condemn and neutralize him  politically. 121 
Indeed, Hodack argues that “badly damaged personally and politically, McCarthy was 
censured by the Senate, 67-22, on Dec. 2, 1954.”122  
 This is not to say that the general mood in the United State took a “left hand turn” away 
from anti-communism  once McCarthy was silenced, but, merely, that an opposition formed. 
Others were present to move forward in McCarthy’s stead. Turning, once again, to the example 
of Secretary of State Dulles, and perhaps my case study of Guatemala as a whole, on March 8, 
1954, in the midst of the McCarthy hearings, Dulles traveled to Caracas, Venezuela to speak in 
front of the Organization of American States (OAS). In doing so, he contended: “My government 
is well aware of the fact that there are few problems more difficult, few tasks more odious, than 
that of effectively exposing and thwarting the danger of international communism …Today we 
face a new peril that is in many respects greater than any of the perils in the past.”123 It is 
important to highlight that, although Senator McCarthy was losing political favor, Dulles’s 
speech not only mimicked the tone and language of McCarthy’s Wheeling, West Virginia speech 
in 1950—in which McCarthy claimed to have identified 205 communists in the State 
Department—but, also, the speech came only three months prior to Arbenz’s overthrow in  
Guatemala. Hence, anti-communism was still very much on the agenda. Yet, we must also note 
that the forum for Dulles’ speech was in South America and was directed toward foreign—not 
domestic—policy.  
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Domestically, at least, Fried contends that “slowly, almost imperceptibly, resistance to 
McCarthyism began picking up momentum in the mid-1950s.”124 Specifically, Fried contends 
that from 1955 onward, governmental policy and law that had given the anti-communist “witch 
hunts” power was slowly counterbalanced or repealed.125 For example, among many other “roll 
backs” on anti-communist policy (that will not be touched upon but should be noted), the HUAC 
committee’s authority was undercut on June 17, 1957, when a Supreme Court decision in 
Watkins v. United States decided that “from now on Congressional investigative committees 
would have to obey limits defined by the Court.” Consequently, according to Fried, the decision 
“[curtailed] as it did the committee’s punitive authority—the threat of contempt, hence jail, it 
held over the heads of witness who refused to talk on Constitutional grounds other than the Fifth 
Amendment.”126  
2.18 CONTAINMENT BEYOND 1954: 
The retreat of McCarthyism and the domestic “red scare” was also marked by an evolution of the 
containment policy though the 1970s. Nevertheless, the general agenda of containment—halting 
the spread of worldwide communism — remained. Moving forward, however, the question we 
must ask is to what extent did the policy of containment, the legal-moralistic perception of 
international relations, and the anti-communist liberal-conservatism consensus dominate the 
domestic political atmosphere. Moreover, would Kennan’s term counterforce still mean what it 
had in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in the late 1950s through the 1970s? 
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 Indeed, in 1955, U.S. military advisors were sent to Vietnam, marking the beginning of a 
twenty year war, in the name of “rolling back communism.”  Likewise, the Cuban Revolution in 
1958 was met by the subsequent “Bay of Pigs”: a failed invasion by U.S. sponsored “counter-
revolutionaries,” which transpired in April 1961. Moreover, in 1973, as argued, the U.S. 
supported and planned a coup against democratically elected Salvador Allende. In total, it is 
evident that the containment policy did not diverge from the use of intervention as a political 
weapon and, thus, U.S. interventions commenced well after Guatemala in 1954.   
2.19 ECONOMIC CONTAINMENT:  
How then did the theoretical policy of containment change from the post-War period from 1945 
to 1954 through the 1970s? Despite the continued use of force, key developments transpired in 
the 1950s, especially for U.S.-Latin American relations. According to Bevan Sewell in “A 
Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet 
Economic Offensive in Latin America”: “By 1955, both Moscow and Washington were 
beginning to see emerging nations in the Third World as being crucial elements in the next phase 
of the Cold War.”127 As a result, Sewell contends that beginning in the mid-1950s, the U.S.S.R. 
extended diplomatic and financial ties to Latin and South American countries. For example, on 
January 16, 1956, Soviet Premier Nikolai Buganin “offered to expand diplomatic, economic, and 
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cultural relations, extend technical assistance, and conclude training arrangements with Latin 
American nations.”128 
 In response, however, the U.S. sought to meet the Kremlin’s challenge, which as Sewell 
argues: 
Could be rebuffed through a more successful implementation of existing U.S. economic 
policy, a wide-ranging attempt to promote and strengthen the ideal of intrahemispheric 
cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS), and a refined and 
improved form of military assistance. 129 
 
Fully aware of these options, Eisenhower defined his approach to U.S.-Latin American 
relationships on April 12, 1953 before the OAS:  
Ours is an historic and meaningful unity. It is triumphant testimony…that peace and trust 
and fellowship can rule the conduct of all nations…I know that these facts, these simple 
ideals, are not new. But they are given a new, sharp meaning, by the nature of the tension 
tormenting our whole world….I do not think its unjust to claim  for the government 
and the whole of the United States a readiness, rarely matched in history, to help other 
nations improve their living standards and guard their security.130  
 
Furthermore, Sewell also reports:  
 
This ‘new’ approach would  be demonstrated at the Panama American Presidents 
Meeting in the summer of 1956, when Eisenhower would meet with Latin American 
heads of state and propose the formation of an Inter-American Committee of Presidential 
Representatives to discuss hemispheric economic relations.131 
 
Toward this end, economic containment was considered a viable option early on in the 
Cold War, having origins that predated the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz. Yet, a resolve to 
strengthen intra-hemispheric cooperation and bolster military assistance were the key proposals. 
132 
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  However, despite the newfound apparent interest in Latin America, historian Paul 
Sigmund argues in The United States and Democracy in Chile, that the Eisenhower 
administration’s policy toward Chile in the 1950s, which epitomized the general trend for U.S. 
action in Latin America as a whole, limited the economic assistance to Latin America, at least in 
comparison to the later Alliance for Progress:  
The Eisenhower administration (1953-61) resisted pressure from Latin America for 
public assistance for development purposes…U.S. policy toward Chile was largely 
restricted to fostering Chile’s integration into the emerging interamerican security 
system—especially its military aspects.133 
 
Smith similarly argues that “Between 1948 and 1958, under Truman and Eisenhower, 
Latin America received only 2.4 percent of U.S. foreign economic aid. Asked why Washington 
was paying such short shrift to the region, veteran diplomat Louis Halle responded with 
customary candor: ‘The United States no longer desperately needs Latin America.’”134  
Yet, I must highlight that by the end of the Eisenhower administration, Smith reports that 
the percentage of U.S. aid to Latin America had risen to 9 percent.135Thus, the aid had increased 
substantially in relation to years prior. Furthermore, this emphasis on economic and military 
assistance within the 1950s and later in the 60’s—which later became known as 
modernization136— were the first steps U.S. policy makers took towards the more full blown 
policy initiatives that would be seen in the Kennedy administrations Alliance for Progress. 
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2.20 LOVE OF DICTATORSHIPS:  
 By the late 1940’s, coinciding with the increased interest in Latin America, U.S. policy makers 
solidified their support for dictatorships and military governments in the region. This is not to 
say the trend was new. Indeed, according to Peter Smith, in Talons of the Eagle, U.S. policy 
makers sponsored dictatorships in Latin America as early as the 1940s (if not earlier.)137 
Robert Holden, in “Securing Central America Against Communism : The United States 
and the Modernization of Surveillance in the War,” contends the U.S. policy makers further 
solidified their beliefs that dictatorships were the best defense against communism  in the 
Western Hemisphere with the introduction of “modernization,” which Holden defines as  “‘an 
almost unquestioning faith in the desirability of perfecting the technical efficiency of the Central 
American States, not only in the realm of surveillance per se but also more generally in military 
and policy matters.”138 More precisely Holden argues: 
Evidence of the ‘modernization’ ethos emerges again and again in the military 
and diplomatic archival records consulted for this study. Those records indicate that 
while expressing occasional reservations about the institutional characteristics of its client 
states in Central America and acknowledging, from time to time, a preference for ‘free’ 
elections and representative government, Washington demonstrated considerably greater 
enthusiasm for enhancing the technical instruments of rule.139 
 
Moreover, Holden contends:  
In Central America, the consequence of the creation of what have been called 
“national security states have been well documented. Security threats emanating 
from the deteriorating social, political, and economic fabric were largely ignored, 
while democracy itself was defined as a security threat by the military 
governments in power and by their patron in Washington.140 
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Holden, does however, clarify that the general sentiment toward favoring technocratic 
advances over democratic ones was limited at least in rhetoric to the mid and late 1950s.141   
From the perspective of Nelson Rockefeller, the Special Assistant to the President for 
Foreign Affairs under Eisenhower, “Dictators in these countries are a mixed blessing…It is true, 
in the short run, that dictators handle Communist effectively. But in the long run, the U.S. must 
encourage the growth of democracies in Latin America if Communism is to be defeated.”142 
Likewise, Sewell contends that “At the heart of the administration’s policy was the assumption 
that economic modernization would eventually lead to a region that was pro-U.S. and 
democratic.”143 Yet, we must still question how long “the love of dictatorship” would last. As I 
will soon discuss, the trend continued onward into the 1960s under President John Kennedy’s 
Alliance for Progress and even into the presidency of Richard Nixon from 1968 into the 1970s.  
2.21 THE CONTAINMENT POLICY AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:  
Even so, one distinction was clear: under the auspices of modernization U.S. policy maker’s 
favored anti-communist dictatorships, while deploring dictatorships that they deemed to be 
communist. For example, aside from the communist dictatorship in Vietnam, on January 1, 1959 
the Cuban Revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro to the head of state in Cuba alarmed U.S. 
policy makers144  and was a crucial event in Cold War history. According to Political Scientist 
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Paul Sigmund, “The radicalization of the Cuban revolution in 1960 awakened Americans to the 
fact that Latin America existed.”145 Indeed, the Cuban revolution, as I will soon argue, greatly 
influenced the creation of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program in the early 1960s, 
an effort to combat communism through remedying the social and economic inequalities in Latin 
and South America.  
 In the late 1950s, U.S. policy makers saw Fidel Castro’s ascension to power in Cuba as 
major threat. Although the United States initially vacillated on Castro’s communist credentials, 
Don Bohning, in The Castro Obsession, argues that “By the fall of 1959, most U.S. officials had 
been convinced that if he wasn’t Communist, he was increasingly under Communist influence. 
Consequently, on March 17, 1960, Eisenhower approved an elaborate covert operation designed 
to oust him.”146 
Yet, Eisenhower was near the end of his tenure and John F. Kennedy took the reins of the 
Presidency on January 20, 1961. Thereafter, only three months after his inauguration on April 
16, 1961, Kennedy oversaw the covert operation that had been initiated under President 
Eisenhower: the Bay of Pigs. Much can be said about the consequences of this action, but the 
importance for our discussion is the rationale behind it (the issue, throughout this paper, is after 
all the nature of government and the perspective of U.S. policy makers). Specifically, Bohning 
recounts: “Jake Esterline, the CIA’s project chief for the failed Bay of Pigs, summarized in a 
1995 interview….communism was considered the mortal enemy of America, to be confronted at 
every turn.” Moreover, according to Bohner Esterline argued that “Dictators and human rights 
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were secondary considerations. This attitude, in his view, didn’t really change until the last half 
of the 1960s when protests began to build against Vietnam.”147  
Indeed, although the Bay of Pigs failed, the Church Committee Report, which Bohner 
describes as “the most useful and authoritative documents available on not only the assassination 
attempts but also the framework within which they occurred,”148 cited “concrete evidence of at 
least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965.”149 Hence, 
through much of Kennedy’s tenure, the goal to remove Castro remained.150 The trend toward 
exceptional anti-communism, although dissipating domestically in relation to the “McCarthyite-
type communist purges” of the late 1940s and early 1950s, was still a dominant concern in the 
early 1960s for the U.S. policy makers and citizens alike, especially regarding international 
relations.   
2.22  THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:  
Cold-War tensions reached their apex in the fall of 1962. Specifically, on August 29, 1962, an 
American U-2 spy plane discovered surface-to-air missile (SAM) construction site in Cuba.151 In 
a radio and televised report on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation: 
“unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in 
preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to 
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provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.” The President subsequently 
argued: 
The presence of these large, long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass 
destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in 
flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and 
hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter  of the United Nations, 
and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also 
contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately 
delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and 
that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of 
any other nation.152 
 
Within the same speech, President Kennedy called for seven specific measures to 
counterbalance the threat: (1) “halting the offensive build up”; (2)“keeping surveillance of 
Cuba”; (3) understanding that any launch of nuclear weapons from Cuba would be considered an 
attack by the Soviet Union against the U.S.; (4) fortifying security at the U.S. base at 
Guantanamo; (5) a meeting by OAS to consider the threat; (6) an emergency meeting by the 
Security Council at the United Nations; (7) and finally, the President called for Chairman 
Khrushchev to “halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world 
peace and to stable relations between our two nations.”153 In summary, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
further characterizes the extraordinary U.S.-Soviet tensions in the early 1960s.  
2.23 ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS—THE EVOLUTION OF MODERNIZATION:  
Yet, once again, the international political context was innately tied to the U.S. foreign policy 
making process and the domestic political atmosphere in the U.S. The Alliance for Progress 
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program under President John Kennedy in the 1960s sought to modernize Latin American 
nations, a program that both Sigmund and Smith argue was initiated by the Kennedy 
administration in 1961 as a response to the challenge of the Cuban revolution.154 Once again, 
policy was molded by the foreign policy perspectives and reaction to the present international 
context.  
On March 13, 1961, only one month prior to the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy, while 
speaking at a White House reception for Latin American diplomats, outlined his goals for 
modernization in Latin America: “We meet together as firm and ancient friends—united by 
history and experience, and by our determination to advance the values of American 
civilization.”155 Thereafter, President Kennedy proposed “that the American republics begin a 
vast new ten-year plan for the Americas—a plan to transform the Nineteen Sixties into an 
historic decade of democratic progress…for if our alliance is to succeed each Latin nation must 
formulate long-range plans for its own development.”156 Indeed, the theory was set.  
Abstractly speaking, according to Fredrick Pike, in Chile and the United States: 1880-
1962: “The basic ideology [of Alliance for Progress] was in accord with the observations made 
by economist William Glade in 1961”157: 
…, while the best available purely economic policies will necessarily take years to effect 
meaningful change in income levels, other quite important elements of economic welfare 
are susceptible to quicker increases through ‘social reform’ type measures which 
themselves need not require heavy expenditures so much as organizational changes and 
which can be designed, moreover, in some cases, to provide incentives for productivity. . 
. . Social reform . . .  is no longer simply a  desirable concomitant of growth in output. It 
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is, or is rapidly becoming, a  prerequisite of growth—as much an integral part of 
development program as any  instrument of monetary control or any tax measure.158 
 
In practice, however, according to Smith, “The Alliance for Progress led to an immediate 
and substantial increase in U.S. aid to Latin America. Bilateral economic assistance nearly 
tripled between FY 1960 and FY 1961, thereafter climbing to well over $1 billion in the mid-
1960s. Under Kennedy and Johnson, Latin America received nearly 18 percent of total U.S. 
aid.”159 Such efforts had nearly doubled the percentage of American funding since the 
Eisenhower Administration.  
Yet, the Alliance for Progress’s most basic purpose, as Sigmund has alluded, was to 
prevent communism from gaining strength in Latin and South American nations. According to 
Michael Latham, in “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-
Era Alliance for Progress”: “The ideology of modernization shaped and legitimated an 
ambitious, highly politicized effort to combine the promotion of Latin American development 
with the containment of communism.”160 To the same accord, Sigmund argued that the Alliance 
was an effort to combat communism in the Western Hemisphere.161  
Like the containment policy, the Alliance “reflected a broader world view, a constellation 
of mutually reinforcing ideas that often framed policy goals through a definition of America’s 
values, character, and mission.”162 In the same breath, Latham contends that “for those looking at 
the world through the lens of modernization, the Cold War certainly did become a struggle for 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the ‘developing nations’…Modernization, therefore, became a battle of 
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image and identity as much as it was one of program and policy.” 163 Indeed, the same “legal-
moralistic” perspective from the post War period, from 1945 to 1954, had carried through to the 
early 1960s and U.S policy makers were still “trying to make the world over in its own image,” 
the very “moral crusade” that Lippmann, Morgenthau, and Kennan had argued against in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. 164  
Nonetheless, Latham contends that the Alliance “reflected a progressive rejection of 
official Cold War orthodoxy.”165 Indeed, land reform programs and many “leftist” social reforms 
were cultivated within Latin America only ten years after the Guatemalan land reform program 
initiated by Arbenz had caused U.S. policy makers great concern. Thus, some things had 
changed.   
 Even so, the Alliance for Progress theory was also similar to the original containment 
policy in how it directed policy action and was later defined through its application by individual 
policy makers to specific issues. Piki Ish-Shalom, in “Theory Gets Real, and the Case for a 
Normative Ethic: Rostow, Modernization Theory, and the Alliance for Progress,” argues that 
“We learn that even though a common agenda was established, it still did not produce a unified 
interpretation.”166 Specifically, Ish-Shalom contends that Walt Rostow, a United States 
economist and political theorist, who was originally appointed by President Kennedy as the 
Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and who was later 
appointed under President Lynden B. Johnson to be the U.S. member of the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress167, acted as a key political theorist that guided the policy 
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actions of the Kennedy administration. Hence, in some sense, Rostow was to the Alliance for 
Progress what Kennan was to the Containment policy. Although Rostow outlined broad goals 
and theory for the Alliance— much like Kennan did in Article “X”— the implementation of the 
goals varied from policy maker to policy maker and perhaps failed to correspond with Rostow’s 
original intent, a theme that mirrors Kennan’s experience with the containment policy:  his 
original policy goals did not correspond to the subsequent actions taken by U.S. policy makers. 
Indeed, according to Ish-Shalom, although Rostow’s theory matched up well with President 
Kennedy’s liberal background, Rostow’s policy suggestions did not determine President 
Kennedy’s agenda: “[the] agenda had already been set up and what remained was to identify 
people to help execute it.”168  Once again, the policy would be set in motion by abstract policy 
guidelines that had been formed by policy maker’s reaction to world events such as the Cuban 
Revolution (in the case of the Alliance for Progress). Such abstract guidelines would 
subsequently be put into practice by individual policy makers and, in turn, more clearly defined, 
but also, would greatly determine the international context as well. Hence, the evolutionary cycle 
of foreign policy was at work.  
2.24 LOVE OF DICTATORS IN THE 1960S:  
Nonetheless, as argued, not all foreign policies evolved, but some policies remained constant 
from 1945 through the 1970s. Like the modernization initiatives under the Eisenhower 
administration, the early 1960s also saw a continued support for Latin American dictatorships.  
According to Sigmund:  
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The changes in the U.S. military relations…with Latin America under the Kennedy 
administration were institutionally separate from the alliance but conceptually related to 
it in its anti-communist purposes. Arguing that earlier concepts of defense of the 
hemisphere from external aggressions were no longer applicable, the State Department 
Policy Planning Staff and the Defense Department recommended that the Latin American 
military receive training in “counterinsurgency” to counteract the threat of Cuban-
inspired guerrilla activity.169  
 
Although Sigmund supports the claim that policy makers continued to support military 
regimes in Latin and South America, he also insinuates that “concepts of defense for the 
hemisphere from external aggressions were no longer applicable.” Hence, it would appear that 
Sigmund was also arguing that a shift in perspective had occurred even by the early 1960s and 
that the “external aggression” was perhaps no longer as much of a threat as it had been for U.S. 
policy makers. Yet, as discussed, the Cuban Missile Crisis would challenge such an assertion. 
Nonetheless, the report that Sigmund sights was issued after the Crisis, and perhaps Sigmund is 
arguing that following the U.S.’s successful defense of the Western Hemisphere from the 
U.S.S.R.’s attempted placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, the external threat had been 
vanquished.  
Aside from this mild digression, the favoring of military regimes was still apparent. 
According to Phillip Schmitter, in Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences:  
In the same way, one sees the U.S. placing its political interests over its democratic credo 
by dropping the anathema held a short while ago against those governments which did 
not come to power through elections. From the resigned acceptance under the Kennedy 
administrations of military coup d’état because of their generally conservative and 
anticommunist functions, advisors of the Department of state and of the President now 
hold to the theory of “salvation by the military” who are seen as forces of progress and 
agents of orderly modernization.170  
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Indeed, over the course of the 1960s, Smith contends that “A rash of military coups” 
commenced.171 Consequently, Smith reports, “The U.S. posture toward military regimes 
thenceforth oscillated between passive acceptance and outright endorsement.”172 
2.25 U.S.S.R. AND CHINA SPLIT: A FRACTURE IN THE COMMUNIST ARMOR. 
 
Although communism and the U.S.S.R. remained a major threat in the eyes of U.S. policy 
makers in the early 1960s and was considered a monolith that uniformly threatened democracy 
and the “free world” as one cohesive entity, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was a 
major milestone in the evolution of international context, which, as argued, directly impacted the 
ways U.S. policy makers formed policy and threatened the U.S.’s bi-polar outlook on 
international relations. According to Crockatt, the Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated for a variety 
of reasons: “It is a mistake to view the split as purely ideological but it is equally erroneous to 
regard it simply as the result of clashing national and geopolitical interests. These elements were 
inseparable… Indeed ideology and national interest were both present in the ambition of each ‘to 
be the leader, to wield the greatest influence, if not actually to dominate world Communism.”173 
Regardless of why the “split” occurred, Crockett contends that it became apparent that Chinese 
and Soviet ideologies clashed: “The ideological intensity of their struggle from the late 1950s 
onwards certainly bore the mark of a theological dispute, each side regarding the other’s version 
of Marxist-Leninism as heretical.”174 According to Hook, et al., “The Soviets publicly likened 
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Mao to Adolf Hitler, while Chinese leaders described the Soviet Union as a “dictatorship of the 
German fascist type.”175 
 Such a “split” shaped the way U.S. policy makers subsequently viewed international 
communism and reacted to it. According to Zbigniew Brezninski, in “A Policy of Peaceful 
Engagement: How We Can Profit from Communist Disunity,” published in 1962, the “split” was 
advantageous to the “West” in that “the long-range consequences of a split…might break the 
backbone of international Communism and shatters its sense of inevitable triumph.”176 Indeed, 
Brezninski was correct and U.S. policy makers, especially President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 
exploited the “split” in the 1970s by extending a diplomatic hand to China for the first time since 
it had “gone communist” in 1949 in order to combat the U.S.S.R.’s power. 177 Hook, et al., 
contend that “By playing the ‘China card,’ Nixon and Kissinger began clearing away mutual 
hostilities and exploring areas of mutual cooperation.”178 Hence, U.S. policy makers were, by the 
1970s, willing to recognize and utilize the support of a communist regime to counter the 
aggression of another communist regime. Consequently, the bi-polar world of U.S. versus the 
U.S.S.R., democracy versus communism, and “good” versus “evil” no longer applied to the ever 
more complex dynamic of international relations and U.S. policy makers realized this. In the 
words of Hook: “The U.S. containment policy had been weakened by the fragmentation of the 
communist bloc. It was one thing to fight a communism that seemed monolithic, but when the 
communist states became more numerous and divided internally, the best Western response 
became more difficult to define.”179 
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2.26 VIETNAM AND A SHIFT IN POLITICAL ATTITUDE:  
Like the Sino-Soviet split, the Vietnam War was fundamental in shaping international political 
context and domestic political atmosphere in the U.S. In fact, according to my survey, the 
Vietnam War was the pivotal moment— the most significant point of transition—for U.S foreign 
policy: in terms of the way U.S. policy makers viewed international relations and how U.S. 
policy makers subsequently formed policy theory and directed policy action.  
In 1964, the United States Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and 
subsequently, in 1965, deployed the “first major U.S. ground combat forces” in March of that 
year.180 According to Rosati, et al., the once firm consensus on foreign policy and anti-
communism was shattered by the events of the Vietnam War. Thus, the liberal-conservative 
consensus became “polarized during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and fragmented during the 
post-Vietnam War years.”181 In fact, Rosati contends:  
The events of the 1960s resulted in the growth of the political left in the United States 
and an alternative understanding of American society. Anticommunism and 
McCarthyism had silenced most liberals and leftists by the early 1950s. However, the 
new left entered the political scene in the late 1950s with the rise of the rise of the civil 
rights movement and grew dramatically as the Vietnam War intensified. Members of the 
new left and the counterculture dissented and rebelled against the liberal-conservative 
consensus of mainstream society.  
 
Likewise, Sanders also contends that “What Vietnam did was to resurrect the 
progressive…impulses after a twenty year hiatus.”182 Specifically, he argues that a progressive 
opposition formed, originating out of three sources: the universities, the corporate and financial 
world, and the general public, all of whom turned against the Vietnam War effort. Whatever 
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impact these sources had on this change in attitude, the facts were clear, facts that show the anti-
War climate was not a fringe element, but a large faction of American society:  
By 1968 the number of self-designated doves rose from 25 percent to 40 percent, while 
those who called themselves hawks declined from a 60 percent majority to a 40 percent 
figure equal to that of the doves…by November 1969, coinciding with  what was at 
the time the largest anti-War demonstration in the nation’s history, the number of those 
who classified themselves as doves was nearly double that of self- styled hawks. 183 
 
Alongside this general “anti-War” sentiment, David Dileo, in George Ball, Vietnam, and 
the Rethinking of Containment, argues:  
…the containment doctrine, having provided an unchallenged blueprint for American 
foreign policy for a quarter-century since World War II, was called into question. 
Particularly after the military and political disappointments of 1967-68,  the bipartisan 
consensus among American foreign policy elites about the nature of the international 
state system, the role of the United States in world affairs, and the constitutional 
framework within which foreign policy was formulated and  administered 
appeared to disintegrate.184 
 
Indeed, by 1968, Dileo contends, “the debacle in Vietnam prompted an agonizing 
reappraisal of American foreign policy.” Furthermore, Dileo argues that notable “foreign policy 
sages,” such as George Wildman Ball, who was engrossed in U.S. politics throughout his life, 
serving various politicians, and among many other accolades, was “a member of the Advisory 
Board of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of International Relations,”185 and in 
“four major books, innumerable speeches, and dozens of trenchant essays” rethought the 
containment policy.”186 As a result, the refurbished containment policy looked much different. 
According to Hook, et al.: 
The philosophy underlying American foreign policy during the Kissinger years (1969-
1977) began with the assumption that world politics was not a fight between a “good” 
side and a “bad” side. All states, communist or noncommunist, had the right to exist and 
possessed legitimate interests. A nation, therefore, did not launch moral crusades against 
                                                 
183 Sanders, p.  109. 184 Dileo, David L. George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment. London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991. p. 185.  185 Ibid., p. 1-3. 186 Ibid., p. 186 
 85 
an adversary on the assumption that differences of interests represented a conflict 
between good and evil. 187 
 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, in her book, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” argues that the 
overall trend by the end of the Nixon Administration in the mid-1970s was a general shift away 
from the Cold War fear of anti-communism:  
President Carter…was not the only political leader in America to have lost his 
“inordinate” fear of Communism, lost his appetite for East-West competition, grown 
embarrassed by the uses of American power, become ashamed of past U.S. policies, and 
grown determined to make a fresh start. By the time Richard Nixon had left office, a 
large portion of the political elite in America, including a majority of Congress, had 
withdrawn not only from Vietnam but from what was more and more frequently called 
the Cold War…From these feelings were inferred the famous “lessons” of Vietnam: that 
the Cold War was over, that concern with communism should no longer “overwhelm” 
other issues.188 
 
In the same light, according to Hook, et al., “Anticommunism was no longer as useful a 
means of eliciting popular support, not just because of the Vietnam fiasco but also because the 
United States might well be supporting one communist state against another.”189 Now I must 
clarify that the Cold War was not “over,” because it continued onward through the 1980’s until 
the U.S.S.R. finally collapsed in 1991. Nonetheless, by the 1970s the anti-communist consensus 
that had once dominated the American psyche had been substantially weakened and a new era 
had emerged. In this sense, although the Cold War was not over, it had greatly changed: not only 
in tone, but in the manner in which the U.S. would response to communism and the U.S.S.R. 
henceforth.  
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2.27 CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE OF ANTI-COMMUNISM, BUT A CHANGE 
IN THE BELIEFS OF U.S. POLICY MAKERS:  
Despite this reality and although the containment policy had evolved significantly from its birth 
in the 1940s, anti-communism was not extinct and not every American citizen believed the War 
in Vietnam was “bad” or wrong. In fact, my survey of American foreign policy towards the case 
of Chile, from 1970 to 1973, signifies that anti-communism was still very much alive. Rosati, et 
al. argues that in the 1970s and 1980’s “Many Americans, especially conservatives and those on 
the politically right, continued to believe…that the major global threat to the security of the 
United States and global order was communism directed by the Soviet Union, requiring a strong 
American military presence in much of the world.” 190 Moreover, Rosati argues that many 
conservatives “saw the Vietnam War as an honorable war lost through a failure of national will,” 
while, in contrast and as argued, “liberals tended to see the Vietnam War as a mistake and 
viewed the use of force as counterproductive.”191 
 Nonetheless, Rosati contends that “disagreement among conservatives existed 
concerning the severity of the Soviet threat and the appropriate foreign policy strategy.”192 
Without delving too much into the matter, Rosati reports that “variations” of conservative 
foreign policy and ideological dispositions evolved. For example, on one hand conservatives still 
looked at the world through a legal-moralistic lens and as the U.S. being “good” and the U.S.S.R. 
as “bad,” but, on the other hand, other conservatives viewed the world as being “bimultipolar”: 
in this light, although the world was still dominated by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the threat was 
not solely linked to the idea of communism  and its ideological threat, but, the more progressive 
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“bimultipolar” disposition reflected a realpolitik concern for international relations.193 Rosati 
argues that “other Americans, especially liberals and those on the political left saw a much more 
complex and interdependent world in the 1970s and 1980’s.”194 Likewise, Hook, et al., contends: 
The U.S.-Soviet balance remained the preoccupation; the Soviet Union, as a great power, 
still had to be contained. Coexistence with Moscow, to be achieved through negotiation 
and compromise, was sufficient to maintain balance of power that preserved American 
security. The ultimate victory, as Kissinger’s fellow realist, George Kennan, predicted a 
quarter of a century earlier, would not stem from an American moral crusade, but with 
the incremental withering of the Soviet state and  society.195 
 
 Perhaps, most importantly, for my analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the cases of Velasco 
and Allende and their respective regimes, both President Nixon and Henry Kissinger both agreed 
that the legal moralistic perspective was antiquated. Rosati, et al., argue that Kissinger shared in 
the realpolitik strategy of “selective containment,” which moved away from the original 
containment goal set forth in the Truman Doctrine of opposing communism everywhere.196 
Rather, “selective containment,” called for a much greater analysis and understanding of 
individual issues because, as the Sino-Soviet split demonstrated, communism was no longer 
monolithic. The U.S. cultivated relationships with communist regimes to counterbalance the 
threat of another. Furthermore, Nixon argued in his memoirs that “I felt that our tendency to 
become preoccupied with only one or two problems at a time had led to a deterioration of policy 
on all fronts.”197 According to esteemed historian David Crockatt, “Policy must be more multi-
faceted, and its different elements coordinated.”198 
 But, how did this shift in foreign policy perspective away from legal-moralism 
impact U.S. policy maker’s beliefs on anti-communism and the “threat of communism” in 
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general? Aside from my case studies, which show that the standard for judgment had changed 
and what had once been considered threatening in the 1940s and 1950s was no longer viewed in 
this way, Crocket explains that Kissinger realized that “it was no longer necessary to hammer 
home one’s distaste for Soviet ideology.”199 In the same way, according to Crocket: “After a 
period of confrontation’, Nixon announced his inaugural address, ‘we are entering an era of 
negotiation.’ The words are vague enough, but they denote an important shift of attitude on the 
part of Nixon and Kissinger. Both, after all, were old cold warriors whose early careers had 
begun during the years of high ideological tension between the superpowers.”200 
2.28 DÉTENTE: THE RELAXATION OF SOVIET-U.S. TENSION 
Marking the change in foreign policy and foreign policy perspective by the Nixon administration 
was the policy of Détente, which called for a relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. Keith Nelson, in “Nixon, Brezhnev, and Détente,” argues that like the shattering of the 
liberal-conservatism consensus, Détente was a direct result of the Vietnam War: “The massive 
dissatisfaction of opinion brought about by the Vietnam War—a disaffection from conventional 
Cold War foreign policy—was crucial in stimulating the creative reorientation of American 
diplomacy that took place during the Nixon administration.”201 
Détente included actions such as: Nixon’s reopening of relations with Communist China 
in 1971 through “Ping Pong diplomacy,” a policy that allowed the U.S. ping pong team to visit 
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China following a 22 year hiatus of no diplomacy202; Nixon’s unprecedented visit to China on 
February 28, 1972; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt I) agreed upon on May 26, 1972, 
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R, which sought to reduce the nuclear arms race; and various other 
initiatives that sought to reconcile that vast ideological, political, and diplomatic difficulties that 
had been experienced between the communist nations and the U.S. since the end of World War 
II. Indeed, a major point in Détente was reached in August of 1975 with the “Helsinki Accords.” 
Axelrod summarizes: 
Thirty five States, including the United States and the Soviet Union, signed accords…the 
accords became the basis for monitoring and enforcing international human rights and 
resulted in pressure on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites and allies to 
liberalize political policies that resulted in the imprisonment, torture, and even deaths of 
dissidents.203 
 
In light of Détente, and in congruence with the overall shift of American foreign policy 
perspective and the beliefs of U.S. policy makers on anti-communist, Crocket reports “Détente 
represented an acknowledgment that the world had changed radically in the direction of 
multipolarity, a diffusion of the “communist threat”, and the rise of new economic forces which 
cut across the rigid lines of the Cold War.”204  
2.29 NIXON AND THE LOVE OF DICTATORS: 
Still, it was not as if twenty years of foreign policy perspective had disappeared. As articulated, 
remnants of the past were still evident in the 1970s, even regarding the U.S. foreign policy 
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toward dictatorships. For example, Nixon carried the torch for favoring dictatorships over 
democracy. Paul Sigmund describes:  
In the late 1960s…a series of military takeovers in Latin America suggested that 
democracy was not necessarily “the wave of the future” in Latin America—notably 
Nixon’s adoption of a “low profile” in the visibility of U.S. diplomacy and his sending of 
a mission to Latin America … which recommended closer relations with military 
governments.205 
 
Precisely, Nixon’s viewed democracy in Latin America as a liability and openly 
expressed this sentiment in his discussions with his aids (captured on tape). In a conversation 
with Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nixon argued: “When you 
look at Latin America, [it is] not a very encouraging place to see, except those countries that got 
dictators in it and successful dictators, they’re all in a hell of a mess.”206 Nixon similarly 
demonstrated his disdain for Latin American democracies during a conversation with Kissinger: 
“I mean France is, is, a Latin country. It couldn’t, even France, with all its sophistication, 
couldn’t handle democracy…Spain, and no country in Latin America that I know of, except for 
Colombia [can handle democracy].”207 Thereafter, in 1971, Nixon argued that self-government 
and constitutional democracy had failed within Latin America: “Look at Latin America…They 
all followed the America constitution. Making a country in Latin America is making it dead. The 
only one that’s really making it at the moment is Brazil…but it’s now a dictatorship.”208   
With such sentiments in mind and in reference to my case study of Chile, Roseti, et al., 
reports that when Allende was overthrown in 1973, the U.S. “installed Augusto Pinochet as the 
                                                 
205 Sigmund, p. 3. 206 Conversation #497-2. 11:20a.m.-11:51p.m., Oval Office. May 11, 1971. Nixon Tapes. Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National 
Archives II, College Park, Maryland. (As  cited in Qureshi, Lubna Z. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup 
in Chile. Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2009. ) 207 Conversation #462-5. 8:30a.m.-10:15a.m., Oval Office. March 5, 1971, Nixon Tapes, Nixon Presidential Materials  Project, National 
Archives II, College Park, Maryland. (As  cited in Qureshi, Lubna Z. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup 
in Chile. Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2009. ) 208 Conversation #497-2. 11:20a.m.-11:51p.m., Oval Office. May 11, 1971. Nixon Tapes. Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National 
Archives II, College Park, Maryland. (As  cited in Qureshi, Lubna Z. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup 
in Chile. Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2009. ) 
 91 
dictator of Chile for the next sixteen years.”209According to Hook, et al., “The United States 
allied itself with a military dictatorship in Chile [to replace Allende following his overthrow] 
rather than run the risk that a nation would become a beachhead of Marxist revolution…From 
the American perspective, anything was better than a totalitarian Marxist regime.”210  
In fact, Smith reports that when Nixon won the presidency, he commissioned his political 
rival Nelson Rockefeller to “conduct a study of U.S.-Latin American relations.” To this end, 
Rockefeller and his “entourage” conferred with over 3,000 Latin America leaders and, in report, 
concluded that U.S.-Latin American relations had “deteriorated badly” and “Latin America 
presented a disturbing picture.” Furthermore, it contended that “clearly, the opinion in the United 
States that communism is no longer a serious factor in the Western Hemisphere is thoroughly 
wrong.”211 Nonetheless, Smith reports that “the Rockefeller group found one strong and positive 
influence: the Latin American military. As the commission contended:  
A new type of military man is coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for 
constructive social change in the American republics. Motivated by increasing 
impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant political order, the new military 
man is prepared to adapt his authoritarian traditions to the goals of social reform and 
economic progress. 212 
 
The report further argued that “military governments have an intrinsic ideological 
unreliability and vulnerability to extreme nationalism. They can go in almost any doctrinal 
direction.” Thus, according to Smith, the report concluded, “it made much more sense to 
collaborate with Latin American military rulers than ‘to abandon or insult them.’”213 In reference 
to my case study of Peru, Smith argues that this entire report “implicitly [referred] to the 
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maverick regime in Peru.”214 Hence, it seems evident, in this light, that Nixon was coddling the 
Velasco regime because of its authoritarian and military roots. Indeed, Smith concluded that 
“Cooperation with dictators would therefore continue to be a basic element in U.S. foreign policy 
toward Latin America in years to come.”215  
2.30 CONCLUSION:  
In total, the U.S. policy of containment was born out of abstract policy goals that were formed 
following World War II in reaction to U.S. policy makers’ judgments of the international 
context. The theory was subsequently applied in practice to individual issues by individual policy 
makers.  In the eyes of U.S. policy makers and American citizens, the world context from 1945 
to 1954 was exceptionally tense. Alongside the international politic context, a combination of 
factors helped create a hysteria driven anti-communist political atmosphere within the United 
States and a general anti-communist liberal-conservative consensus that viewed the world from a 
legal-moralistic perspective.  Policy action, such as: the employment of the Truman Doctrine in 
Greece and Turkey; the Korean War, the covert ousting of Guatemalan President Arbenz in 
1954; emergence of modernizing initiatives; the Cuban Revolution; the Sino-Soviet “split”; and 
later the Vietnam War determined how the policy of Containment would be applied in practice. 
Nonetheless, these same events catalyzed policy change and evolution. For example, as I have 
argued the once threatening land reform program in Arbenz’s Guatemalan regime would have 
been accepted and promoted by the Alliance for Progress program in the early 1960s under 
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President Kennedy. Hence, an evolution in perspective and policy was apparent from 1945 
through the early 1960s. Moreover, aside from the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, the policy of 
favoring dictatorships over democracy was cultivated in the 1950s with the appearance of new 
modernization initiatives and carried through to the early 1960s.  
As the hysteria of the late 1940s and early 1950s slowly dissipated from 1955 through the 
1970s, a new political context evolved. The same events that caused the policy of containment to 
evolve also impacted the general sentiments of U.S. policy makers and citizens alike. By the 
early 1960s and through the 1970s, with critical events such as the Sino-Soviet “split” and the 
Vietnam War, the U.S. political atmosphere turned against the extreme anti-communist liberal-
conservative consensus and legal-moralistic approach to international relations. Epitomizing the 
change in foreign policy and policy perspective, Nixon’s administration Détente policy was 
initiated. Although the Cold War was not “over,” important government actors, such as Henry 
Kissinger, were more sensitive to the complexities of international relations and realized the 
necessity of “selective containment” in place of the universal call to action that the Truman 
Doctrine embodied in 1947. Still, the favoring of dictatorships over democracy carried through 
to the Nixon administration.  
2.31 APPLYING CHAPTER 1 TO THE CASE STUDIES: GUATEMALA, CHILE, 
AND PERU 
Yet, once again, it is important to highlight how these conclusions relate to my case studies. The 
extreme anti-communist consensus from 1945 to 1954, the very years that Arevalo and Arbenz 
were in power, reveal how U.S. policy makers were exceptionally sensitive to “communist 
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threats.” It might be said that U.S. policy makers were hysterical and even biased in comparison 
to the way they later characterized “communist threats” in the 1970s. This provides an 
explanation as to why Arbenz and Arevalo were considered such threats, despite the fact that, all 
things considered, their land reform programs, expropriation of U.S. businesses, relation with the 
CP, and CP in government were relatively mild in comparison to regimes such as Allende’s.  
In contrasting, the way U.S. policy makers, especially Kissinger, who was the principle 
actor in the way U.S. foreign policy proceeded in the cases of Chile and Peru, viewed 
international relations and characterized threats much differently in the 1970s. For this reason, 
Velasco and his regime, although similar to Arevalo, Arbenz, and their respective regimes, was 
not deemed a threat. Indeed, under the auspices of “selective containment” Kissinger was able to 
accurately determine the level of threat and realize that Velasco’s regime, despite many 
similarities with Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes in Guatemala, was simply not a threat. 
Moreover, the difference in perspective surely was related to the Nixon administration’s stance 
toward dictatorships and military regimes. Specifically, he cultivated relations with the Velasco 
regime because of its authoritarian and military roots. As will later be argued, Velasco’s regime 
was also favored by U.S. policy makers, especially Kissinger, as an alternative example to 
Allende’s Marxist-Socialist revolution in Chile. As previously discussed, despite the changes of 
political atmosphere, international political context, U.S. foreign policy, and the beliefs of U.S. 
policy makers, Chile could not be ignored because of the extreme existential threat it posed.  
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3.0  CHAPTER 2                                                                                                                  
THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN GUATEMALA, PERU, AND CHILE AND THE 
RELATIVELY RADICAL STANCE OF ALLENDE’S CHILE 
This chapter argues for two conclusions: (1) the “similarities” that I have touched upon in my 
introduction between the case of Guatemala and Peru exist, which is a basic prerequisite for my 
claim that a discrepancy in perspective occurred for policy makers when judging the similar 
variables; (2) Allende and his regime were more radical and more communist than the other two 
cases, thus explaining why it was considered a threat in the 1970s despite the less charged 
political atmosphere.  
I will first provide a historical summary of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco in order to 
compare and contrast them: in terms of their political ideologies, their relationships with 
domestic communists, their stances on Marxism and communism, and their stances on 
democracy (i.e. Arevalo and Arbenz pro-democratic, Velasco authoritarian and anti-democratic). 
I will also compare the Arbenz and Velasco regime in terms of: expropriation of U.S. business 
interests, CP members in government, and the regimes relations with the Socialist Bloc. Lastly, I 
will compare the CP’s control of the labor movement during the tenures of Arbenz and Velasco. 
I will also provide further evidence in the case of Velasco’s Peru that may have caused concern 
for U.S. policy makers if it had counterfactually occurred in the later 1940s and early 1950s: 
Velasco’s agenda was closely aligned with the CP and other Marxist groups and Velasco’s 
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cabinet became increasingly radical. Aside from this “extra point,” all of the other variables 
directly correspond to what U.S. policy makers pointed to in order to ground their claim that a 
communist threat existed in Guatemala. Hence, if I can assert that many similarities are present, 
and further demonstrate that other variables that may have been considered threatening in 
Guatemala were also present in Peru, then my subsequent research question of why a 
discrepancy in perspective occurred is compelling and the entire thesis has solid footing to 
proceed.  
Second, I will give a summary of Allende’s Marxist orientation and his close relations 
with international communism. Also, I will briefly touch upon the radical nature of his 
government coalition and his Socialist party in order to further demonstrate why he was still 
considered a threat in the 1970s. This explanation should remedy the concern that I presented in 
the first chapter: that if Allende’s regime was still considered a threat by similar standards used 
to define threat in Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes, then my basic thesis—my contention that a 
change in foreign policy and policy perspective explains the discrepancy in perspective— would 
be challenged because policy makers would have still viewed the similar variables as equally 
threatening in the 1970s. I will also provide a brief discussion of the Chilean regime’s 
relationship with the Socialist Bloc and its respective expropriation of business assets in order to 
demonstrate its similarities to the other cases.  
3.1 A COMPARISON: THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AREVALO, ARBENZ, AND 
VELASCO (CONCLUSION 1): 
Preface: Much of my research in Guatemala is based upon three main sources.  
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1) Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kenner’s Bitter Fruit (1999) 
2) Piero Gluiness’s Shattered Hope (1992) 
3) Ronald Schneider Communism  in Guatemala (1959) 
 
3.1.1 A quick note on the three major authors:  
When determining the accuracy of these three perspectives—between Schneider, Kinzer, et al., 
and Gleijeses (and other sources for that matter)—it is important to note that Shattered Hope was 
published in 1992 and Kinzer and Schlesinger’s Bitter Fruit was published in 1982. In contrast, 
Schneider’s Communism in Guatemala was published in 1958. These dates are important 
because, as previously discussed with regards to my alternative thesis, Stephen Streeter contends 
that the explanation that scholars have provided for why the U.S. intervened in Guatemala was 
influenced by the period in which they wrote. Unlike my original discussion of Streeter’s essay, 
where I focus on the revisionist and postrevisionist perspective, here, I focus on the realist 
perspective. 
 Specifically, Streeter contends that Schneider’s work fell under the “realist” heading, a 
heading completely apart from the Kennan or Kissinger typed “realist” defined in the first 
chapter. Indeed, Streeter uses the term realist in a much different way: “Realists…generally 
blame the Cold War on an aggressive, expansionist Soviet empire. Because realists believe that 
Arbenz was a Soviet puppet, they view his overthrow as the necessary rollback of communism in 
the Western Hemisphere.”216 Moreover, Streeter contends that “In the 1950s, anti-communist 
scholars such as …Ronald Schneider [who was a realist]… asserted that the Eisenhower 
                                                 
216 Ibid., p. 62. 
 98 
administration had accurately gaged the “communist threat” in Guatemala.”217   In short, realists 
embodied the McCarthyite perspective and Truman-like, legal-moralistic and Cold War 
internationalist outlook that I have previously discussed. As such, “realists” were naturally more 
sensitive to communist threats because they wrote within the extreme anti-communist 
environment from 1945 through the 1950s. This is not to suggest that Schneider’s work is not 
noteworthy (I have cited him multiple times), but, simply that Gleijeses and Kinzer, et al., and 
other authors apart from the “realist perspective,”  were working in a less biased environment in 
the early 1970s onward and, therefore, were not influenced by the political atmosphere of the 
1950s.218 Hence, it is imperative to weigh these facts when determine which “experts” account of 
the “Guatemalan situation” is more accurate. Specifically, we must be cautious when Schneider 
speaks in a similar way to the “cold War internationalist” tone of the 1940s and 1950s U.S. 
policy makers. Furthermore, we should take notice when Schneider “takes it easy” on Arevalo 
and Arbenz because his bias would never incline him toward such sympathy.  
3.1.2 Arevalo and Arbenz: Political Ideology, Relationship with Domestic Communists, 
Stance on Marxism and Communism, and Stance on Democracy: 
I will first discuss Arevalo and Arbenz’s political ideology, their relationship with domestic 
communists, their respective stances on Marxism and communism, and their pro-democratic 
stances, variables that will subsequently be analyzed in the case of Velasco.  
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To begin, Arevalo became president in March 1945 following the 1944 “October 
Revolution.”219 Shortly thereafter, Arevalo claimed to have formed a revolutionary ideology: 
“Spirited Socialism”:  
Our socialism does not…aim at an ingenious distribution of goods, or the stupid 
economic equalization of men who are economically different. Our socialism aims at 
liberating men psychologically, granting to all the psychological and spiritual integrity 
denied by conservatism and liberalism.220  
 
In part, Arevalo believed “Spirited Socialism” sought to transcend the clash between liberalism 
and communism by forging its independent political and economic path.  
Yet, according to Schneider “Spirited Socialism” was not practical in action: “The ideas 
which he expressed were to prove a wholly inadequate basis for his government and never 
attained significant acceptance as the philosophy of the Guatemalan social revolution.”  Rather, 
Schneider argues that Arevalo’s more “practical approach to politics” was called Arevalismo.221 
In this regard, Kinzer, et al. argues that “When Juan Jose Arevalo took office in March 1945, he 
set forth priorities to guide him during his six-year term: agrarian reform, protection of labor, a 
better educational system and consolidation of political democracy.” 222 In an undated report 
from the U.S embassy to the State Department, Earl T. Crain reflected on Arevalo’s view on his 
presidential tenure:  
In a reply to a question as to what he considered the best accomplishment of his 
Government, Arevalo stated that he was especially proud of the social legislation enacted 
under his regime. He explained that formerly the laws on the subject were  the product of 
a group of capitalists who legislated exclusively from the point of  view of their own 
interests. Arevalo stated that this group, consisting of ten percent  of the population had 
governed the other ninety percent.223 
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Indeed, Arevalo’s agenda was clearly focused on remedying the vast inequalities of 
Guatemalan society. 
Yet, over the course of his Presidency and even in retirement, Arevalo argued that neither 
he nor his political agenda was influenced by communist ideology. Nonetheless, according to 
Kinzer, et al., Arevalo confided in Jose Manuel Fortuney, “Guatemala’s number one 
communist.”224 In fact Schneider argues, “There is irrefutable proof that Arevalo numbered some 
of the Communist leaders among his close friends and political collaborators and appointed them 
to responsible and influential positions in his government.”225  
Even so, as my survey shows, Arevalo was predominantly opposed to communism, not 
only from an ideological stand point, but politically as well. Schneider admits, “It would appear 
that Arevalo viewed them as home-grown variety of communists [opposed to the more 
dangerous international communists I suppose],” and therefore Arevalo felt, “that he could 
control them.”226 In one of his campaign speeches, Arevalo argued:  
Communism is contrary to human nature, for it is contrary to the psychology of 
man…Here we see the superiority of the doctrine of democracy, which does not seek to 
destroy anything that man has accomplished, but humbly seeks to “straighten out  the 
crooked paths.” The philosophy of democracy is satisfied with working with human 
elements, retouching, harmonizing movements as in an unfinished  symphony, hoping not 
for infinite beauty.227 
 
To the same effect, Earl T. Crain, a U.S. diplomat in Guatemala, reflected on Arevalo’s 
stance on communism in an undated Dispatch titled, “Habana 2194,” which suggests that 
Arevalo was unconcerned about any of his “relations” with “home grown” communists. 
According to the document, Arevalo, while on a visit to Cuba to meet with the Cuban President 
Carlos Prio Sacarras, was questioned concerning communism. Crain reported: “Amused by the 
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subject, [Arevalo] stated that communism was an extravagant idea…to which relatively few 
were dedicated. He added that communism was a theme exploited by the Catholics as a means of 
frightening the people…to such an extent that to talk about it would be like talking about the 
devil.”228 According to Schneider:  
The official position of Arevalo as president toward Communism was based upon 
toleration of Communists as individuals but opposition to the formation of an organized 
Communist party…While in some of his earliest speeches he professed disagreement 
with the principles of Communism, he accepted the help of Communists on the ground 
that he needed all the possible support. The sum of his public statements was that 
Communism as a doctrine was innocuous, but the Communists as a political power were 
a danger, although less so than the falangists. While Soviet imperialism was a potential 
threat, according to Arevalo that posed by the United States was immediate.229 
 
Moreover, following Arevalo’s presidency on November 15, 1950, Arevalo was asked to 
reflect on “Spirited Socialism” and his view on Communism in Guatemala during an interview.  
The interviewer asked, “How do you describe the left of center, extreme left of center, 
combination of socialism and free enterprise? Is your socialism similar to the Labor Government 
of Great Britain? That is, do you believe in nationalization and collectivization of industry more 
than the British Socialists?” In response, Arevalo stated, “The political position of the President 
of Guatemala has nothing to do with the political sects of England nor the United States, nor of 
other European or American powers. The political position of the president is Guatemalan and 
nothing more than Guatemalan, being focused on the present problems in Guatemala.” 
Subsequently, Arevalo was also asked to comment on his country’s fight against communism. In 
response, he stated, “Communism and every kind of totalitarianism is prohibited under the laws 
of Guatemala as organized entities, but not as individual thinking.”230  
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During his presidency, Arevalo’s actions mirrored his sentiments. On January 25, 1946, 
Arevalo ordered the closing of Escuela Claridad, “a Communist-run indoctrination center and 
training school for labor leaders.”231 A year prior, he had also ousted fifteen foreign communists 
in the face of growing anti-communist feelings in the country.232 Ralph Woodward Jr.  argues in 
his article “Octubre: Communist Appeal to the Urban Labor Force of  Guatemala, 1950-1953,” 
that at the end of Arevalo’s tenure, “from July 9th to September 6th, 1950, and again from 
September 13th to November 1st,” Arevalo “suppressed the publications of Octubre, the 
communist run newspaper because of “its obvious identification with foreign interest [(i.e. 
international communism )].”233 Hence, in total, Arevalo was clearly not a communist 
sympathizer. His opposition to their political freedom thoroughly demonstrates this point. 
In regards to Arevalo’s commitment to democracy, in his inaugural speech, Arevalo 
lectured on Guatemalan freedom, while reflecting on his idol President Franklin Roosevelt: “He 
taught us that there is no need to cancel the concept of freedom in the democratic system in order 
to breathe into it a Socialist “spirit.”234 According to Kinzer, et al., when Arevalo took office he 
set out to consolidate Democracy, which above all the other goals—agrarian reform, protection 
of labor, and a better education system— “was perhaps the least complicated most universally 
demanded.” Kinzer, et al. further reports that “Arevalo liberated the long-suppressed energies of 
his people by permitting and encouraging the formation of political parties” and “guided the 
nation’s first Congress,” which attained “full equality with the executive branch.” Moreover, 
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freedom of speech “flourished.”235 In his final act as President, Arevalo oversaw the peaceful 
transfer of power through the democratic election of Jacabo Arbenz Guzman.  
Arbenz ascended the presidency in March 1951. Like Arevalo, Arbenz’s political 
platform focused upon remedying the ills of the Guatemalan political infrastructure. 
Consequently, he proposed sweeping reforms similar to that of Arevalo.  In his inaugural 
address, Arbenz argued:  
To transform Guatemala from a dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy into a 
country that is economically independent; to transform Guatemala from a backward 
country with a semi-feudal economy into a modern capitalist country; to proceed in a way 
that will ensure the greatest possible improvement in the standard of living of the great 
messes of our people.236 
 
Despite such goals, as will be argued in Chapter 3, U.S. policy makers were critical that 
social programs, especially Arbenz’s land reform program, signified a “communist threat” in 
Guatemala. Consequently, Arbenz refuted any charges that his reforms had an affiliation with 
communist ideology. For example, in the case of his largest social venture—land reform—
Arbenz affirmed his right to such action and argued that “The landless will be granted title to the 
land according to the Constitution” and “Industrialization of the country cannot be achieved 
without agrarian reform.”237 From Arbenz’s perspective, the grounds for land reform were based 
upon an overarching need for economic growth in Guatemala:   
I do not exaggerate when I say that the most important pragmatic point of my 
government and of the revolutionary movement of October is that one related to a 
profound change in the backward agricultural production of Guatemala, by way of an 
agrarian reform which puts an end to the latifundios and the semi-feudal  practices, 
giving the land to thousands of peasants, raising their purchasing power  and creating a 
great internal market favorable to the development of domestic industry.238 
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Hence, in my survey of Arbenz’s land reform program, Arbenz never claimed that the 
program was connected to Marxist of communist ideology, nor did he say that it was influenced 
by it.  
Although Arbenz argued that his land reform program was not communist inspired, 
Arbenz’s political ideology was impacted by Marxist thought prior to his presidency. According 
to Gleijeses, Maria, Arbenz’s wife, received a copy of the Communist Manifesto at a “woman’s 
congress” and shared it with Arbenz. In the interview, Maria stated, “Together we talked about 
the Manifesto. It seemed to us to explain what we had been feeling.” She went on to state, 
“Marxist theory…offered Jacabo explanations that weren’t available in other theories. What 
other theory can one use to analyze our country’s past? Marx is not perfect, but he comes closest 
to explaining the history of Guatemala.”239 Maria concluded, “Through all this reading…Jacabo 
was convinced that the triumph of communism in the world was inevitable and desirable. The 
march of history was toward communism. Capitalism was doomed.”240 
I hope to point out, however, that, as always, actions speak louder than words. While in 
tenure, Arbenz never joined the CP or ever claimed to support the CP for anything more than the 
political support they offered him. Moreover, as far as my research suggests, U.S. policy makers 
neither heard Maria’s testimony nor heard of these thoughts from any other source.  Thus, as 
argued, U.S policy makers were reliant, predominantly, on secondary sources241 to form an 
opinion about Arbenz. Even Schneider agrees, “Publicly at least, Arbenz’s attitude toward the 
Communists was undefined.”242 
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Yet, for Arbenz, the communists were still a valuable political tool. Like Arevalo, 
Gleijeses argues that “More and more, Arbenz appreciated the honesty and discipline of a small 
group of friends—the leaders of the clandestine communist party of Guatemala.”243  Kinzer 
argues that, “Though the president himself never joined any political party, he did turn 
increasingly to the communists—who had helped him in his campaign and formed the smallest 
component of his four-party coalition in Congress—because, with their control of some urban-
based unions, they could mobilize popular support for his programs.244   However, Kinzer, et 
al. argues that “Arbenz, whose primary ideology was nationalism, enthusiastically accepted the 
backing of the Communists,” but “never doubted that when the need arose, he could keep them 
in line”245 (a stance very similar to Arevalo’s). In fact, in a New York Times editorial titled, “The 
Ghosts of Guatemala’s Past,” Stephen Schlesinger, co-author to Kinzer in Bitter Fruit similarly 
argued: 
It is true that Arbenz’s supporters in the Guatemalan Legislature did include the 
Communist Party, but it was the smallest part of his coalition. Arbenz had also appointed 
a few communists to lower-level jobs in his administration. But there was no evidence 
that Arbenz himself was anything more than a European-style democratic Socialist.246 
 
Although Arbenz spoke little of his disposition towards communism and how it impacted 
his agenda, he publically defended the communists’ political freedom. Arbenz argued that the 
communists’ political freedom was deserved under a democratic system (in direct contrast to 
Arevalo’s stance on the CP’s political freedom) and expressed this belief in his speech while 
opening congress on March 1, 1954:  
The democratic and progressive forces of Guatemala are not something isolated from the 
democratic and patriotic program of these same forces, which were grouped around my 
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candidacy and firmly support my government. To attempt to combat certain democratic 
and progressive forces without attacking at the same time our program is not only 
paradoxical but presume an ingenuousness on our part in agreeing to lose the support of 
what has been the basis of the conquests achieved by the program of that regime. 247 
 
In the face of a growing concern over communist influence in government, Arbenz 
continually suggested communist political success was an aggregate of democracy and freedom 
in the political process. Arbenz reflected following his overthrow: 
The political parties which aided the government were of the most varied tendencies. 
Among them were found some moderates and some extreme leftists. My government 
counted also on the aid of the Guatemalan Labor party (communists). There was a great 
stir over the participation of this party in the activities of my government, but this was 
only the external excuse for the (U.S.) aggression. Among the parties, among them all, 
the Communists had the same opportunities as others. 248 
 
Furthermore, the protection of democratic values was evident: Kinzer et al. reports that in 
1953, a “conservative American Journalist,” contended that “Anti-Communist and pro-American 
newspapers were still in business. They attacked the government as hotly as Hearst used to attack 
the New Deal, yet their editors walked the street unharmed.”249 Indeed, over the course of 
Arbenz’s tenure, although he may have had Marxist inspiration in private, he was fully 
committed to constitutional democracy and only used communist support for political purposes 
and electoral strength.  
3.1.3 Velasco: Political Ideology, Relationship with Domestic Communists, Stance on 
Marxism and Communism, and Stance on Democracy: 
Yet, how did Velasco compare with Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s political ideology, their 
relations with domestic communists, their stance on communism and Marxism, and their pro-
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democratic stances? The Velasco regime took power in 1968, following the successful coup 
d’état of Fernando Belaunde Terry, and, according to Christine Hunefeldt, in A Brief History of 
Peru, “The government intended to find a route of development for the country that would be 
neither communist nor capitalist, a sort of state capitalism with social redistribution to benefit the 
poorest in the country.”250Orin Starn and Carlos Degregori, the editors of The Peru Reader: 
History, Culture, Politics, also argue that Velasco’s regime “would forge a ‘third way’ of state-
directed national development between capitalism and socialism.”251 Similarly, Ruben Berrios 
and Cole Blasier argue, in “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989)” that Velasco, “stressed that 
Peru would follow its own ways and was determined to shake off foreign domination.”252  
In this light, Alfred Stepan argues in his book The State and Society: Peruvian 
Comparative Perspective that the Velasco regime adamantly rejected Marxism.253 In the same 
breath, however, Stepan also reports that Velasco simultaneously rejected U.S. styled liberalism: 
“Liberalism and Capitalism were attacked for engendering the ‘free manifestation of interests 
and the egoism of the individual without any discipline and without any restraint.’”254 By the 
same token, the Peruvian state believed that the advent of capitalism precipitated the occurrence 
of communism and Velasco believed that the presence of capitalism in “developing states” 
“contributed to a ‘state of inconceivable misery of the masses.’”255 On the whole, with such 
sentiments in mind, Hunefeldt contends that “What Peru’s military leadership envisaged was 
“socialism from above” in order to prevent “socialism from below.”256 She further notes that, 
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“Velasco’s policies were soon labeled in the United States as the ‘Peruvian experiment’ and in 
the Soviet Union as ‘Peruvian socialism.’”257 
The congruency between Velasco’s political philosophy and Arevalo’s “spirited 
socialism” is apparent: both favored revolutionary paths that transcended the doctrines of 
communism and liberalism. And, moreover, like Arevalo and Arbenz, Velasco’s agenda sought 
to abridge the inequalities in Peruvian wealth—between rich and poor—while providing 
structural change to bolster the economy.258 According to Article 2 of Decree law No. 17063, the 
first two goals of the revolutionary government were to:  
(1) Transform the structure of the State making it more dynamic and efficient as 
required for a proper Government action; and 
 
(2) to promote the less favored segments of the population to higher standards of 
living compatible with the dignity of the human being. This is to be achieved 
through the transformation of the economic, social and cultural structures of the 
Nation. 259 
 
To the end of assisting “the less favored segments of the population,” Hunefeldt argues 
that, like Arbenz and Arevalo, Velasco favored land reform: “General Velasco regarded agrarian 
reform as a necessary first step toward more sweeping reforms throughout society.”260 Velasco 
proclaimed on June 24, 1969, while addressed the nation on national television:  
This is an historic day. And it’s important that we all be aware of its full significance. 
Today, the Revolutionary Government has issued the Agrarian Reform Law, thereby 
giving the country its most vital instrument of transformation and development.  History 
will remember June 24 as the beginning of an irreversible process that will lay the 
groundwork for true national greatness, founded on social justice and the real 
participation of the people in the wealth and future of our motherland. 261 
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Velasco’s announcement mimics that of Arbenz’s; Like Arbenz the word choice of 
development was a keystone in their respective speeches. 
 Although Velasco rejected Marxism as an economic and political model (as did Arevalo 
and Arbenz), he was not opposed to communist support. Stepan argues:  
In order to create a countervailing power to APRA in the trade union sector, the military 
government granted official recognition and valuable support to a national Communist 
party trade union confederation CGTP (Confederacion General de Trabajadores del 
Peru). The CGTP and the Communist party in return gave the new government much 
needed support in the installation period.262 
 
Yet, despite this political relationship, no evidence suggests that Velasco formed close 
personal relations with the domestic communists in Peru as was seen with Arevalo and Arbenz in 
Guatemala.  
In reference to Velasco’s stance on democracy, Maxwell Cameron and Phillip Mauceri, 
in The Peruvian Labrynth: Polity, Society, Economy, argue that “Velasco… emphasized that 
authoritarian rule was necessary for a period because of the failure of the previous democratic 
administrations—particularly the failure of the various political parties—to implement the 
changes that appeared appropriate for the era." 263 In my survey of Velasco’s coup, I also contend 
that Velasco removed the democratically elected Fernando Belaunde because his regime had 
failed to carry out the social reforms that it had promised and thus Velasco hoped to succeed 
where Belaunde had failed. Furthermore, according to Cameron, et al., Velasco’s dictatorship 
was only a temporary and necessary measure before achieving the “long-term” goal of a “true” 
democracy.264 
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Yet, under the auspices of “authoritarianism,” political parties were greatly limited in 
their ability to impact change through the political process. 265 Indeed, Cameron, et al., contend 
that the Velasco government hoped to increase political participation, but “contradicted” itself 
“by its refusal to surrender its own authority and by its rejection of national and local elections. 
Moreover, in the so-called no-party thesis, the government repudiated political parties, including 
a progovernment party.”266Yet, over the course of Velasco’s tenure, Cameron, et al. reports that 
“a dramatic strength in political organizations” was apparent.  
Indeed, political freedom was not altogether vacant. In fact, to a limited extent, parties 
and civilian policy makers held positions within the Velasco regime. Gorman describes that:  
The military opted to assume control of only those positions that directly concerned 
decision making, leaving the more technical positions in the hands of the trained civilian 
bureaucrats. This dependency on civilian state employees was accepted as the only 
alternative until the military could form its own core of experts to take on the full range 
of public administration functions.267 
Moreover, Civilian parties maintained a limited level of political strength in government 
through a parliamentary body. In the 1960s, three parties received over 80% of the votes: APRA, 
Accion Popular (AP), and UNO, while Marxist parties, including the CP only received 4 
percent.268 
Even so, over the course of the Velasco tenure, Velasco’s cabinet was comprised solely 
of military men269 and the military dominated the government as a whole: By mid-1975, “6 out 
of 14 vice-ministers, 33 out of 48 sectorial advisors, 30 out of 91 major agency heads, the 
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directors of all independent bodies of the Government, and the presidents of 16 state industries, 
were also military men.”270  
In summary, all three leaders—Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco— hoped to modernize their 
respective countries. The prime difference between the three was that Arevalo and Arbenz were 
pro-democratic and they came to power through the electoral process under the Guatemala 
constitutional democracy, while Velasco took power through a military coup and imposed an 
authoritarian styled rule throughout his tenure.  Yet, aside from these similarities, the three 
leaders stance on communism and Marxism were similar in many ways. First, Arevalo and 
Velasco were clearly anti-communist. The degree to which one was more anti-communist than 
another is not exceptionally clear. Indeed, the fact that Arevalo formed personal relations with 
domestic CP suggests that he was not adamantly opposed to them. In his own words, 
communism as an “organized entity” was not allowed, but it was permitted as “individual 
thinking.” Yet, although Velasco claimed to be exceptionally anti-communist, as I will soon 
argue, Velasco cultivated the CP’s support and provided them official recognition in his term. 
But, unlike Velasco, Arevalo did not form personal relations with the domestic communists. 
Hence, the difference between Velasco and Arevalo is not exceptionally clear. With regards to 
Arbenz, we can see from a historical perspective that he may have favored a Marxist approach to 
politics, but his actions and statements throughout his tenure were not explicitly pro or anti- 
Marxist or communist. This is not to say he did not utilize communist support, because he surely 
did, both politically and personally. Nonetheless, his disposition was always that of protecting 
constitutional democracy and, as many experts suggest, he was no more than a nationalist. Even 
so, Arbenz was surely more pro-communist than Arevalo and Velasco. The difference between 
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Arevalo and Arbenz, however, was that Arbenz, like Velasco, officially recognized the CP in his 
term and utilized them for support. But like Arevalo, he confided personally in domestic CP 
members. Despite such difference, explicitly clear similarities can be drawn between all three 
leaders. Once again, why was Velasco judged in a different light than Arevalo and Arbenz?  
3.2 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIMES: ARBENZ AND 
VELASCO 
3.2.1 Arbenz’s Guatemalan Social Platforms:  
Another variable that caused U.S. policy makers concern was Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s 
expropriation of U.S. business interests, which, as I will argue, U.S. policy makers considered as 
evidence that a communist threat had manifest in Guatemala. In 1944, Arevalo’s government 
engaged in sweeping reforms aimed to remedy the social ills of Guatemala’s antiquated society, 
political system, and economic system. To this same end, Arbenz’s agrarian reform of 1952 
called for the expropriation of private estates and idle land.271 The decree mandated that, “Estates 
of more than 672 acres would be expropriated; idle land in estates of between 224 and 672 acres 
would be expropriated only if less than two thirds of the estate was under cultivation: estates of 
less than 224 acres would not be affected.”272 In total, the decree led to the redistribution of 
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603,615 hectares out of 2.8 million hectares of cultivable land area273 to around 100,000 
families274 by the time Arbenz was overthrown.  
To say the least, the largest land owner in the country—the United Fruit Company— was 
not pleased. It owned 550,000 acres, of which 386,901 acres of uncultivated land was 
expropriated.275 As compensation, Arbenz offered the company $627,572 based upon the 
UFCO’s declared tax value for the land.276 In contrast, the UFCO wanted much more, and with 
the strong arm of the U.S. State Department, asked for $15,854,849. Kinzer recounts that 
although Guatemala’s offer averaged $2.99 per acre and the company had only paid $1.49 acre 
twenty years prior, the State Department was asking for $75 an acre.277  
Aside from the land reform, according to Stephen Kinzer, Arbenz was also motivated by 
recommendations by the World Bank to combat the domination of foreign business through 
direct competition rather than nationalization.278 For example, he sought to end the 
monopolization of the IRCA railways and also the UFCO’s ports, by beginning construction on a 
“highway to the Atlantic” and a publically owned port. Similarly, he began work on a publically 
owned electric company to combat the monopoly enjoyed by the American owned electricity 
company.279 Nevertheless, above all, these social reform initiatives were docile in comparison to 
those seen in the Velasco regime.  
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3.2.2 Velasco’s Peruvian Social Platforms:  
Indeed, by 1968 the military decided to remove President Belaunde because he had failed to 
carry out the modernist reform program that he had originally campaigned for in 1963.280 In his 
stead, as argued, Velasco Alvarado picked up the reigns and initiated sweeping social reforms. 
Philip Mauceri recounts that Velasco acted quickly once taking office: “The first act of the 
‘revolutionary’ regime was to nationalize the International Petroleum Company (IPC), whose 
generous treatment by the Belaunde government had created a national scandal.”281 Starn, et al. 
ed. argue that Velasco’s “reforms included the selective nationalization of foreign enterprises, 
the creation of a state-run system of mass organizations called the National System of Social 
Mobilization (SINAMOS), and, most importantly, the massive agrarian reform, handing over the 
estates of big landowners to their former serfs and employees.”282 Stepan recalls that there were 
sweeping changes in education, health care, and communication and “the state nationalized many 
foreign firms in sectors such as mining, communications, fish-meal plants and banking.”283  
Francisco Durand argues, in “The Growth and Limitations of the Peruvian right”: “The military 
regime inaugurated a new era of intense governmental controls, radical social reforms, and 
widespread intervention of the public sector in the economy.”284  Furthermore, Hunefeldt 
contends that “a reform of Peru’s enterprises” included “[turning] over 50 percent of firm shares 
to its workers,”285 and “According to Velasco’s plan, these enterprises were to become 
‘industrial communities,’ in which workers became shareholders and participated in the 
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enterprises management and profits, or they might become a ‘social property enterprise,’ owned 
by the workers.”286 Nonetheless, as discussed, for the United States, the most pressing issues 
revolved around the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company. 
Yet, as previously indicated, of all of the social reform initiatives enacted by the Velasco 
regime, land reform may have been the most important for Velasco.287 Originally initiated in 
1969, Velasco’s agrarian reform law distributed land to over 350,000 families (one fourth of the 
entire rural population).288 From 1968-1980, 7,889,008 hectares were redistributed out of 7.6 
million cultivable land area,289 comparably more significant than the land distribution reform in 
Guatemala 20 years earlier (only 600,000 hectares). 
Putting the entirety of Velasco’s social reforms into perspective, Stepan compared Peru’s 
“bold structural changes” to Cuba, arguing that no other “Latin American change-oriented 
regimes” had succeeded in such a vast overhaul of the state.290 The Federal Research Division of 
the Library of Congress reported:  
At the end of the Belaunde government in 1968, three-quarters of mining, one-half of 
manufacturing, two-thirds of the commercial banking system, and one-third of the fishing 
industry were under direct foreign control. Velasco reversed this  situation. By 1975 
state enterprises accounted for more than half of mining output, two-thirds of the banking 
system, a fifth of industrial production, and half  of total productive investment.291 
 
Indeed, such massive social reforms far exceeded those seen in Guatemala twenty years 
prior. Once again, why was Velasco’s regime overlooked?  
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3.2.3 The CP in Arbenz’s regime: 292 
Despite the aforementioned similarities, what role did the CP have in the regimes of Arbenz and 
Velasco? First, in reference to Arbenz’s regime, according to Schneider, the communists 
influence in government can be attributed…[to] their ability to hold key positions in the Arbenz 
administration.293 Schneider contends that the communists, the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), 
were the smallest of a five group government coalition in 1954294, the supposed height of 
communist infiltration, according to U.S. policy makers. The other four parties were the General 
Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG), the National Confederation of Campesinos 
(CNCG), the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR), and Party of the Guatemalan Revolution 
(PRG). Nonetheless, Schneider argues that the communists were gaining influence in PAR.295 In 
fact, he further argues: 
By the beginning of 1953 the political structure of the Arbenz regime was becoming 
apparent. The Communists were now a full partner in the official coalition and in a 
position to aim at establishing their hegemony over the other parties. During the third 
year of Arbenz’s presidency the Communist party grew rapidly in size and influence. In 
the government they were able to bring about the Guatemalan withdrawal from the 
Organization of Central American States in April 1953 and  were instrumental in shaping 
the ultra-nationalistic policy which resulted in a defense of Communism by the 
Guatemalan delegation at the Caracas Conference in March 1954. In the countryside they 
exploited agrarian reform and the rivalry of  the major government parties to become the 
most dynamic factor in Guatemalan  politics. 296 
 
Yet, Schneider’s account portrays the role of the CP into the Arbenz regime as far 
reaching and exceptionally influential, but not all authors agreed on this perspective. In contrast 
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to Schneider, Kinzer, et al. argues that the communist were relatively limited throughout 
government: 
Communist numbered about 26 in the 350-member staff of the National Agrarian 
Department, the government agency in which they had the strongest influence...But in 
terms of numbers, the party remained marginal. There were only 4 Communists deputies 
in the 1953-54 Congress. (The rest of the ruling coalition consisted of 24  deputies from 
the dominant PAR, 16 from the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution and 7 from the 
National Renovation Party—for the most party moderates and liberals.) No more than 
seven or eight Communists ever held significant sub-cabinet posts, and neither Arevalo 
nor Arbenz ever appointed a single Communist to his cabinet. 297 
 
Kinzer also acknowledges that “the total membership of the party never exceeded 4,000 
in a nation of almost 3 million people.”298 In contrast, Schneider admits that “the CGTG claimed 
over 100,000 members, while its agrarian counter party CNCG, boasted a membership more than 
twice as large.”299 Hence, in comparison, the communist party was numerically infinitesimal to 
the other major parties in Guatemala.  
To the same accord, historian Cole Blasier contends in his book The Hovering Giant: 
U.S. Response to Revolutionary Change in Latin America that the communist power in 
Guatemala was not significant: 
All the…evidence leaves no doubt that Guatemalan Communists had made substantial 
political gains in a half dozen years. They dominated the Guatemalan  labor 
movement and had relatively free access to and influence with the president. Influence is 
one thing; control is another. It would be difficult to determine  quantitative methods 
whether the Communists “controlled” or “dominated” the  Guatemalan government. As 
events so dramatically show later, the Communists  most emphatically did not control the 
most powerful organization in the country— the armed forces. And the weight of 
evidence would seem to show that, lacking a single cabinet post, they could scarcely have 
controlled Guatemala as a whole. What would, no doubt, be fairer to say is that the 
groups which controlled Guatemala  under Arbenz had interests and policies established 
independently of the  Communists which the Communists supported. As a result of 
domestic and foreign  developments, the government’s and the Communists’ policies 
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overlapped in many areas…President Arbenz found Communist support useful. As he 
grew weaker, he needed that support even more. 300 
 
Based upon the fact that Schneider is clearly speaking in unison with U.S. policy makers 
on the subject, as I have argued he would, I find it difficult to agree with his position on this 
matter. Thus, it appears that the latter two accounts are more accurate. Although it is perhaps 
obvious, Blasier was not speaking from a “realist” position and his book was published well after 
the Coup in 1954. In summary, although CP members gained government posts, their numbers 
were relatively infinitesimal and no CP members gained access to Arbenz’s cabinet. Thus, we 
must question the extent of influence the CP wielded.  
3.2.4 The CP in Velasco’s regime:  
Although there has been far less analysis of the role of the CP in Velasco’s regime, when 
compared with Arevalo and, especially Arbenz, my survey suggests that no CP members held 
government posts apart from their very minor role in the Peruvian parliament.301 Stephen 
Gorman, in his book, “Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation” argues that the 
military dominated the government during Velasco’s tenure, which naturally limited civilian, and 
therefore political parties, access to government positions. Hence, although I cannot supply an 
exact rational for why CP members did not hold positions, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
limitations on access to government positions played a role. Yet, it is crucial to highlight that 
Cameron, et al. contends:  
All of us scholars, including Carol Wise and Carmen Rosa Balbi…agree that whatever 
the Velasco government’s political intentions were, the result was a dramatic increase in 
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the strength of popular political organizations, in particular of the political Left. Political 
parties of the Marxist Left won 29 percent of the vote in Peru’s 1978 [(three years after 
Velasco’s overthrow)] Constituent Assembly election, in contrast to less than 4 percent in 
the 1962 and 1963 elections.302 
 
Although the CP did not hold government positions, it and other “leftist” parties gained 
considerable strength during Velasco’s tenure. Moreover, as I will argue the lack of government 
positions did not hinder the influence of the CP in State politics. Indeed, much like the CP in 
Guatemala, the CP in Peru’s major strength and source of influence was through the respective 
labor movements in each country. Thus, the fact that a limited number of  CP members held 
government positions in the Arbenz’s regime opposed to Velasco’s should not be of great 
consequence. Still, the question should be whether or not U.S. policy makers considered this 
difference to matter. As I will argue, U.S. policy makers were aware of the CP presence in 
government, but the major source of threat came from the labor movement and the land reform 
program.  
3.2.5 The Arbenz Regime: Relations with the U.S.S.R. and Socialist countries.  
A major point of threat for U.S. policy makers was the possibility that Arevalo and Arbenz’s 
regimes had engaged in diplomatic relations with the Socialist Bloc and the Soviet Union. Yet, 
Gleijeses argues that the Soviet Union, on only one occasion, tried to establish interest in 
“developing ties with Guatemala,” with reference to banana sales, but because of a lack of 
transportation abilities the conversations halted.303 The only other known interaction between 
Arbenz’s regime and a Socialist Bloc member occurred on May 17, 1954, when Swedish ship 
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was apprehended while delivering Czechoslovakian weapons to Guatemala.304  In hind sight, 
Cullather reports that Manuel Fortuney “had met in Prague in November [of 1953] with Antonin 
Novotony, first secretary of the Czech Communist Party, to negotiate the purchase of 2,000 tons 
of captured Nazi weapons.”305  Yet, Cullather notes that the CIA did not know of Fortuney’s 
travels, but only realized that Arbenz’s regime had engaged in trade relations with the Socialist 
bloc when a State Department official realized “that the Bank of Guatemala had telegraphically 
transferred $4,860,000 through the Union Bank of Switzerland and Stabank, Prague, to the 
account of Investa, a Czech firm.”306 In response, the U.S. began scanning the Guatemala coast 
to apprehend any shipments from Czechoslovakia, which resulted in the discovery of the arms 
shipment.307 Stephen Kinzer reflects, that despite this discovery, “No serious evidence ever 
turned up after the coup establishing a secret tie to the Soviets…the much-publicized claim that 
Guatemala could become a base for a Soviet seizure of the Panama Canal was…difficult to 
sustain.”308  
Aside from formal diplomatic relations between the Guatemalan State and the Socialist 
Bloc, Gleijeses contends that even the local Guatemalan communists, let alone the regime, did 
not form relations with the international communist movement to any great extent: “On occasion 
the PGT leaders did travel to the Soviet bloc…[but] The evidence in the Guatemalan Transcripts 
supports the testimony of PGT leaders that their contacts with West European and Soviet bloc 
communist parties was very limited.”309 In an interview with the two main Communist leaders, 
Gutierrez and Fortuny, both men explained, “We were a provincial party; we didn’t look beyond 
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our village; we didn’t even have an international committee.” They continued by explaining, 
“We were overwhelmed with work. We were preoccupied with the development of PGT and 
with Guatemala domestic politics.”310 
3.2.6 The Velasco Regime: Relations with the U.S.S.R. and Socialist countries. 
In contrast to the limited Guatemalan-Socialist Bloc relations, the Velasco regime engaged in 
extensive interaction with members of the Socialist Bloc. Berrios argues that for the Peruvian 
regime: 
Relations with the United States were strained after a number of U.S. firms were 
nationalized, provoking the threat of application of the Hickenlooper and Pelly 
Amendments by the U.S. government. In redefining her foreign policy, Peru began to 
diversify her foreign trade and, for the first time, expanded her diplomatic ties with the 
Socialist countries.311 
 
Velasco specifically argued, “Contact with countries...whose markets can open to our 
products and who technical and economic cooperation can be very useful in the undertaking of 
national development.”312 Likewise, According to noted historian Richard Walter, the Velasco’s 
number two man— General Mercado Jarrin— the Peruvian Foreign Minister, was also interested 
in forming relations with the Socialist Bloc to combat the United States domination of Peruvian 
politics.:  
[Mercado’s] first and paramount concern was how to deal with the United States, which 
he saw as the main threat to Peruvian sovereignty and the kind of revolutionary and 
nationalistic policies the regime planned to implement. Recognizing the power of the 
United State and the relative weakness of Peru, he devised a strategy to try to 
counterbalance U.S. influence through various manipulations and maneuvers. These 
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included establishing links with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and other communist 
nations, which he claimed was his idea.313 
 
Mercado and Velasco thus promoted relations with the Socialist bloc in order to 
counterbalance the influence of the United States.  
In order to achieve this end, according to Berrios, et al., “Diplomatic ties with the Soviet 
Union were established on i February I969. Javier Perez de Cuellar, later Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, was appointed Peru's first ambassador to Moscow.314 Subsequently, Berrios 
contends that “Peru became the center of Soviet operations on the continent. Soviets interaction 
with Peru, which began in 1969, was part of Soviet global strategy.”315 A part of this strategy, 
according to Berrios, was the acquisition of a land strip for Soviet planes to land in South 
America. In fact, Berrios argues that once the landing strip was created it became the “main point 
of access to South America” for the Soviet airline Aeroflot where Soviet passengers could “fan 
out from Peru to neighboring countries.”316 
According to the Stephen Gorman, in “Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External 
Political and Economic Initiatives”: “Peru established diplomatic and commercial relations with 
the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and numerous other Socialist countries, 
including, eventually, Cuba.”317 Barrios recounts, “The trade agreements initially signed with the 
U.S.S.R. involved intergovernmental, bilateral commissions to exchange goods, and to find areas 
of cooperation and facilitate credit lines.”318 As the trade relations cemented, the U.S.S.R. 
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“exported more to Peru than to any other Latin American state except Argentina and Brazil, and 
its clients, Cuba and Nicaragua.319 
Moreover, the Peruvians also sought to bolster their military power. Under the Belaunde 
government, preceding Velasco, Peru had purchased fighter jets from France, resulting in a 
backlash from the United States and a “reluctance” to sell “sophisticated weapons systems to 
Peru.” Berrios contends that the Peruvians looked to other sources for such weapons and the 
U.S.S.R. responded favorably. Stephen Gormon describes that “The Soviet Union…became an 
important source of arms and related technology over time [to Peru]. The army and air force took 
full advantage of this credit to acquire some of the most modern equipment that existed in South 
America.”320 Near the end of the Velasco regime in 1974 and 1975, and even after Velasco’s 
overthrow, through the 1980’s, Velasco’s regime and the Peruvian regimes that followed, 
received “250 TS 5 tanks and a fleet of 36 supersonic SU-22 Sukhoi fighter bombers as well as 
seven MI-8 helicopters and I6 Antonov planes.”321  
In summary, the Velasco regime engaged in extensive relations with the Socialist Bloc 
and especially the Soviet Union. This evidence alone, above all the other variables, reveals that 
U.S. policy makers had plenty of evidence that they could legitimize that a communist threat was 
present. Once again, why was Velasco’s regime not considered a threat?  
3.2.7 CP Power in Guatemalan Labor:  
Yet, another major point of concern for U.S. policy makers was the CP’s power in 
Guatemalan labor movement, which they felt indicated a “communist threat.” My survey relies 
                                                 
319 Ibid., p. 366.  320 Gorman, “Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political and Economic Initiatives.” p. 164.  321 Berrios, p. 376. 
 124 
predominantly upon Schneider’s research in Communism in Guatemala, which is the most 
comprehensive account and research of the Guatemalan labor movement that I have found. In 
total, I contend that the CP’s influence in labor was far reaching. But, this was not always the 
case. In fact, Schneider contends that “At the time of the overthrow of Ubico, no real trade 
unions existed in Guatemala.”322 Henceforth, following the success of the October Revolution in 
1944, the labor movement grew rapidly. Logically speaking, the growth was most likely an 
aggregate of the new found freedom to form unions under the Arevalo regime. Kinzer et al. 
argues that:  
…the Arevalo administration’s 1947 Labor Code” provided that “government should 
 no longer automatically support large farm owners and other employees. 
Arevalo’s Minister of Labor explained, ‘a capitalist democracy ought to compensate with 
the means at its disposal, some of which are legislative, for the economic inequality 
between those who possess the means of production and those who sell manuallabor.323 
 
Furthermore Gleijeses contends that the labor code “In a more advanced country… would 
have been a moderate document; in Guatemala, it was radical. It affirmed the right to unionize 
(but set crippling limitations on agriculture unions.) It afforded protection from unfair dismissals 
and guaranteed the right to strike within a conciliation mechanism.”324  
Yet, even prior to the “new labor code,” the CTG (Confederacion de Trabajadores de 
Guatemala) was formed on December 5, 1944 and encompassed seventeen “embryotic” trade 
unions in Guatemala’s capital.325 At this time, according to Robert Wasserstrom, “many of the 
men who were active in union affairs were Communists and Socialists.”326 Although the CTG 
split in 1945 into two factions—SAMF (the Sindicato de Accion y Mejoramientode los 
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Ferrocarrileros) and STEG (the Sindicato de Trabajadores en Educacion de Guatemala)—the 
workers movement was ultimately consolidated in the General Confederation of Guatemalan 
Workers (CGTP) in the midst of Arbenz’s tenure.327  
In the late 1940s, the National Worker’s Political Committee (CPNT) was formed to 
allow the leaders of labor unions to convene in order to unite workers behind a single 
candidate.328 Woodward argues that the communist newspaper Octubre similarly agreed: 
“[Octubre] insisted that unity was the key to control by labor of national policy.”329 In fact, 
Woodward further argues “Octubre had launched a vigorous campaign to unify” the segregated 
unions.330 Schneider explains that, to this end, in 1949, “Top leadership of the labor federations 
gathered to make plans for a convention of all workers’ political committees. Five of the dozen 
leaders were secretly Communists and four of them were elected to the nine-member national 
committee.”331 The main purpose of the CPNT was to bolster working class and campesino 
support for Arbenz’s presidential campaign, to prevent votes from being divided up among other 
parties and candidates, and to make a transition towards a true working class party.332 
 The end result was CGTG, which formed from a collaboration of worker-based parties. 
By 1951 the CGTG had 60,000 members. Schneider argues, “Within each union there functioned 
a Communist fraction which was under instructions to meet in advance to coordinate their 
work….In this manner the less than 2,000 Communists in the CGTG were able to control its 
political line and speak in the name of its 100,000 members.”333 Moreover, “The CGTP and the 
CNCG (the National Campesino Confederation), rather than the parties, proved to be the most 
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efficient instrument for bringing the rural masses into the national life and developing them into 
an effective political force.” 334 In fact, Schneider argues: 
The overall impression obtained from an extensive reading of CGTG correspondence 
with members and local unions is that the hesitancy to accept Communism as the 
legitimate political expression of the working class was greatly reduced in the two years 
which followed the unification of the labor movement. This can be attributed to the 
revelation by an increasing number of labor leaders that they were Communists, to the 
acceptance of the Communists by the President and the leader of the other parties, and to 
the intensive Communist propaganda campaign carried on within the ranks of labor. 
From late 1952 on, many labor leaders left the other parties to join PGT.335 
 
Schneider further contends:  
Through the unions the Communists won the confidence of the workers, first on labor 
and economic matters, then in politics. Through their control of organized  labor the 
Communists were able to exert influence over the government and the  revolutionary 
parties. In short, control of the labor movement gave the Communists a lever in the 
political process and put them in position to offer Arbenz readily  mobilized popular 
support.336 
 
Quickly following the official recognition of the Communist party in 1952, Fortuney and 
the respective Communist leadership started a massive propaganda campaign distributing 65,000 
copies of the communist party manifesto to campensino’s and rural laborers. 337 Even prior to 
this, in 1951, the party had been working through its communist newspaper Octubre distributing 
150,000 pieces of propaganda and on agrarian reform 210,000 items of propaganda were 
circulated.338 Octubre made bold statements such as: “The laboring class must develop the party 
which it directs itself; only a Marxist-Leninist party is able to be the instrument of struggle 
capable of assuring a proper policy for the workers and peasants, the group capable of leading all 
the people.”339 With growing propaganda and membership, the PGT collaborated with the 
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CGTG, whose leader, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, was the unquestionable leader of 100,000 
organized workers.340 Moreover, as Schneider recounts, “in every significant union there was a 
Communist fraction operating under the directions of the PGT.”341 Historian Cole Blasier, in a 
similar tone toe Schneider, contends that the communists “dominated the Guatemalan labor 
movement.”342 
Nonetheless, Gleijeses argues: 
The PGT, however, never controlled the labor confederation. Its influence depended on 
Arbenz’s support and on the personal prestige of a handful of CGTG leaders who 
belonged to the party. Within the CGTG, individual unions retained a large degree of 
autonomy, and only a few were led by PGT members. 343 
 
Hence, Gleijeses appears to depart from Schneider and Blasier’s firm claim that the CP 
controlled the labor movement. Nonetheless, Gleijeses highlights that “With the exception of 
union elections, the great majority of the hundred thousand CGTG members voted for the 
revolutionary parties and for the PGT.”344  
Although it is difficult to reconcile Schneider and Blaseir’s overwhelming contention that 
the CP controlled the labor, while Gleijeses argues the CP did not control the labor, the ultimate 
conclusion is that, at the very least, the CP wielded considerable influence in the labor 
movement, a conclusion that even Gleijeses could agree upon.  
3.2.8 CP Power in Peruvian Labor:  
In comparison to the CP’s influence in the Guatemalan labor movement, the CP’s influence, and 
or control, of the Peruvian labor movement was also extensive. Moreover, the labor movement in 
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Peru wielded considerable power and influence in the State. Mauceri argues that the communist 
party (in part because of the symbiotic relationship to the Velasco regime) became the 
predominant force in the labor movement345 while working with their communist union affiliate 
the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP).346 Consequently, Mauceri contends 
that 44 percent of all unions were affiliated with the communist party. 347 According to Carmen 
Rosa Balbi in “Politics and Trade Unions in Peru”: “In the past, the CGTP was the main political 
representative of organized labor. The CGTP was consolidated during the 1970s in a struggle for 
workers’ rights and for improved labor legislation.”348  
With the CGTP and the CP firmly in control of Peruvian labor, the Velasco regime had a 
vested interest in the growth of industry and saw labor as a source of potential success for 
industrial growth. Moreover, Hunefeldt argues that “Velasco [created] new union organizations 
for peasants, students, workers, and professionals” to “gain popular support.”349 Indeed, much 
like Arevalo had done for the labor movement in Guatemala, Velasco sought to bolster the 
freedom and strength of the labor movement in Peru. Kenneth Roberts describes Velasco’s 
impact on labor by stating, “Structurally, rapid industrialization expanded the manufacturing 
labor force from 428,700 in 1961 to 643,900 in 1971. Industrial conflicts over wages and 
demands such as labor rights and union autonomy also increased.  The reforms of Velasco had a 
politicizing effect.”350 Furthermore, Mauceri reports that the “The number of Labor 
organizations during the Velasco era dramatically increased. Nearly 2000 new unions were 
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officially recognized from 1969 to 1975, the same number of unions recognized in the previous 
30 years.” The following table charts the increased growth in unions under Velasco.  
 
Figure 3: Growth of Peru's Recognized Trade Unions 
From 1968 to 1973, a substantial growth in unions was seen in all sectors. No sectors saw 
a fall in the number of unions during this time period.  
Mauceri argues that the growth in unions coincided with the strengthening of the left: 
“The regime implemented a variety of new schemes in the labor sector that favored a strong 
leftist presence.”351 Spurred on by the regime support, the CGTP initiated a new set of labor 
strategies that included “confrontational and combative tactics,” including marches, rallies, 
propaganda, and even violent confrontation with authorities or employers.352 Elizabeth Dore 
explains this process when stating:  
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While the number of labor unions nearly doubled under Velasco, they were not the 
compliant, coopted organizations envisioned by government planners to  ameliorate class 
conflict through social reform. Their autonomy not only allowed  the Communist-led CGTP to 
expand, but also made it possible for the radical Left to  advocate militant class identities and 
confrontational tactics to break with  traditional clientelistic relations in the workplace.353 
Mauceri contends that the CGTP and its offspring were responsible for the majority of 
strikes in the country, “accounting for 63 percent of the man-hours lost to strikes in this period.” 
Another 20 percent was attributed to other Marxist oriented groups that included the Maoists and 
the New Left Labor Federations. 354 The following chart’s demonstrates the increased number of 
strikes under the Velasco regime: 
 
Figure 4: Total Number of Strikes 
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Figure 5: Workers Involved in Thousands 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Total Labor Force 
 
Figure 7: Man Hours Lost in Millions 
Notice that the total numbers of strikes per year, consistent from 1960 through 1972, 
dramatically increased from 1973 to 1975, the latter half of Velasco’s tenure. Following 
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Velasco’s removal, in 1976, we see another dramatic shift in the amount of strikes returning to 
the levels seen in the 1960s. Yet, the percentage of man hours lost doubled from 1966 to 1975 
and the percentage of the total labor force striking increased from 6.3 percent in 1966 to 28.9 
percent in the final year of the Velasco regime in 1975. Once again, these statistics fell back to 
12 percent the following year in 1976.  
The increase in strikes during the Velasco regime should not be minimalized or taken for 
granted as a source of social unrest. According to Stephen Gorman, “The labor disturbances 
eventually culminated in three nation-wide general strikes, one of which lasted three days and 
semi-paralyzed the country. The military regime lost political ground to the unions since it had 
already lacked popularity to begin with.”355 
Hence, with such widespread social unrest and the drastic increase in labor unions and 
their strength to affect change in the country, there is little doubt that in comparison with the 
threat that the labor movement may have posed in the Guatemalan regime, the labor movement 
in Peru was on equal par. With such a compelling comparison in mind, why was Velasco’s 
regime not considered a threat, or at the very least, why was the CP’s strength in labor not 
considered a threat in Peru? 
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3.3 EXTRA VARIABLES TO CONSIDER: MAKING THE ARGUMENT THAT 
VELASCO AND HIS REGIME SHOULD HAVE COUNTERFACTUALLY BEEN 
CONSIDERED A THREAT IN THE LATE 1940S AND EARLY 1950S.  
As an extra point of argument, I highlight, beyond all of the other similarities I have 
pointed out, Velasco’s policy initiatives mimicked exceptionally “leftist reforms” that I contend 
should have counterfactually would have been considered a concern in Guatemala. Specifically, 
Stephen Gormon argues, in Post-revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation, that the 
agenda for both the “left”— which according to Cameron et al., was dominated by Marxist 
political parties, including the CP356—and the CTGP and the military government were closely 
aligned. The closeness of their policy goals is demonstrated by the following charts. The first 
figure lists the political parties that are compared, of which I highlighted the “left,” the CGTP, 
Velasco’s military government. In the same figure a list also defines the various issues that the 
parties are taking position on. The second figure demonstrates the issues agreement between the 
military government, the “left,” and the CGTP, which is expressed through (+) and (-).  
Table 1: Selected Key Factors in the Political Economy of Peru 
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Table 2: Matrix of Policy Orientations of Key Groups 
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357In summary, aside from “promoting national defense,” the “left” and the military shared 
postions on all other key issues. Similarly, the CGTP maintained similar views with the military 
aside from the issue of maintaining a civilian government, which the military actually favored, 
while the CGTP did not.  The only other points of differentation between the CGTP and the 
military regime were on the topics of “promoting self-help and local infrastructure development 
projects” and the issue of “maintain[ing] vigorous support of the Andean Pact,” both of which 
the CGTP took a neutral stance for both issues, while the military government took a favorable 
position for both. I must make clear that these “issues” were not grounds for U.S. policy makers 
to consider Velasco’s regime a threat per say, but, I high light them to show how the Military 
regime, the “left,” and the CGTP shared similar political platforms, which may have caused 
concern from the perspecitve of policy makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s.   
Yet, not only did Velasco’s regime mirror the CP’s political platform in this way, it 
became increasingly radical. Barrios argues that, “The new leftist military government, some of 
whose advisers were from Marxist parties or the labor movement, set Peru off on its own course 
seeking independence from its traditional allies in the West.”358 Hernan Rosenkranz reports:  
Radicals [in government] wanted state-intervention, control of foreign investment, partial 
redistribution of wealth; they did not hesitate to call themselves “Socialists,” and encouraged a 
certain kind of mass participation. Moderate reformists shared the radical’s inclination for state 
intervention and the control of foreign investment,  but put more emphasis on growth and 
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productive investment rather than on  distribution. Conservatives resisted attempts to transform 
the status quo, although they would support limited, specific change. 359 
The shift of key policy makers in Velasco’s cabinet toward the “left” is further 
demonstrated by the following charts. These charts show the shift in balance from moderate 
ideologies of key policy makers in Velasco’s cabinet to more radical policy makers over the 
course of Velasco’s stay in office.  
 
Figure 8: Velasco's Cabinet Composition of Coservative, Moderate Reformists and Radicals 
360 
In 1968, Velasco’s cabinet was comprised of only conservatives and moderate reformists. 
Yet, in 1969 three radicals were introduced and, in 1971, four radicals were installed in 
Velasco’s cabinet. By 1975 five radicals held cabinet positions, while the number of 
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conservatives had decreased from 5 in 1969, to 4 in 1973, and 3 in 1975. In summation, such 
evidence should have been considered as a prime indication that a communist threat was 
manifesting in Velasco’s regime, that is, if such variables had been present in the late 1950’s and 
early 1950’s. For the last time, why was Velasco’s regime not considered a threat?  
3.4 OVERVIEW OF COMPARISON:  
Table 3: Arevalo's and Velasco's relations with CP in their respective countries 
 Banned CP Formed relations 
with international 
communists 
Formed close relations 
with domestic CP 
Exiled CP members to 
show opposition to their 
growing strength 
Arevalo Yes No Yes Yes 
Velasco No No No, but closest advisors 
were “radical” and 
perhaps Marxist 
Socialists. 
No, but claimed to be 
willing to kill CP members 
if they stepped out of line. 
 
Table 4: Arevalo and Velasco’s political philosophies, defense of their regimes (i.e. anti-communist), and 
stance on democracy: 
 Claimed to be anti-
communist 
 
claimed to favor alternative 
paths to liberalism and communism  
(i.e. non-Marxist Socialist or 
communist) 
Pro-
Democracy 
Arevalo Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Velasco Yes Yes No 
 
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of Arbenz and Velasco: The extent of Arbenz 
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and Velasco’s “relations” with domestic CP, pro-communist or Marxist, and 
stance on democracy, and Marxist or communist affiliation. 
 Granted CP 
official 
recognition 
Pro-Marxist or 
Communist 
Maintained 
personal relations 
with CP members 
Pro-
Democratic 
Defended regime 
was not communist 
Arbenz Yes Never publicly 
announced that he was 
pro-Marxist during his 
tenure 
Yes Yes Yes (claimed to be a 
pro-democratic and 
never claimed to be 
Marxist or 
communist) 
Velasco Yes No, claimed to be 
vehemently anti-
communist, but still 
granted CP official 
recognition during his 
term and used it for 
political support 
No, but, as argued, 
his closest advisors 
became increasingly 
radical and may have 
been Marxist 
Socialists 
No Yes, claimed to reject 
communism entirely 
as a guiding ideology 
for his regime 
 
 
Table 6: Arbenz and Velasco regimes: CP in government, relations 
with international communists, social platforms. 
 Political platform: anti-imperialist, 
favored institution building, and 
sweeping social reform that 
included the expropriation of U.S. 
businesses 
CP hold government posts Relations with Soviet Bloc 
Arbenz 
Regime 
Yes Yes (but very few and only 4,000 CP in 
country as a whole) 
Yes (but only on two 
occasions, one of which was 
only “talks” of possible 
trade relations) 
Velasco 
Regime 
Yes Yes, but only very limited influence in 
parliament alongside other Marxist 
groups during Velasco’s tenure, but 
during his tenure the “left’s” influence 
appreciated; three years following 
Velasco’s overthrow, they won 29 
percent of vote  in Parliament  
Yes (extensive) 
 
Table 7: Communist Control/Influence of the labor movement in Guatemala and Peru 
Guatemala Significant (main source of CP power in country) 
Peru Significant (main source of CP power in country)  
 141 
3.5 ALLENDE AND REGIME: MORE RADICAL AND MORE COMMUNIST THAN 
AREVALO, ARBENZ, VELASCO AND THEIR RESPECTIVE REGIMES 
(CONCLUSION 2): 
 
In this section, I hope to affirm several basic points that provide grounds for my claim that 
Allende was more communist than the other leaders and was thus considered a threat in the 
1970s, despite its less charged atmosphere and a change in U.S. foreign policy and policy 
perception. The two prime variables that caused U.S. policy makers to consider Allende a threat 
were:  
(1) Allende was openly Marxist, favoring a “Marxist-Socialist revolution” 
through his career; and  
 
(2) Allende openly supported the international communist movement and praised 
various communist, Marxist, and Socialist leaders.  
 
These two variables alone caused U.S. policy makers to view Allende as a threat well 
before his election to the Chilean Presidency in 1970 or attempted election in 1964. Thus, U.S. 
policy makers did not initially consider Allende a threat  because of the variables that caused 
U.S. policy makers such concern in Guatemala in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. Hence, as 
discussed in my introduction, the case of Allende cannot be used to discount my thesis. 
Still, the variables seen in Guatemala were, in large part, present in Allende’s regime 
once he ascended the Presidency in 1970 and may have further motivated U.S. policy makers to 
act. Even so, these variables were certainly only auxiliary threats to in comparison to the two 
variables listed above. Indeed, without a further cause for threat, the case of Velasco’s regime, as 
I will argue for in the third Chapter, clearly shows that the U.S. was not willing to act upon the 
variables that had once been considered as threatening in Guatemala, at least on their own.   
 142 
 Nonetheless, I will also briefly touch upon Allende’s regimes relations with the 
Socialist Bloc, his expropriation of U.S. businesses as a point of comparison with the other cases, 
and the role of the CP in his government, which I argue was far more “advanced” when 
compared to the role of the CP in both of the Guatemalan regimes and Velasco’s regime. The last 
point—the CP’s advanced role in Allende’s coalition and government—thoroughly demonstrates 
how Allende and his regime were more communist than the other cases.  
Lastly, I will touch upon Allende’s commitment to democracy, despite his Marxist-
Socialist orientation. This is important to highlight in order to show that a difference in regime 
type—dictatorship versus democracy— is indeed present between Allende’s Chilean regime and 
Velasco’s regime in Peru, as it is also present between the regimes of Arevalo and Arbenz when 
compared to Velasco’s regime. As I have previously argued, this difference, in part, explains the 
U.S.’s anxiety in Guatemala and Chile and the lack of anxiety for Velasco and his regime.  
3.5.1 Salvador Allende: A Marxist 
Allende’s Marxist roots predated his political career and followed him all the way to the 
presidency. Peter Winn, who interviewed Allende during the height of his Presidency reports that 
Allende described himself early in his life as a poor medical student living in impoverished 
neighborhoods. Winn recounts that this was Allende’s exposure to the “tragedy of poverty” and 
that “Part of his subsequent appeal as a political candidate was his image of a doctor in politics, 
curing society’s ills.”361 Allende lamented, “My studies taught me that Socialism was the only 
                                                 
361 Winn, Peter. “Salvador Allende: His Political Life…and after life”. Socialism and Democracy, Volume 19, Issue 3, p. 133, 2005. Web. 22 Sept. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
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solution to these problems and that Chile had to find its own road.”362 Salvador Allende became 
Secretary-General of the Socialist Party in 1943 and was subsequently elected to the Chilean 
Senate in 1945. He even claimed to have been one of the “founders of the Socialist party.”363 
The Socialist party was, in fact, a “Socialist Marxist party.”364  
A decade and half later, Allende won the presidential office, while maintaining his 
Marxist badge, self-proclaiming himself a “Marxist Socialist President.”365  Upon taking office 
he exclaimed, “The President of the Republic is a Socialist…I have reached this office to achieve 
the economic and social transformation of Chile, to open the road for Socialism. Our aim is 
Marxist Socialism, total and Scientific.366 Toward this end, in Allende’s inauguration speech, he 
declared: 
This Victory belongs to the workers, to those who suffered and endured for more 
than a century and a half, under the name of independence, the exploitation of a  ruling 
class which was unable to provide progress and wasn’t even concerned about it. We all 
know the truth that the backwardness, ignorance and hunger of our people from it.367 
 
Allende affirmed, in January 1971, “The people of Chile chose the road of revolution and 
we have not forgotten the fundamental principle of Marxism: the class struggle. During the 
electoral campaign we said that the purpose of our struggle was to change the regime, the 
system.”368 He subsequently concluded that the “backwardness” of Chili’s society was directly 
linked to capitalism.369   
 
                                                 
362 Ibid.  363 Debray, Regis. The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971.p. 61. 364 Faundez, Julio. Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende. London: Yale University Press, 1988. p. 85, 86. 365 Debray, p. 67.  366 Pinera, Jose. “How Salvador Allende Destroyed Democracy in Chile”. Society, Vol. 42, Issue 6, p. 21, 2005. Web. 28 Sept. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 367 Johnson, Dale. The Chilean Road to Socialism. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973. p. 150. 368 Debray, p. 81. 369 Johnson, p. 151. 
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3.5.2 Allende’s personal relations with international communism: 
Moreover, Allende’s commitment to international communism began early in his career. For 
example, in 1953, Allende was one of the “principle speakers” at a ceremony to honor Joseph 
Stalin following his death. Allende exclaimed, “Stalin was to the Russian People a banner of 
revolution, of creative execution, of human sentiment; a symbol of edifying peace and 
unbounded heroism…but above all this is his enormous faith in Marx and Lenin doctrine and his 
unyielding Marxist behavior.”370 It is crucial to understand the gravity of this statement, a 
statement that can be interpreted as nothing other than full acceptance of the international 
communist movement. Without going into a full discussion of Stalin, no one other than a 
communist member or devout Marxist follower would make such statements. Moreover, when 
contrasted with the public comments of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco, there is no mistaking that 
Allende’s ideology is explicitly pro-communist and Marxist, whereas the stance of the other men 
was always obscure, if not, overtly anti-communist.  
Now this is not to say that he fully agreed with Stalin on every issue, but, generally 
speaking he supported international communism. For example, Peter Winn reports:  
Allende’s political principles were revealed by two acts of solidarity that he undertook in 
1948: the first was to visit the Moscow-line orthodox Communist leaders imprisoned in 
the desert concentration camp of Pisagua; the second was to express his solidarity with 
the dissident Yugoslav Communist leader Tito in his conflict with Stalin and the Soviet 
Union, affirming ‘each people is free to choose is own road to socialism.’371 
 
Even late in his career, during his presidency Allende maintained his support of 
international communism and, “In a speech in the Kremlin on December 7, 1972, Allende even 
called the communist superpower the ‘Big Brother’ of Chile.” In the same breath, according to 
                                                 
370 Pinera, p. 23. 371 Winn, p. 136. 
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Jose Pinera, “having met with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai 
Podgorny, Allende, said that he had reached an ‘identical point of view’ with the communist 
leaders. Thereafter, he received the ‘Lenin Peace Prize.’”372 
 Moreover, according to a Fact on File Publication, Allende and Chile, on December 6, 
1972, Allende traveled to Moscow where he met Soviet Communist Party General Secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev, President Nikolai Podgorny, Premier Aleksei Kosygin and 100,000 citizens. 
Four days later, Allende arrived in Havana, Cuba and was met by Premier Fidel Castro, President 
Osvaldo Dorticos, and “a large crowd.”373  
As a final point of evidencing his strong support for international communism, while 
being interviewed by Debrays, Allende explained that Fidel Castro had sent him a gift following 
the election of Popular Unity:  
He sent me a copy of Granma, the official organ of the Cuban revolution, which had the 
news of our electoral victory splashed across the front page. He had been at the offices of 
the newspaper waiting for the news from Chile, and he sent his congratulations on the 
front page proclaiming that ours was a victory against imperialism, signed it and had it 
signed by everyone around him. I keep it as a souvenir. He also called me that morning 
after the election to congratulate us.374 
 
When Allende was asked what he had learned from the Cuban revolution, he responded: 
“An extraordinary lesson… when it has responsible leadership, when it has men who are able to 
interpret the people’s will, to feel that the people are the government,  and this is the case 
with Fidel.”375  
Lastly, I highlight that throughout this interview Debray continually referred to Allende 
as “comrade president,” to which Allende would also refer to Debray as “comrade.” The term 
                                                 
372 Pinera, p. 23. 373 Sobel, Lester A., Ed. Chile & Allende. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1974. p. 102. 374 Debray, p. 74.  375 Debray, p. 73.  
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comrade was adopted by international communists and was used throughout the Socialist bloc to 
refer to friends or supporters of the Soviet State and communism in general. Hence, above all, it 
is quite difficult to refute the claim that Allende was a supporter of international communism, a 
stance that was never shared with the leaders in my other case studies.  
3.5.3 Allende’s Regime:  A quick note on the regimes relations with the Socialist Bloc: 
Aside from his personal relations with international communists, Allende’s regime sought aid 
from other Socialist countries. According to Dale Johnson, in his book The Chilean Road to 
Socialism, representatives of the Chilean regime engaged in a “technical mission” for the 
purposes of gaining aid to bolster Chileans antiquated technological fields and industrial 
infrastructure. Johnson contends that the Soviet Union, the Polish Government, the Yugoslavs, 
the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, and the East Germans were willing to contribute to Chileans 
needs after a multi-month tour by the Chilean technical mission in these countries.376 In 1972, 
Chile established diplomatic ties with both North Korea and North Vietnam, “becoming the first 
South American nation to recognize either country.” Beginning on May 28, 1972, Chile secured 
a loan from China for 65 million dollars.377 Thus, the Chilean regime’s relations with the 
Socialist Bloc appear quite similar to the Peruvian-Soviet relations from 1968 to 1975, but were 
clearly more advanced than those experienced by Arbenz’s regime.  
                                                 
376 Johnson, p. 144, 145, 146. 377 Sobel, p. 105. 
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3.5.4 Chile Social Platforms: 
In the first year of Allende’s Presidency, Allende immediately began nationalizing companies, 
including those from the U.S. For example, a slew of nationalizations occurred: On November 
20, 1971, Allende ordered the nationalization of Nibsa, a plumbing and heating fittings 
manufacturer and on December 1st of the same year, the government nationalized Bellavista 
Tome, the country’s largest fabric manufacturer. Twenty days later, on December 21st, the 
government gave orders to nationalize the copper industry, including three American 
companies—Anaconda Co., Kennecott Corp., and the Cerro Corps, order that were approved by 
Congress on July 11, 1971.378 On December 30, 1971, Allende called for the nationalization of 
the banking system, while excluding any national banks from operating in Chile.379 On January 
1, the trend continued, and the Agriculture Minister Jacques Chonchol announced the 
government plan to expropriate farms larger than 80 hectares and stated that all of these farms 
would be legally expropriated by the end of 1971.380  
Many more expropriations occurred, all which will not be discussed. It suffices to say 
that in October 19, 1971, Allende sent a bill to congress that listed 150 Chilean firms that he felt 
should be nationalized.381 Among the most controversial of the expropriations was with 
American owned ITT. The point stands that, like Arbenz and Velasco, Allende sought a drastic 
overhaul of the state and succeeded immensely before being overthrown in 1973. Once again, the 
similarities to Velasco’s regime are quite apparent, while Arbenz’s social reforms were far more 
docile and less expansive in comparison.  
                                                 
378 Ibid., p. 52. 379 Ibid., p. 38. 380 Ibid., p. 50. 381 Ibid., p. 57. 
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3.5.5 Allende’s Coalition: Popular Unity 
As a final point, in order to demonstrate how Allende and his regime were more radical and more 
communist than Arevalo, Arbenz, Velasco and their regimes, I highlight the extensive role of the 
CP in Allende’s government and how Allende’s socialist party was even more radical than the 
Chilean CP. Indeed, according to Pinera, the Chilean CP “was the largest and best organized of 
all the communist parties in Latin America, and the third largest in the Western world, after those 
of France and Italy.” 382 Yet, Allende’s government was a conglomerate of “leftist” ideologies, 
that Julio Faundez argues, in his book Marxism and Democracy in Chile, were “not 
homogeneous.”383 Regardless, Faundez contends that the Socialist and Communist Parties were 
the two largest and most influential parties in Allende’s coalition:  “the bulk of the coalition’s 
elector strength was derived from three of its six members: the Communist, Socialist and Radical 
parties.” Fuandez reports that the strength of the CP and the Socialist was demonstrated in the 
1969 general elections: 
In the general election of 1969, the combined vote of these parties had in fact reached 41 
per cent, that is, 5 percent more than Allende had obtained in the 1970 presidential 
elections. In these same 1969 electoral results, the largest of the three parties was the 
Communist Party, with 15.9 per cent of the vote, followed by the Radical and Socialist 
parties with 13 and 12.3 per cent of the vote respectively. 384 
 
Faundez further argues that members of the three largest parties “were appointed to ten 
out of the fifteen cabinet posts.”385  
                                                 
382 Pinera, p. 22. 383 Faundez, p. 198.  384 Ibid., p. 198. 385 Ibid., p. 199.  
 149 
Although all of the parties did not share exacting ideologies, the CP and Socialist parties, 
wielding the most significant power, shared a mutual goal of Socialist revolution in Chile; a goal 
that I contend would not have been ignored by U.S. policy makers, regardless of time period.  
Julio Faundez briefly summarizes the similarities and differences between the two party’s 
respective ideologies in the 1950s, which generally characterizes a mutual end of Socialist 
revolution, but a contrasting method for accomplishing this end:  
When the FRAP was created in 1956 the political strategies of communists and Socialists 
were notably different. That of the Communists, known as the national liberation front, 
was based on the conception of a Socialist revolution with two  clearly defined stages. 
The first would prepare the ground for socialism by freeing the economy from the fetters 
of imperialism and the landed oligarchy. During this stage, the process of 
democratization within the existing capitalist state would be furthered by a political 
alliance between working-class parties and those groups within the bourgeoisie whose 
interests were in conflict with imperialism and the  local oligarchy. This stage, also 
described as the national democratic stage of the revolution, would last for an unspecified 
time, but would be followed by a second stage, in which the working-class parties would 
conquer power and begin a period of Socialist transition. The line developed by the 
Socialist in the early fifties, known  as the Worker’s Front Strategy started from the 
assumption that the local bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out the democratic tasks 
as set out by the Communist Party in the first stage of the revolution. Accordingly, it 
described the Socialist revolution as an uninterrupted process led, from the start, by the 
working class. 386 
 
Notice that differences are apparent, such as the “two stage” versus “one stage” approach 
to accomplish the mutual goal of Socialist revolution, but the end goal is still the same: Marxist 
Socialist revolution!  
In fact, the Socialist party was more radical than the CP. The communists became 
“leading advocates of united front tactics and a peaceful way to socialism” beginning in the 
1930’s  and 387 favored peaceful methods.388 In contrast, Faundez contends that “there was a 
marked radicalization of the Socialist Party from 1952 to 1970. After adopting the Workers’ 
                                                 
386 Ibid., p. 160. 387 Moss, Robert. Chile’s Marxist Experiment. New York: Halsted Press, 1973. p. 43. 388 Ibid., p. 44. 
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Front Strategy in the mid-1950s, it followed a line which was consistently to the left of the 
Communist Party.”389 The radical stance of the Socialist party is characterized by an annual 
Socialist meeting in 1965, when an unnamed Socialist proclaimed, “Our strategy in fact rejects 
the electoral route as a way to achieve our goal of seizing power…the Party has one objective: in 
order to obtain power, the party must use all the methods and means that the revolutions struggle 
requires.”390 Likewise, a “resolution” passed in another Socialist meeting in 1967 and contended: 
Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate….It constitutes the only route 
to political and economic power…Only by destroying the democratic-military 
apparatus of the bourgeois State can the Socialist revolution take root…The 
peacefulor legal expression of struggle do not, in themselves, lead to power. The 
Socialist Party considers them to be instruments of limited action, part of the 
political process that leads us to armed struggle.391 
 
Even Allende did not appear opposed to the use of force. For example, in January 1971, 
while in the Presidency, Allende argued, “The revolutionary struggle may be found in the 
guerilla foco or in urban insurrection; it may be the people’s war and it may be an insurgence 
through the polling booths; it depends on the content it is given. In some countries, there is no 
alternative to the armed struggle.”392 Nonetheless, Faundez reports: 
By the mid-1960s, [Socialists] repudiated the electoral process, declaring that 
revolutionary violence was inevitable. Yet despite this rhetoric, its practice was, as ever, 
consistent with its parliamentary traditions…once it became clear at the practical level 
that there was no easy alternative to the Communist strategy, it followed their lead while, 
at the ideological level, embracing the view that violence was the only way to Socialist 
revolution.393 
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However, regardless of whether violence was or was not carried out, I argue that the mere 
rhetorical call to violence was so blatantly threatening that U.S. policy makers could not ignore 
it.  
3.5.6 Allende’s Pro-Democratic Stance: 
Allende’s stance on democracy also indicates that he ultimately favored a “peaceful road to 
socialism” and favored constitutional democracy in Chile, but, as argued, his commitment to 
democracy is important because of my general contention that U.S. policy makers favored 
dictatorships over democracy’s, which, partially explains why U.S. policy makers, as argued, 
were so threatened by Allende even well before his ascendency to the presidency. In light of 
Allende’s “communist credentials,” U.S. policy makers realized that Allende had a real “shot” at 
achieving power through the electoral process and were threatened as a result.  
 According to Edgardo Boeninger, in The Chilean Road to Democracy, “At the dawn of 
the 1960s, Chile enjoyed the enviable reputation of being one of the few stable democracies in 
Latin America.”394 Indeed, Daniel Hellinger, in “Electoral Change in the Chilean Countryside: 
The Presidential Elections of 1958 and 1970,” argues that “Chilean elections during the period of 
the Republic are generally acknowledged to have been fairly administered and free from 
corruption.” Yet, Hellinger also reports that if any interference in the electoral process occurred 
it was a result of “foreign intervention” and especially the CIA. My survey of Chile in the next 
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chapter will thoroughly support this claim. Nonetheless, the Chilean democracy, on its own, was 
fully intact. 395 
Following Allende’s ascension to the Presidency, throughout his tenure, he maintained a 
commitment to democracy. Immediately following his election to the Presidency, at the National 
Stadium in Santiago on November 5, 1970, Allende exclaimed:  
The People of Chile are proud of having made the political road prevail over the 
violent one. This is a noble tradition, a lasting achievement. Throughout our 
permanent battle for liberation, the slow and hard struggle for justice and equality, 
we have always preferred solving social conflicts by means of persuasion and 
political action. From the bottoms of our hearts, we Chileans reject fratricidal 
struggle—but without ever giving up the defense of the right of the people. Our 
coat of arms says “By reason or force,” but it puts reason first. This civic peace, 
this continuation of the political process, is no accident. It is the result of our 
social economic structure, of a particular relationship of social forces which our 
country has been building in keeping with the reality of our development. 396 
 
Even well into his tenure, Allende spoke of protecting Chilean Democracy. Lester Sobel, 
in Allende and Chile, summarizes one Allende’s speeches presented on November 4, 1971, in 
front of 70,000 workers and students: “Allende insisted his government did not intend to destroy 
the institution of private property. He promised that the country, while following the ‘Chilean 
road to socialism,’ would remain a pluralistic, democratic and free society.”397 
Likewise, Peter Winn describes a conversation he had with Allende in 1972: 
His ambition was to be the first leader in history  to reach socialism “without 
violence because there are millions of people in the world who want socialism, 
but without having to pay the terrible price of civil war.” “If that is being 
ambitious,” he stressed, “then I am ambitious, but it is not an ordinary or vulgar 
ambition. It is a historic ambition.” 
 
In summation, Allende’s commitment to democracy was quite evident.  
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3.5.7 Conclusion:  
Overall, Allende was a Marxist Socialists, supported international communism, and was 
committed to democracy. I argue that all three of these variables are what caused U.S. policy 
makers to view Allende as an extreme threat well before his election and throughout his tenure in 
the 1970’s, above and beyond the variables that caused U.S. policy makers to consider the 
Guatemalan case as threatening. Nonetheless, Allende’s regime shared similarities with the 
Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco’s regime in terms of several of the variables that U.S. policy 
makers considered threatening in Arevalo and Arbenz’s regime.  The Chilean regimes 
expropriation of businesses mimicked the actions of Arbenz and Velasco, while his regime’s 
trade relations with the Soviet Bloc mimicked that of Velasco’s regime. The Chilean CP was the 
largest in South America and had an extensive influence in Allende’s government coalition. 
Furthermore, Allende’s own Socialist party was more radical the Chilean CP and favored, at 
least in rhetoric, violent methods to achieve a Marxist Socialist revolution. In total, Allende and 
his regime were more radical and more communist than the other leaders and their respective 
regimes.  
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3.5.8 Overview:  
Table 8: A comparison of Allende’s regime with the regimes of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco 
 Expropriation of 
U.S. business 
interests 
CP in government Relations with Soviet Bloc Pro-Democratic 
Arevalo 
regime 
Yes No No Yes 
Arbenz 
regime 
Yes Yes (but very limited) No (except on instance of 
arms shipment in 1954) 
Yes 
Velasco 
regime 
Yes Yes (but exceptionally limited) Yes, extensive No 
Allende 
regime 
Yes Yes (CP party second largest 
party in government coalition 
and largest CP in South 
America) 
Yes, extensive Yes 
 
Table 9: A comparison of Allende personal ideology and relationship with domestic and international 
communists in comparison to Arbenz, Arevalo, and Velasco: 
 Close relations with domestic 
communists 
International communist 
follower 
Ideology favors Marxism and a transition to a 
Marxist Socialist state 
Arbenz Yes No No, favored constitutional democracy and 
liberalism.  
Arevalo Yes No No, favored a unique brand of non-Marxist 
socialism and favored, and although claiming to 
favor a unique path away from liberalism and 
communism, most likely adopted a liberalist 
outlook. 
Velasco  No, but closest advisors were 
radical and some were Marxist 
Socialists 
No No, favored an independent ideology from both 
liberalism and communism  (a form of 
populism) 
Allende Yes Yes Yes 
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4.0  CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                       
THE PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY MAKERS AND THE PERCEPTION OF 
“THREAT” 
In light of the similarities described— between the cases of Guatemala and Peru— the purpose 
of this chapter is, above all, to demonstrate that U.S. policy makers not only judged the regimes 
of Arevalo and Arbenz as exceptionally threatening in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but it will 
also bring to light that U.S. policy makers undertook extensive investigations to substantiate and 
legitimize that a threat was present in Guatemala. In contrast, U.S. policy makers were not only 
unconcerned about the threat of communism in Velasco’s regime, but did not provide the same 
breadth of investigation to search for a communist threat as was seen in the case of Guatemala. 
Hence, a discrepancy in perspective was apparent between the two cases, which, as argued can 
be explained by a change in foreign policy and policy perception and my second thesis (U.S. 
policy makers favored dictatorships).  
This chapter will also demonstrate that U.S. policy makers considered Allende a threat 
well before his election to the Chilean Presidency—even in the 1950s— and sought to prevent 
his election as early as 1964. Like the case of Guatemala, U.S. policy makers, once again, 
scrutinized Allende and the Chilean State in search of a communist threat to a much greater 
extent than policy makers had scrutinized Velasco and his regime. As argued, Allende and his 
regime were still considered a threat in the 1970s because they were far more radical and 
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communist than the other cases. However, I also contend that the greater scrutiny applied to the 
democratic regimes of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende, when compared to the lack of scrutiny 
applied to the authoritarian Velasco and his regime, suggests that U.S. policy makers favored 
dictatorships over democracies, hence, my second thesis. Moreover, the fact President Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger sought to use Velasco’s regime as a non-Marxist example to Allende’s Marxist 
regime further supports this argument, alongside the evidence provided in Chapter One. I argue: 
the second thesis also accounts for the discrepancy in perspective between the case of Guatemala 
and Peru, and further explains why Allende was seen as a threat in the 1970s.  
In light of these claims, the fact that U.S. policy makers did not intervene and did not 
even consider intervention in Peru as an option superficially supports the conclusion that a 
discrepancy in perception was apparent; however, this chapter further articulates and 
demonstrates how a change in perspective occurred: by analyzing, in all three cases, the 
correspondence between U.S. policy officials in the U.S. embassy and the State Department and 
conversations between top policy makers. 
I argue that the study of U.S. policy makers’ correspondence, in all three cases, 
demonstrates the change in foreign policy and policy perception from 1945 through the 1970s, 
thus linking my case studies to my argument in Chapter One. For example, I highlight that U.S. 
policy maker’s use of language—word choice, tone, and the conclusions reached in their 
respective telegrams and conversations— in the 1940s and 1950s is much different than was seen 
in the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of Guatemala, U.S. policy makers clearly believed that the 
idea of communism had indoctrinated the Guatemalan society. That is, words such as 
“subversion,” “dupe,” and “fellow traveler,” were used by U.S. policy makers to explain that 
they were worried not only of communists themselves, but a much larger communist conspiracy.  
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Such sentiments directly correspond to the way U.S. policy makers sought to purge the 
American CP from U.S. government and society. In such efforts, U.S. policy makers charged 
that any individual who had relations with a communist was also a threat. Law enforcement 
agencies (e.g. the FBI) and Congress engaged in widespread investigations and hearings to 
uncover communist threats, regardless of how small. As argued, new legislation, such as the 
National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, effectively, continued the investigations 
and “search” for communist threats abroad. Hence, even a modicum of suspicion, then, would 
induce an investigation or a charge that a communist threat might be present.   
I contend: The very same policy perceptions that drove the domestic communist “witch 
hunt”— the legal-moralistic perspective of international relations and the anti-communist liberal-
conservative consensus in the U.S.—were the same sentiments that motivated the U.S. response 
in Guatemala. Such a claim is further bolstered by the fact that the very same years in which the 
hysterical anti-communist political climate was at its climax, from 1947 to 1954, U.S. policy 
makers considered Arevalo and Arbenz a threat. Furthermore, at the peak of McCarthy’s 
influence, around 1952 and 1953, coincided in time with the formation of plans to oust Arbenz’s 
regime. Hence, there is exceptionally strong evidence that suggests the political atmosphere of 
the time, alongside the foreign policy of containment, as it was interpreted to mean defeating the 
spread of communism everywhere, impacted U.S. policy makers’ perception of threat in 
Guatemala.  
By the 1960s and 1970s, the fanatical anxieties of the McCarthyite political atmosphere 
in the 1950s, and the “witch hunt” like attacks on the American CP and international 
communism, had dissipated. Although communism was a predominant concern for U.S. policy 
makers, their correspondence indicates that communism was viewed in a much different way. A 
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change in perspective regarding land reform and social reform as a whole, under the auspices of 
Kennedy’s Alliance for progress, was significant because unlike the late 1940s and 1950s, not 
every “leftist” reform would be considered as a potential communist threat. Rather, not only 
were these social reforms not considered as an indication of communist threats, by the late 
1950’s through the 1970s, but they were conversely utilized in the fight against communism. But 
also, events such as the Sino-Soviet “split” in 1961 and the Vietnam War greatly determined 
U.S. policy maker’s foreign policy abroad. As argued, not every instance of a supposed 
communist threat would be combatted and a more “selective” and practical approach of 
realpolitik would guide U.S. policy maker’s actions. Thus, in Peru, U.S. policy makers such as 
Henry Kissinger were no longer threatened by Velasco’s leftist reform programs, the CPs 
influence in labor, his regime’s relations with the Socialist bloc, or Velasco’s radical cabinet, 
because Kissinger was able to determine, with his more analytical and realpolitik approach to 
international relations, that Velasco and his regime, although leftist, did not support communism. 
Yet, simultaneously, Kissinger was also able to recognize the threat that Allende posed, a threat 
that was linked to his Marxist orientation and his relations with the international communist 
movement. Hence, in response, Kissinger employed the “selective containment” policy and 
sought to remove Allende.  
4.1 GUATEMALA: U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
As an aside from the introduction to Chapter Three thus far, in this section—U.S. perspective in 
Guatemala—I hope to substantiate that the ways in which U.S. policy makers defined the threat 
in Guatemala were linked to: (1) Arevalo and Arbenz’s relations with CP members; (2) the 
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regimes social platform; (3) CP in government; (4) the regimes relations with the Soviet Bloc; 
(5) CP power in the Guatemalan labor movement. Although it is impossible to quantitatively 
determine which of these variables caused U.S. policy makers greater concern, it is clear that the 
land reform program, the CP control of labor, and the belief that a “communist conspiracy” 
throughout Guatemala was the main source of worry. Thus, the worry was not directly linked to 
the amount of communists in the country, because policy makers even acknowledged that the CP 
numbers were quite limited, but, as argued, U.S. anxieties were linked to a more obscure worry 
that the idea of communism was gaining support throughout Guatemalan society. Thus, although 
Arevalo and Arbenz may not have been considered communists, the idea of communism was 
feared to have greatly influenced their regimes.  
Also, in my account of Guatemala, I highlight that U.S. embassy officials were less 
convinced that a communist threat influenced Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s regimes than the CIA, the 
President, and the highest officials in the Department of State such as John Foster Dulles, the 
Secretary of State (who believed Arbenz’s regime posed an imminent communist threat and 
needed to be removed as a result). U.S. embassy officials were, nonetheless, convinced that the 
CP controlled organized labor had the ability to “infiltrate” the “countryside,” but generally 
concluded that no intervention was necessary and Arbenz’s regime was not in danger of “turning 
communist.” Although this paper will not delve into why a difference in perspective occurred in 
the case of Guatemala between lower level State Department officials and higher up state 
department officials, the CIA, and President Truman and Eisenhower, such a discrepancy, at the 
very least, demonstrates how a perception of threat is relative to an individual policy makers 
perspectives. Moreover, it demonstrates the exceptionally anti-communist stance of President 
Truman and Eisenhower and their goal of stopping communism everywhere, a goal that was 
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reflected by Truman’s containment policy and Eisenhower’s “new look” goal of “rolling back” 
communism, especially through covert means.  
To begin, Milton Wells, the Foreign Service Officer in the American Embassy in 
Guatemala, described by Gleijeses as “the embassy’s most influential official,” reported on 
November 27, 1950, that “the extent to which Communism has infiltrated the present 
revolutionary regime in Guatemala is a subject which has occupied a great deal of the Embassy’s 
attention since 1944.”398 According to Richard Immerman, in The CIA in Guatemala: The 
Foreign Policy of Intervention, Wells was suspicious of communist influence within one of 
Arevalo’s reform programs as early as 1945. Led by Carlos Manuel Pellecer (who was described 
by the State Department as one of the “most fiery and least inhibited of the young 
Communists”), the program called for “traveling cultural missions…mobile units that went into 
the outlying regions to educate those Indians who had no other available facilities.” Immerman 
reports, “Wells lamented that these missions had been suspected of radicalism since 1945, but 
now that their chief [(Pellecer)] was ‘a Communist in heart if not in fact…at the same time these 
backward Indians get their A.B.C’s, they get a shot of communism.”399 Hence, even as early as 
1945, Wells anxiety about communism was clearly evident.  
Nevertheless, according to “a December 1946 intelligence report on Soviet objectives in 
the Western Hemisphere,” Gleijeses argues that the report “…expressed no anxiety about 
communism in Central America, except in Costa Rica. In the other four republics, the report 
noted, the Communist party was banned, and ‘there was no indication that if any real 
communists exist, they have an appreciable influence.’”400  
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However, by 1948 and 1949, near the end of Arevalo’s tenure, and during the rise of 
exceptional anti-communism in the U.S., the U.S. embassy in Guatemala had become 
increasingly anxious. In 1948, one year after the emergence of the “Truman Doctrine,” Wells’ 
suspicions had developed. For example, he argued (in a 28 page report on the Communist 
situation in Guatemala) on May 16, 1948:  
Communist penetration made startling progress during the immediate post-
revolutionary period (1944-1947), as evidenced by the radical nature of social, 
labor, and economic reforms, accompanied by strong overtones of class warfare. 
Infiltration of indoctrinated communists, fellow-travelers, and Marxist ideas 
unquestionably reached dangerous proportions.401 
 
Yet, others also shared in this perceptive. For example, on November 3, 1949, the 
Guatemalan desk officer of the State Department similarly reported:  
Many sources allege that the present Government of Guatemala is Communist 
(Moscow)-directed. When I visited there recently our Embassy did not go so far 
as that but did characterize the Guatemalan government as “almost” in that 
category and certainly as a menace to Inter-America unity and defense. 
Furthermore, some Embassy officers maintained that the present Guatemalan 
government is so far  involved with international Communism that there is no 
possibility of its disentanglement.402 
 
Thus, U.S. embassy officials appeared thoroughly convinced that a communist threat was 
present in Guatemala by 1949. Furthermore, according to Gleijeses, “By the late 1940s the 
Truman administration [also] saw Guatemala as a nightmarish world infested not only by 
communists, but also by ill-defined yet dangerous species such as pro-Communists, fellow 
travelers, extreme leftists, and radical leftists.”403  Immerman argues that “The Truman 
administration’s alarm grew concurrently with the enactment of Arevalo’s Labor Code and the 
rising number of strikes involving the United Fruit and International Railways of Central 
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America.404 He added: “William Barber, Truman’s deputy assistant secretary of state for 
American republic affairs…[explained] in 1949 that Washington viewed government programs 
such as agrarian reform bills, which damaged United States investments, as symptoms of a much 
larger problem.”405 In effect, U.S. policy makers believed the “leftist” land reform programs and 
labor unrest during Arevalo’s tenure signified that a communist threat was present in Guatemala.  
However, despite this seemingly firm conclusion, from 1949 through 1952, U.S. policy 
makers vacillated on whether or not communism posed a serious threat. Indeed, my survey of the 
U.S embassy official’s correspondences reveals that they were undecided on how threatening 
Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes were. Gleijeses affirms, “With abrupt swings toward greater 
pessimism, this ‘centrist’ view prevailed, both in the embassy and in Washington. Despite their 
fears and their irritation, U.S. officials conceded occasionally in 1949 and 1950 that Arevalo and 
his government could act in a constructive manner.”406   
In this light, Wells admitted by 1949 to being unsure about the threat that Arevalo’s 
regime posed. For example, on March 31, 1949, Wells contended that Arevalo was the, “Biggest 
Enigma” and on July 7, 1950, Well’s reported that Arevalo had condemned communism in his 
speeches. In fact, Arevalo had directly told Wells that the communist’s “identities are known,” 
and Arevalo stated that “come a crisis, [the communists] would be rounded up in twenty-four 
hours.”407 Thus, as my survey supports, no explicit evidence, apart from a worry about Arevalo’s 
land reform program, suggested that Arevalo’s regime posed communist threat in 1949, but, as 
detailed, Arevalo argued that he was firmly in control of his regime.    
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In the same year, Jacabo Arbenz, the presidential front runner at the time, was not yet 
considered a “communist threat.” For example, on August 11, 1949, less than five year before 
Arbenz’s overthrow, the American Ambassador to Guatemala Richard Patterson telegrammed 
the president of the United Fruit Company and reflected upon Arbenz’s potential ascension to the 
Guatemalan Presidency:  
The first inclination of most people here was that it forecasts a sharper leftward move in 
the Government. All along I have felt that this is not necessarily the case because of the 
kind of man I believe Arbenz to be. He is an opportunist with no deep seated leftist 
convictions…Since he wants to be President and is clever, his best bet is an alliance with 
the United States. Therefore, if he remains in the saddle it means better results for 
American interests and the possible eradication of the foreign Communist element. In any 
event, I believe that United Fruit and other interests will not suffer because of the 
revolution.408 
 
Similarly, Wells was not threatened by Arbenz in 1949:  
With obvious sincerity and clarity of language Colonal Arbenz spoke at length on the 
basic aims of the 1944 Revolution and the Arevalo regime—which, in simple terms, are 
social and economic betterment to the people, and to establish a decent, democratic way 
of life, which will make impossible the old-style military coup d’etat  and personal 
dictatorships under which the people have suffered for generations. It must be 
understood; he argued…that the laws of the land are general, affecting Guatemalan and 
United States firms and persons alike. 409 
  
Gleijeses contends that by 1949, “Arbenz’s opportunism had become an article of faith 
for U.S. officials. This opportunist would have few qualms, they argued, at betraying his friends 
from the PAR and organized labor (including the Communists) after he had used them to win 
elections.”410 Hence, as Gleijeses argues, in the eyes of U.S. officials in 1949, Arbenz was 
utilizing communist support for political purposes. As a result, Arbenz’s “self-interest,” in the 
minds of U.S. policy makers would “drive him into the familiar embrace of Washington.”411 
Likewise, according to Cullathers, U.S. embassy officials in Guatemala were not yet overtly 
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threatened by Arevalo, his regime, or Arbenz’s potential Presidency. For example, Cullather 
reports that in May 1950 Thomas Mann, director of the State Department’s Office of Middle 
American Affairs, and his colleagues: 
…saw Arbenz as conservative, ‘an opportunist’ concerned primarily with his own 
interests. They expected him to ‘steer more nearly a middle course’  because his 
economic and military dependence on the United States required it…although Embassy 
officials had only vague notions of its internal politics, they considered it free from 
Communist influence.412 
 
 Naturally, intervention was not yet considered an option in 1950. For example, on May 
15, 1950, Thomas Corcoran, the UFCO’s lobbyist (who subsequently became the UFCO’s 
liaison with the CIA during the plot to overthrow Arbenz) and Mann discussed possible action in 
Guatemala. 413 The report asserted that Corcoran “had been turning over in his mind the 
possibility that the American companies might agree between themselves on some method to 
bring moderate elements into power in Guatemala.” Corcoran inquired if the State Department 
“had any program for bringing about the election of a middle-of-the-road candidate.” Gleijeses 
recounts that “[Corcoron’s] overture was rebuffed by Mann, who argued that any attempt to 
interfere in the elections would become known, causing a backlash in Guatemala and throughout 
Latin America.”414 However, Mann ominously stated, “I would not like to try to guess what the 
policy in the future might be if it were definitively determined that the Guatemalan Government 
and people had fallen under the totalitarian control of Communist elements.”415 Although 
intervention was not an option in 1950, Mann certainly foreshadowed the inevitable coup. 
In contrast to the perception of U.S. embassy officials, the CIA was far more concerned 
about the threat of communism in Guatemala. Cullather reports: 
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Agency officials were more apprehensive about Guatemala than their counterparts at 
State. Officials in the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) grew concerned in August 
1950 about “the rapid growth of Communist activity in Guatemala and the probability 
that Guatemala may become a central point for the dissemination of anti-U.S. 
propaganda.416 
 
Yet, the U.S. embassy, although more relaxed in its “anti-communist perspective” of 
Guatemala, was still searching for answers regarding the communist situation. As a result, 
embassy officials engaged in an intensive investigation for the “truth.” To this end, U.S. 
embassies across Latin American engaged in wide spread interviews and investigations, 
collecting an assortment of sources that ranged widely from “experts” in sociology, Guatemalan 
residents, business men, to Guatemalan government officials, the Guatemalan Embassy, and 
Arevalo and Arbenz themselves. 
4.1.1 Anti-Arevalo and Anti-Arbenz sources:  
Many of the sources argued that communism was a major threat in Arevalo’s regime and that 
Arevalo and Arbenz constituted communist threats. For example, on August 1, 1950, a telegram 
was sent from the American Embassy in Mexico to the State Department. The document 
summarized the testimony of four recently exiled Guatemalans who were exiled “for political 
purposes” and concluded, “Juan Jose Arevalo has been openly communistic and in so many 
instances, anti-north American.”417  
Thereafter, on August 16, 1950, the State Department reported that the minister of 
Guatemala to Colombia, Virgilio Rodriguez, had argued that “The Arevalista party’s…political 
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program is ‘anti-imperialist,’ which means anti-American. They have subterranean relations with 
Russia.”418 The document explained that Rodriguez is a personal friend of Arevalo, but is, “Not 
friendly to the group who surround Arevalo and keep him a virtual prisoner.”  
Similarly, on September 6, 1950, the American embassy reflected on a conversation with 
Dr. Gonzalez Allende (not to be mistaken with Salvador Allende) who was the Chilean 
Ambassador to Guatemala at the time: “On the subject of Communism, the Ambassador’s 
opinion was we should not underestimate the influence of the relatively few internationalists in 
Guatemala…It would not surprise him if Guatemala is already the center of a Communist 
network in the hemisphere, since this seems to be about the only country where they still enjoy 
unrestricted liberty.”419Hence, many sources supported the claim that Arevalo’s regime posed a 
communist threat, or, at the least, communists were gaining strength throughout Arevalo’s 
tenure.  
4.1.2 Pro-Arevalo and Arbenz sources:  
Conversely, other sources collected by the State Department were less pessimistic regarding 
Arevalo’s regime and Arbenz. For example, on August 23, 1950, John W. Fisher, a U.S. 
embassy official in Guatemala, summarized his conversation with Fernando Gallo, who Fisher 
described as “a young Guatemalan I have known for over two years, of a good business family, 
who studied banking at Berkeley on a State Department Scholarship, is intelligent, well-
informed, friendly, and in my opinion very pro-American”: “Today [Gallo] said that he has 
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become convinced that Arbenz’s election is assured, and that Arbenz will turn toward the 
center.”420  
Moreover, on September 5, 1950, the U.S. embassy reflected on the opinion of a Mr. Leo 
A. Suslow: “Mr. Suslow, who last year wrote a thesis on social reforms in Guatemala, called 
today. He just returned from a three month visit in Guatemala where he had been studying the 
Social Security System in conjunction with his candidacy for a doctor in international 
sociology… [Mr. Suslow] does not believe that either of these men are real communists although 
he said that Arbenz has been reading some “Marxian literature and the ‘impact of this on second-
rate mind might be strong.’”421  
Perhaps it goes without saying that the strongest defense of the regime came from the 
Guatemalan Embassy and Arevalo himself. According to the Guatemalan Embassy: “It is not 
communist; there are no Russian or other foreign bases in Guatemala.”422 Likewise, a report on 
August 14, 1950, reflected upon the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Antonio Goubaud’s 
conversation with President Arevalo, in which Arevalo argued that Guatemala was clearly 
opposed to communism worldwide. For example, the report noted that President Arevalo was 
willing to help with the U.S. war effort in Korea:  
 President Arevalo told him he could tell the State Department that Guatemala was 
one hundred percent behind the United State and United Nations, that if the United States 
needed bases in Guatemala it could have them and that Guatemala was prepared to make 
available to the United Nations men for the armed forces if needed…Guatemala stood 
shoulder to shoulder with the United States and the other American Republics on the 
question of communist aggression in Korea and other places in the world.423 
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Similarly, on September 15, 1950, an office memorandum summarized another statement 
issued by the Guatemalan government: “The people and the government of Guatemala treasure 
the democratic liberties and principles that are represented here and were established in 
Guatemala in 1881, and will continue to resist any threat to these liberties.424 In summary of all 
the sources, regardless of whether they supported Arevalo and Arbenz, the U.S. embassy 
officials clearly engaged in a sweeping investigation to identify a communist threat in 
Guatemala. What was to be determined was how the U.S. Embassy and U.S. policy makers 
interpreted these sources.  
Initially, U.S. embassy officials appeared to be swayed by Arevalo’s defense of his 
regime. The U.S. embassy acknowledged “Arevalo’s strong statement on his countries policy 
toward Communism at home and abroad. The Department has noted with satisfaction 
Guatemala’s statement of intention to resist all forms of communist aggression.” 425 Yet, this was 
soon to change.  
Nonetheless, during this time, the U.S. embassy also remained uncertain about Arbenz’s 
stance on communism. John Fisher argued on September 20, 1950: 
Colonel Jacabo Arbenz has apparently judged the time ripe to display coolness to- 
ward his extremist supporters, as part of the general campaign recently undertaken by the 
Arevalo Government to make itself out as anti-Communistic. No  overt developments 
can be pointed out, but Arbenz is reportedly behind a move  against pro-Communist 
Manuel PINTO Usaga, and the pro-Arbenz press has recently adopted a new line against 
the Communists.426 
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One month later, on October 13, 1950, Wells likewise lamented on his uncertainty 
towards Arbenz’s communist affiliations and sympathies:  
Arbenz is playing both ends against the middle on the Communist issue. His friend 
Colonel Elfego H. Monzon, has come out as Guatemala’s most enthusiastic anti-
Communist. At a large pro-Arbenz meeting in  the central square of the capital on 
October 11, the main speaker was none other than Guatemala’s front-rank  Communist, 
Victor Manuel Gutierrez…With the principal actors stubbornly refusing to commit 
themselves openly to the Communist issue, it is impossible to say more than that the best 
evidence is that Arevalo and Arbenz allowed Monzon to test public opinion with his anti-
Communist measures, dropping him without compunction when they proved distasteful 
to the official parties, who have, after all, for the past six years been more sympathetic to 
Communism  than opposed to it. 427 
 
A week later, on October 19, 1950, Fisher argued, “Arbenz’s stand on Communism 
remains obscure as ever, in the absence of any clarification from him personally or from his 
campaign headquarters. However, it is observed that the Communists are prominent on the 
Arbenz bandwagon.”428 On November 27, 1950, a report issued by the U.S. embassy argued that 
“No one knows positively if the president of the republic is really a communist or a communist 
sympathizer on the one hand, or if he is really a true democrat and tolerant of ideology on the 
other. Neither, perhaps can we furnish the correct answer to this question.”429  Hence, U.S. 
embassy officials were clearly uncertain about Arbenz’s stance on communism.  
Although no explicit evidence suggested that communism greatly impacted Arevalo or 
Arbenz’s social platform or political agendas by 1950, more prominent U.S. officials, apart from 
those in the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, believed a communist threat was explicitly clear and 
that communists had considerable influence in the government. For example, the Cuban 
President of the time, Carlos Prio Socorras, had traveled to Guatemala to meet personally with 
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Arevalo in the summer of 1950, after growing worried about the increased U.S. anxieties 
regarding the potential communist threat in Guatemala. On August 25, 1950, the State 
Department received a personal letter from President Prio, which was intended to be sent to 
President Truman, which stated, “My anti-Sovietic convictions are unalterable,”430 and, “Neither 
Arevalo nor Arbenz sympathize with communism, but neither is in a position to act against 
them.” In conclusion, Prio argued, “I have been able to verify, with great relief, that this 
(communist infiltration) is all pure fantasy, and still worse a selfish campaign, maintained by 
subsidized newspapermen. I have been able to verify that doctor Juan Jose Arevalo’s greatest 
desire is to defend democracy.”431 Although this letter was dated on August 25th, the Secretary to 
the President, Mr. William Hasset, the Presidential secretary, revealed that it was not received 
until September 21st and the response was not completed until October 13th. Hasset suggested 
that delay had been a result of three primary causes. He argued that:  
The principle cause for the delay…was emphasized by the fact that the comments were to 
be made in writing by President Truman, by the probability that the letter  would be 
shown to President Arevalo and by the possibility that it would leak to the  press if anti-
United States elements considered it to their advantage to do so. The  other horn of 
the dilemma was that communists have influenced Guatemalan government policy to 
such an extent that it was necessary to make perfectly clear  our concern and to encourage 
the removal of Guatemalan communist from position of political influence. Thirdly, the 
delay… might in fact have a beneficial in discouraging President Prio from lending his 
moral support to the tendency of President Arevalo to temporize with the communist 
problem in Guatemala.432 
 
By October 25, 1950, Hasset had written to James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State and 
noted that, “[It is] recommended President Prio’s suggestion not be followed.”433 Hence, Hasset 
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clearly indicates that prominent U.S. policy makers believed a communist threat existed and thus 
ignored Prio’s defense of Arevalo’s regime. 
Although the embassy was unsure about Arevalo and Arbenz’s stance on communism, 
the U.S. embassy also soon believed that a communist threat was growing within Guatemala as a 
whole. A report issued by the U.S. embassy on November 27, 1950, argued that “communists 
functioned in official and private newspaper staffs through its affiliates or sympathizers and in 
workshops and farms through “activists” charged with the responsibility of leading strikes and 
provoking political incidents.”434 Moreover, the report contended that “Foreign and native-born 
communists have directed communist activities in this country along the lines of the international 
European parties, taking strategic positions within government, union organizations, farms 
groups, etc…Guatemala is a country that became an earthly paradise for communists, for dealers 
in Soviet ideology, and for ambitious politicians, both native an foreign.”435 Hence, the threat for 
U.S. embassy officials, and perhaps other U.S. policy makers, was not initially linked to Arevalo 
or Arbenz’s stance on communism, but was linked to a deeper seeded “communist conspiracy” 
that U.S. policy makers believed to exist.  
Yet, although Arevalo’s stance on communism was not clear for U.S. policy makers 
through 1950, on January 22, 1951, Edward Clark, the Guatemalan Desk officer to the 
Department of State, made firm declaration about Arevalo: “…I heartily share the feeling that 
President Arevalo is responsible for tolerating the Communists and that we have no reason 
whatsoever for doing anything to show pleasure with his administration.”436 Likewise, my 
survey agrees that U.S. policy makers, from 1951 onward, believed that Arevalo was a 
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“communist sympathizer.” Richard Immerman argues that this sentiment had evolved as early as 
1950: 
A State Department memorandum to Ambassador Edwin Kyle called attention to the 
code’s [referring to a specific element of Arevalo’s land reform policy] provisions, which 
appeared to ‘discriminate in practice against U.S. companies.’ By 1950, Guatemalan 
experts were so disturbed by the ‘continued mistreatment of U.S. business concerns,’ that 
Kyle’s successor, Richard Patterson, Warned Arevalo that ‘Cordial relations between 
Guatemala and the United States cannot continue if the persecution of American interest 
does not cease.’”437 
 
Hence, U.S. policy makers appeared to be returning to their initial pessimism of 1948 and 
1949: once again, U.S. policy makers believed that Arevalo was a communist sympathizer and 
that his regime’s social platform signified that a communist threat was indeed present in 
Guatemala.  
 Despite the concerns about Arevalo and his regime, U.S. policy makers were still 
uncertain about Arbenz. In fact, some reports affirm that U.S. policy makers believed Arbenz 
would turn against the communists. For example, on February 6, 1951, the Department of State 
messaged Edward Clark, the U.S. embassy desk officer, and argued in favor of Arbenz’s regime, 
stating that it would not be sympathetic to communists in the future: “[Communists] are probably 
seeking to strengthen themselves against the possibility of finding themselves in disfavor with 
future [Arbenz] administration.”438 Also around January of 1951, in a document sent by the 
American Embassy in Guatemala to the U.S. State department, called “Tab ‘A,’” and titled, 
“Capabilities of the Guatemalan Communists to Seriously Challenge the Country’s Armed 
Forces,” the U.S. embassy reflected on communist strength and argued that communists  neither 
were capable of taking power nor could they threaten Arbenz’s regime. Moreover, as argued in 
the “January report,” U.S. “Tab ‘A’” argued that Arbenz might turn against the communists 
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(“Tab A” is undated, but we can assume that it occurred proximally to the report in which Well’s 
cited “Tab A” on January 9, 1951.) “Tab ‘A’” reported:  
1) There is no organized Communist Party in Guatemala and the number of Communists is 
probably under 500. Because they have infiltrated into the Administration political 
parties, have established influential connections in the Government, and particularly 
because they dominate the labor movement, they wield an influence out of proportion to 
their numbers. It is not believed, however, that they are capable of taking over the 
Government, nor even of dominating Guatemalan international policies. They are in a 
position to influence domestic matters, particularly in relation to labor matters. 
 
2) There has been much discussion concerning the attitude that the President-elect, Colonel 
Jacabo Arbenz, would take concerning Communism. He accepted Communist support in 
his campaign and, as the Administration candidate, may follow the toleration policy of 
the current Administration toward the Communists. There have been reports, however, 
that he might attempt, with the backing of the armed forces, to eliminate the Communists 
from influence in Guatemala. The Guatemalans have requested approval of the purchase 
of 12 F-51 planes on the grounds that they would be a decisive factor in a contest 
between the Armed forces and the Communists. The request presumably is connected 
with possible moves against the Communists when Arbenz takes office.  
 
3) There is no reliable evidence available to G-2 that the Communists or Communist-
dominated groups in Guatemala have significant quantities of arms.  
 
4) It is estimated that the Guatemalan Armed Forces, if united and determined as it is 
expected they would be against the Communists, could win any struggle against them. 439 
 
In short, the report firmly established that the communists were not a significant threat to 
overthrow or threaten Arbenz’s regime.  
Even Wells appeared to agree with such a conclusion. On January 9, 1951, in a response 
to the Guatemalan government’s request for aircraft to fight the Communists, as was cited in the 
previous document, Wells argued:  
As far as my personal opinion goes, I see no need whatsoever for F-51’s [aircraft] to fight 
Communism in Guatemala. If the issue should come to a show down between the armed 
forces and the extremists, the former could make much better use of basic trainers from 
which could be dropped a few well-placed hand grenades from low altitude. The 
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Communists by no stretch of imagination are going to possess aircraft which would have 
to be shot out of the skies by F-51’s. 440 
 
The language of this statement is critical. Note that Wells did not passively suggest that 
request for aircraft was merely an exaggeration, but sarcastically replied that a possible 
counteraction of dropping several well placed hand grenades to combat the communists would 
suffice. Thus, Well’s implicitly affirms the conclusion that was reached by “Tab ‘A’”; that the 
communist threat was not significant. 
However, a difference in perspective was yet again apparent between U.S. policy makers. 
For example, apart from the U.S. embassy, U.S. policy makers in the State Department’s Office 
of Intelligence were concerned with the level of support that Arbenz’s government was giving 
the communists. A report issued on March 16, 1951 argued: “Other Latin American 
governments…have in the past worked with Communists, generally because of their influence in 
labor unions. In no other Latin American country, however, has the ruling group in power 
accepted the Communists with such cordiality into a political partnership including the frequent 
support of the Communist line by administration media.”441 
Even Well’s changed course from his stance in the “January 9th” report: On June 6, 1951, 
Wells became increasingly alarmed when he realized that Arbenz had recognized the PGT (the 
communist party) as an official party: “Whatever the long range advantages or disadvantages to 
the Communist movement in Guatemala, the open appearance of the Party has had the effect of 
focusing public attention on the fact that Communism actually exists here. Government 
spokesmen may no longer deny their existence.” Yet, Wells was even more concerned by the 
“fellow traveler” or “communist sympathizer”: He argued that “The problem of Communist 
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penetration cannot be solved by the simple expedient of outlawing the avowed Communists 
identified within the “Octubre” group. The many crypto-Communist who remain affiliated with 
PAR and other pro-Government political parties are probably more dangerous and influential. 
Their undercover influence may be expected to continue to agitate the genuinely nationalistic 
and pro-labor tendencies of the present revolutionary regime.”442 Hence, although Wells 
acknowledged that the creation of an official party caused great concern, the threat was also, 
once again, linked to an unseen and intangible communist conspiracy of the “crypto-
communist.”  
Still, by the middle of 1951, officials in the U.S. embassy had not argued for any course 
of action against Arbenz’s regime. Gleijeses recounts the words of Bill Kreig, the DCM at the 
U.S. embassy in Guatemala, who stated, “incident after incident accumulated and we became 
increasingly concerned and pessimistic, but no irrevocable line had been crossed.”443 As a result 
intervention was not yet an option. According to Gleijeses: 
Until the spring of 1952, Truman’s policy toward Arbenz was similar to that adopted 
toward Arevalo in the late 1940s. Diplomatic pressure was accompanied  by the denial 
of economic aid. Washington continued to refuse to sell weapons to Guatemala and 
began a successful effort to prevent Arbenz from acquiring arms in other Western 
countries. In June 1951, the United States halted financial assistance for the construction 
of the Guatemalan segment of the Inter-American Highway.444 
 
Although intervention was not yet an otion, U.S. policy makers continued to closely 
analyze what they believed to be further evidence that a communist threat was growing. By 
January of 1952, the U.S. policy makers in the CIA spoke with much greater resolve about the 
threat of the communism in Guatemala. For example, On January 11, 1952, Joseph King, the 
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Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA argued that “The Communists continue to 
be very active in Guatemala and continue to receive government support.” King also reported: 
Since the anti-communist rioting in July 1951 the Communists have softened their overt 
campaign for immediate action in the political field, but they have forged ahead in the 
labor movement, succeeding in forming…a central labor organization comprising almost 
all the unions in the country…The Guatemalan Communists are small in number, but 
their influence in government and labor is substantial.445 
 
Thus, King indicates that the threat of communism was, in part, directly linked to the 
CP’s influence in the labor movement. Moreover, Cullather argues that the CIA also considered 
Arbenz’s land reform as indication of further communist “subversion”: “To CIA observers, land 
reform seemed a powerful weapon for the expansion of Communist influence…they regarded 
Decree 900 (Arbenz’s land reform bill) as a menacing instrument of Communist penetration.”446 
Nonetheless, despite such evidence, according to Cullather, even CIA officials agreed: “no 
immediate danger of communist subversion of power in 1952” existed. 
Further analysis of communism in Guatemala was also provided by the State Department 
in a “National Intelligence Estimate” on March 11, 1952: 
The Communists already exercise in Guatemala a political influence far out of proportion 
to their small numerical strength. This influence will probably continue to grow during 
1952. The political situation in Guatemala adversely affects U.S. interests and constitutes 
a potential threat to U.S. security…[communists] have been successful in infiltrating the 
Administration and the pro-Administration political parties and have gained control of 
organized labor upon which the Administration has become increasingly 
dependent…Any deterioration in the economic and political situations would tend to 
increase the Administrations dependence on and favor toward organized labor, with a 
consequent increase in Communist influence.447  
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Hence, much like the CIA, the State Department also agreed that the CP’s influence in 
labor was a major cause for concern. The report also agreed with the CIA’s analysis that 
communists were not capable of seizing power:  
It is unlikely that the Communists could come directly to power during 1952, even 
though, in case of the incapacitation of President Arbenz, his present legal successor 
would be a pro-Communist…In present circumstances the Army is loyal to President 
Arbenz, although increasingly disturbed by the growth of Communist influence. If it 
appeared that the Communists were about to come to power in Guatemala, the Army 
would probably prevent development…In the longer view, continued Communist 
influence and action in Guatemala will gradually reduce the capabilities of the potentially 
powerful anti-Communist forces to produce a change. The Communists will also attempt 
to subvert or neutralize the Army in order to reduce its capability to prevent them from 
eventually taking full control of the Government. 448 
 
Once again, in 1952, the State Department explicitly agrees that the CP could not 
overtake Arbenz’s regime.  Yet, they did worry that the communists would attempt to do so. In 
regards to Arbenz’s relationship with the CP, the document reported: 
The present political situation in Guatemala is the outgrowth of the Revolution of  1944. 
That Revolution was something more than a routine military coup. From it there has 
developed a strong national movement to free Guatemala from the military dictatorship, 
social backwardness, and “economic colonialism,” which had been the pattern of the 
past…President Arbenz himself is essentially an opportunist  whose politics are 
largely a matter of historical accident…by 1951 the toleration of  Communist activity 
which had characterized the early years of the Arevalo Administration had developed into 
an effective working alliance between Arevalo and the Communists. Arbenz, to attain the 
Presidency, made with the Communists commitments of mutual support which 
importantly affect the present situation. He did not, however, surrender himself 
completely to Communist control…The CP of Guatemala has no more than 500 
members, of whom perhaps one-third are militant.  It is in open communication with 
international communism, chiefly through the Communist controlled international labor 
organizations. With the assistance of the Government, Communist and Communist-
influenced labor leaders have been the most successful organizers of Guatemalan 
labor…Through their control of organized labor and their influence within the pro-
Administration political parties the Communists have been successful in gaining 
influential positions with the  Government…The communists do not fully control the 
Administration, however. Over their protests, President Arbenz has recently dismissed a 
pro-Communist Minister of Education and appointed a non-Communist Minister of 
Communications…If President Arbenz should become incapacitated…the Army would 
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probably seize power itself in order to prevent the Communists from gaining direct 
control of the Government.449  
 
The report explicitly defines, in sequence with other reports, that communists would not 
be able to take power, especially since the army would stop such efforts, but, once again, the 
report affirms that the State Department believed that the CP’s major source of influence in 
Guatemala and with regards to Arbenz’s regime stemmed from their influence in labor.  Yet, the 
report notes that the communist do not “fully” control the administration, insinuating that they 
did, at least, partially influence Arbenz’s regime.  
Although the “National Intelligence Estimate” and certain members of the CIA had 
concluded that a communist takeover of the Guatemalan government was not feasible in 1952, 
King argued on March 17, 1952, “If the Guatemalan Government does not fall of its own weight 
it is conceivable that more direct measures may eventually become necessary, and planning for 
such an emergency will proceed.”450 Cullather summarizes that CIA officials, “predicated a 
slow, inevitable deterioration of the situation in Guatemala” and thus believed counter measures 
to prevent the inevitable should be undertaken (i.e. intervention).451 Thus, for the first time, 
intervention was a proposed option, at least in theory. The divergence in perspective henceforth 
became increasingly apparent.  
In fact, only one month later, Gleijeses argues that the Truman administration began 
planning for Arbenz’s overthrow when Anastasia Somoza, the Nicaraguan dictator at the time, 
“approached the United States” in April of 1952. On a private trip in April and May of 1952, 
Somoza met with Truman and other executive officials. He argued, “Just give me the arms, and 
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I’ll clean up Guatemala for you in no time.”452 Furthermore, Colonel Cornelius Mara (who was 
the personal assistant to General Harry Vaughan, Truman’s personal military assistant) joined 
Somoza on his trip to Guatemala, in which, Somoza further incited Mara to allow him to “take 
care of Guatemala.” Gleijeses contends that “Mara became Somoza’s champion. His report to 
Truman must have been truly eloquent; so eloquent, in fact, that Truman immediately ‘Initialed 
the report’ and instructed General Walter Bedell Smith, the CIA director, ‘to put it into effect.’ 
Truman did not inform Acheson or any other State Department official.”453 Thereafter, the 
subsequent plan was formulated by the CIA and was titled PBFORTUNE. By June 1952, CIA 
correspondence was no longer centered on the perception of threat that communism posed, but 
was discussing the specific actions and costs of a military coup. 454 That is, the theoretical option 
of intervention was put into action because the communist threat in Guatemala was substantial 
enough in the eyes of Truman and his closest advisors to react.  
However, the plan was not implemented because, as Gleijeses contends, certain 
government officials believed PBFORTUNE would not succeed because of various logistical 
problems. Nonetheless, by the time Eisenhower had come to office, the predecessor to 
PBFORTUNE— PBSUCCESS — was underway. In brief, the goal to remove Arbenz had 
merely been sidetracked and was still alive. Thus, Eisenhower and his closest advisors initiated a 
renewed effort remove Arbenz.  
In the process of planning the PBSUCCESS, Cullather argues that CIA officials sought 
approval from the State Department’s highest officials before finalizing PBSUCCESS: including 
King; Allen Dulles, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; John Dulles, the Secretary of 
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State; Thomas Mann of the State Department; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, Edward G. Miller; the under Secretary of State David Bruce; John Moors Cabot, the 
Assistant Secretary of Latin American Affairs; and several others. Cullather contends that these 
men gave specific approval before moving forward on September 9, 1952 to proceed with 
operation PBSUCCESS. Hence, each man’s approval indicates that U.S. policy makers at the 
highest levels of the U.S. government believed the “communist threat” in Guatemala required a 
U.S. response: intervention.  
Yet, despite the shift towards favoring intervention, many U.S. policy makers, who were 
unaware of the pending coup, still believed that a threat did not warrant intervention because 
they believed that communists could not overtake Arbenz’s regime. For example, on January 1, 
1953, the State Department argued: 
… there are serious limitations to the Communist position. Although the Communists 
have enjoyed considerable success in capturing key positions among important groups in 
Guatemalan society, they have not yet gained a substantial consistent popular following. 
They must continually contend with an essentially inarticulate and conservative mass. On 
higher levels they must face the fact that the economic groups which subscribe to the 
principles of the Revolution of 1944 are not extremists and that many seeming pro-
Communist political allies are, in fact, primarily opportunists.455 
The report concluded:  
The real answer to Communist success in Guatemala lies with the attitude of the 
administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-), for, 
despite democratic overtones, Guatemalan political life is still largely run by the 
executive. Arbenz, in particular, has favored Communist development because he has 
found its leadership cooperative and capable. Whether or not he fully appreciates the 
dangers of Communism, he apparently believes that he controls the Communist 
organization. He has the power to check or break the Communist organization at will. In 
the last analysis the Communists are dependent upon the executive's pleasure for their 
positions and probably the great bulk of their financial support. In themselves they lack 
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the economic resources and popular following to contest determined opposition from the 
President.456 
Thus, in complete opposition to the findings of the CIA, President Truman, President 
Eisenhower, and their closest advisors, U.S. officials in the State Department clearly believed 
that communism did not pose a serious threat, at least one that warranted intervention. In the 
same way, according to Stephen Rabe, in Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of 
Anticommunism , in August 1953, “the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the State 
Department noted, in a draft paper prepared for the NSC, that ‘it is possible that President 
Arbenz thinks of the Communists in Guatemala only as reformers and useful allies rather than as 
Soviet agents.’” In fact, Rabe further argues that “the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs found 
that, ‘almost without exception,’ Guatemalan Communists were ‘indigenous to the area and are 
Mexican trained rather than Moscow-trained, although some have visited the Soviet orbit and 
may have received brief instruction there.’”457 Hence, if all the U.S. government had ever 
uniformly agreed on the threat that communism posed in Guatemala, that general consensus was 
now gone and a discrepancy in perspective was exceptionally clear.    
However, a discrepancy in perspective did not halt PBSUCCESS from moving forward. 
Obviously, the CIA, the Presidents, and their closest advisors were the ones that made the 
decisions; thus, their perspectives were the ones that mattered. On December 16, 1953, Peurifoy 
had dinner with Arbenz and subsequently wrote a five-page report, in which he stated, “I am 
definitely convinced that if the President is not a Communist, he will certainly do until one 
comes along.”458 Immerman recounts that in a 1954 report, “The House subcommittee on 
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Communist aggression claimed that Communists and Communists sympathizers came to 
dominate all of Arevalo’s propaganda outlets, including the information offices, the official 
newspaper, and the government-owned radio stations.”459 Likewise, President Eisenhower’s own 
brother wrote to him following a fact finding trip to Latin America, stating: 
The possible conquest of a Latin American nation today would not be, so far as anyone 
can foresee, by direct assault. It would come, rather, through the insidious  process of 
infiltration, conspiracy, spreading lies, and the undermining of free institutions, one by 
one. Highly disciplined groups of Communists are busy, night and day, illegally or 
openly, in the American republics, as they are in every nation of the world…One 
American nation has succumbed to Communist infiltration.  (Emphases added).460 
 
Likewise, Walter B. Smith, former Central Intelligence Director, head of the CIA, and 
current Under Secretary of State reported to President Eisenhower in on January 15, 1954:  
We have repeatedly expressed deep concern to the Guatemalan Government because it 
plays the Communists’ game. Our relations are further disturbed because of the merciless 
hounding of American companies there by tax and labor demands, strikes, and, in the 
case of the United Fruit Company, inadequately compensated seizures of land under a 
Communist-administration Agrarian Reform Law.  
 
The Guatemalan situation has attracted the interest of many American journalists who 
have visited Guatemala and independently reported on their findings. Prominent 
Congressmen and Senators of both Parties have shown increasing  concern with 
Communism in Guatemala.461  
 
Hence, such policy makers clearly were convinced that a communist threat was present 
and were willing to intervene to prevent the threat from growing.  
To this end, according to Aybar de Soto, in 1954, prior to the coup, Allen Dulles traveled 
to the Tenth Inter-American Conference (TIAC), which usually was organized to consider 
“hemispheric economic problems.” Dulles’s main initiative and goal was to achieve a resolution 
that provided, “the United States with a regional ‘legal’ instrument that would allow it legally to 
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intervene in Guatemala. The result of Dulles’ efforts at TIAC was a passage of a resolution titled, 
“Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States 
Against International Communist Intervention,” passed on March 13, 1954. The resolution 
stated:  
That the domination or control of the political institutions of an American State by the 
International communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of 
an extra continental power would constitute a threat to the sovereignty  and political 
independence of the American States, endangering the peace of  America, and would 
call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with 
existing threats. 462 
 
In effect, Dulles was gearing up for the intervention.  
 
The planners of PBSUCCESS received their final piece of evidence in May of 1954 that 
grounded their claim that the Guatemalan regime was a threat: as discussed in Chapter Two, U.S. 
policy makers discovered a bank transfer from the Guatemalan regime to an investment firm in 
Czechoslovakia and they subsequently sought to track down incoming shipments from the 
Socialist Bloc to Guatemala. Ultimately, U.S. policy makers discovered an arms shipment off the 
Guatemalan coast, which had indeed originated from Czechoslovakia. Cullather argues that “the 
arms purchase handed PBSUCCESS a propaganda bonanza.” Specifically, Cullather reports:  
On May 17, [1954], the State Department declared that the shipment revealed 
Guatemala’s complicity in a Soviet plan for Communist conquest in the Americas. John 
Foster Dulles exaggerated the size of the cargo, hinting that it would enable Guatemala to 
triple the size of its Army and overwhelm neighboring states. The press and Congress 
responded on cue. House Speaker John McCormack sputtered that ‘this cargo of arms is 
like an atom bomb planted in the rear of our backyard.463 
 
Hence, one arms shipment was enough to cause not only U.S. policy makers great 
concern, but the American populous in general. It suffices to say, only three months after the 
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arms shipment was apprehended, the coup was initiated on June 18th and Arbenz resigned on 
June 27th.464   
In summary, U.S. policy makers engaged in an intensive investigation of Arevalo’s 
regime that dated back to 1944, suggesting that U.S. policy makers were looking for a 
communist threat well before it was apparent. Indeed, from 1944 to 1948, little evidence 
suggested that a communist threat was present. Yet, by 1948 and 1949, U.S. policy makers 
became increasingly concerned, especially with regards to Arevalo’s land reform program. 
Nevertheless, from 1948 to 1951, U.S. policy makers were largely undecided about Arevalo’s 
stance on communism. But by 1951, U.S. policy makers once again concluded that Arevalo was 
a “communist sympathizer.”   
Up until 1951, however, U.S. policy makers were even more perplexed by Arbenz and, at 
times, concluded that he was pro-American, and, thus, was only utilizing communist political 
support to advance his own political career. From this perspective, U.S. policy makers labeled 
Arbenz as an “opportunist,” rather than a “communist sympathizer.” Yet, this initial optimism 
soon changed around 1951 and Arbenz was henceforth labeled as a “communist sympathizer.” 
Among the variables that U.S. policy makers considered as threatening, U.S. policy makers 
considered Arbenz’s land reform program and the CP’s influence in Guatemalan labor 
movement as significant evidence that a communist threat was growing. Also, U.S. policy 
makers feared of a pervasive “communist conspiracy” that included not only the CP themselves, 
but also the communist’s “fellow traveler.” Although many U.S. policy makers believed that the 
CP did not pose a threat to overthrow Arbenz, President Truman, and his closest advisors 
believed the communist threat required a response and initiated PBFORTUNE in 1952, a plan to 
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remove Arbenz and his regime. Although PBFORTUNE failed, another plan, PBSUCCESS, was 
ultimately successful in removing Arbenz from power in 1954.   
While many U.S. policy makers did not believe that a communist threat required U.S. 
action, all U.S. policy makers believed that a communist threat was present. The U.S. policy 
makers breadth of analysis, intensity of focus, and the use of language regarding the search for a 
communist threat clearly indicates that U.S. policy makers were working under the auspices of 
the legal-moralistic and anti-communist liberal-conservative consensus perspective that 
dominated U.S. policy perspective in late 1940’s and early 1950’s.  
 
4.2 PERU: U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
By the late 1960s and 1970s, in the case Peru, U.S. policy makers were no longer working under 
the policy guidelines or anti-communist political atmosphere experienced in the 1950s. This 
section will demonstrate that U.S. policy makers were no longer threatened by the expropriation 
of U.S. businesses or any other social reform regarding communism. This is not to say that the 
expropriation of U.S. business interests was favorable in the eyes of U.S. policy makers— 
because U.S. policy maker’s main focus in Peru was the expropriation of the International 
Petroleum Company and the economic threat that it posed—but, nonetheless, the expropriation 
was not related to the threat of communism in anyway. Furthermore, U.S. policy makers likewise 
were not threatened by the CP’s influence in labor, the growing strength of the labor movement, 
or the massive labor unrest that ensued during Velasco’s tenure. In fact, for all the variables that 
I have discussed in the case of Guatemala and that were also present in Peru, U.S. policy makers 
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never considered the Peruvian state as a whole, Velasco, or his regime as a communist threat. I 
also, as promised, will highlight the lack of investigation in the case of Peru and how U.S. policy 
makers, with little effort, concluded he was anti-communist and not a threat.  
Before turning to the U.S. perspective regarding Velasco and his regime, I will briefly 
summarize the perspectives of U.S. policy makers regarding the regime of Fernando Belaunde 
Terry (the Peruvian President from 1963 to 1968, who was ultimately overthrown by Velasco’s 
military coup d’état in 1968) in order to substantiate that little investigation of a communist 
threat occurred prior to Velasco’s ascension to power. Indeed, communism is only mentioned in 
passing in several reports, in which the Belaunde regime is described as anti-communist. In fact, 
not only is communism not mentioned as a threat, but, in line with the Alliance for progress, U.S. 
policy makers explicitly outline how they favor the economic and social development programs 
initiated by Belaunde to counter the threat of communism. For example, on January 29, 1966, 
Lincoln Gordon, the Ambassador to Brazil under President Johnson, argued:  “Aspects of the 
Belaunde program are designed to bring the long neglected Indian population into the 
mainstream of national life, thereby countering communist efforts to use Indian discontent to 
launch a guerilla movement.”465 Moreover, despite concerns with the expropriation of the IPC, 
initiated under Belaunde’s tenure, U.S. policy worried that an aggressive stance against 
Velasco’s regime in response to his expropriation of the IPC would “pose a serious threat to 
U.S.-Peruvian relations and to [the U.S.’s] Alliance image.”466 Hence, furthering social reform 
and protecting the U.S. image in Latin America, under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress 
Program, was a prime concern for U.S. policy makers in the late 1960s.  
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Near the end of Belaunde’s term, in an information Memorandum from William G. 
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, the U.S. was concerned 
that Belaunde stay in power (perhaps because was he the main U.S. ally in the IPC case); 
however, no discussion of communism  is evident.467 Indeed, throughout my entire survey of the 
diplomatic correspondence during Belaunde’s tenure, little discussion of communism is evident.  
Thus, with U.S. policy makers clearly unconcerned with communism in Peru, Belaunde 
was overthrown on October 3, 1968, and Velasco seized power, installing the ominously named, 
“Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.” In an information Memorandum from the 
President’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow to President Johnson on October 4, 1968, Rostow 
summarized the coup: 
 
The Military Junta appears firmly in control in Peru, supported by a united military 
establishment and some conservative civilians…Unlike the case of the Argentine coup in 
1966, we have made no official statement condemning the action of the military leaders, 
although State officials have made our unhappiness clear on a background basis…better 
to allow the weight of Latin American sentiment to  register first.468 
 
In support of my general contention, this quote demonstrates that U.S. policy makers did not link 
the military overthrow to any communist threat.  
Rather, the threat was an economic one in the eyes of U.S. policy makers: they were 
concerned with possible expropriation of U.S. businesses interests. For example, on October 10, 
1968, the Secretary of State Rusk publically commented on the coup and the IPC case and stated, 
“We are very concerned and disappointed about the developments in Peru.” Yet, once again, 
Secretary Rusk never expressed a concern regarding communism. The remainder of the message 
focused on the U.S. government’s position on the IPC case. Rusk reported: 
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We don’t know yet what this announced move against the IPC will involve.As we go 
forward, there is one thing we have to watch with great care: our public deprecation of 
the coup has for various reasons been limited to working levels. (Personally I think it 
wiser not to advise public lamentations at very high levels. But not having rended our 
garments and torn our hair in public heretofore, it would be bad in Latin America and 
here if we should go very suddenly into public outcry after IPC nationalization. 
Fortunately, IPC’s parent does not want us to.469 
 
Just as U.S. policy makers were concerned about upholding the U.S. “Alliance Image,” Rusk, 
once again, demonstrates that U.S. policy makers were concerned with how U.S. action would be 
interpreted in Latin America. Yet, communism and the threat that it might pose was still not 
mentioned with regards to the IPC expropriation, Velasco, or his regime.  
Moreover, on October 11, 1968, a memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to 
President Johnson discussed the “implications of the IPC case”:  
The Revolutionary Government, which appears to be highly nationalistic, justified its 
grounds of general unrest and loss of public confidence in Government. The new Regime 
particularly stressed the pretext that the August 13 agreement with the Government and 
the International Petroleum Company…was a sellout. The president announced the 
expropriation of IPC’s oil fields, refinery, and other  assets…The Implications of the IPC 
expropriation are being explored, including all relevant U.S. legislative provisions. 470 
 
Although the U.S. State Department acknowledge that Velsco’s regime was “revolutionary” and 
“nationalistic,” as it had done in the case of Arevalo and Arbenz, still, no perception of a threat is 
apparant.  
In the wake of U.S. pressure and reaction to the IPC expropriation, Velasco and his 
closest advisors defended their regimes right to expropriation. A key actor in the Velasco regime 
was General Mercado Jarrin who was appointed as the Foreign Minister under Velasco, soon 
after the 1968 coup. Richard Walter, in Peru and the United States, 1960-1975, explains: 
“Mercado was a natural choice for the all-important Foreign Ministry post, which…could be 
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considered the second-most important within the new regime…According to Mercado, Velasco 
gave him free rein to run foreign affairs as he saw fit.”471 On October 11, 1968, a State 
Department report summarizes General Mercado’s defense of the IPC expropriation:  
In connection with the foregoing discussion on IPC, General Mercado sought repeatedly 
to give assurance as to the “special” nature of IPC case. He said the revolutionary 
government, while it is nationalistic, is neither statist nor leftist and that it recognizes the 
need to protect and encourage private capital and to attract foreign private investment.472 
 
The report subsequently argued that General Mercado was questioned about several criticisms of 
the Peruvian government—that the Velasco regime was “influenced by a group of “Nasserist” 
colonels,” the radical advisors that surrounded Velasco. The report summarized General 
Mercado’s response: “He asserted that the armed forces was unified as a single man in 
determination to carry out their obligations to their country as they saw them under the 
constitution and to bring about necessary revolutionary reforms.”473 Notice that the colonels 
were labeled as “Nasserist” rather than “communist sympathizers,” “fellow travelers,” or 
“dupes,” as they most likely would have been in the context of the early 1950’s. Moreover, 
Mercardo’s defense of his regime was quite similar to that of Velasco’s and Arbenz’s. Yet, in 
Guatemala, although Arevalo’s initial “defense” received positive praise from the State 
Department, the Cuban President Prio’s defense was discarded.  
In contrast from the way U.S. policy makers responded to Arevalo’s defense, in the case 
of Peru and Mercado’s defense, U.S. policy makers were quick to determine that Mercado’s 
claim was valid and that the expropriation, Velasco, and his regime were not communist threats. 
For example, the previously cited report also included Ambassador Oliver’s response to General 
Mercado’s defense: “I replied that it was not my purpose to discuss expropriation since the 
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United States recognized the right of a sovereign nation to take territory within its jurisdiction for 
public purpose. I said, however, that the U.S. also expected fulfillment of the corresponding 
obligation under international law to make prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.”474Hence, such a position is prime evidence that policy makers viewed 
expropriation in a much different light than was seen in the Guatemalan situation, but also that 
they were more open to Mercado’s defense. Thus, although the regimes expropriation of IPC, 
while unfavorable, was not considered to be an indication of a “communist threat” in Velasco’s 
regime.  
In 1969, despite overt nationalism and anti-American rhetoric, the State Department 
remained certain that Velasco was anti-communist. For example, a memorandum from the 
department of state for Kissinger declared: 
The military government used the IPC issue as their principal pretext for the October 
coup, and derived enormous popular support from expropriating the IPC properties. That 
act remains highly popular and no sector or leader can afford to repudiate it or even 
appear to "sell out" on this issue. Anti-U.S. nationalism is not  only something on 
which the Velasco government has built its appeal, but it may be something it will use to 
transfer from the shoulders of itself, the elite and the  population generally, the 
blame for any future political and economic failures. This nationalistic antipathy was not 
created by Velasco or the IPC issue itself. It has roots  in other irritants—
disagreements on fishing and territorial waters, aid terms, the Mirage issue—as well as in 
the country's heavy dependence on official and private U.S. finances. U.S. firms 
dominate the export industries and U.S. aid has been heavy. Beneficial as this 
relationship has been, viewed through the eyes of Peruvian  nationalists, it creates 
emotional reactions against "dependence".475 
 
Although U.S. officials acknowledge that Velasco and his regime relied on “nationalistic 
support,” and U.S. policy makers further cite how his regime engaged in sweeping social reform, 
no discussion of a communist threat is apparent. Likewise in a report titled “The President has 
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directed that a review be undertaken of U.S. policy toward Peru,” Kissinger reported that “The 
review is to examine…the present situation and short-term outlook in Peru, with particular focus 
on the International Petroleum Company expropriation issue.”476 In the entire report, no mention 
of communism is made.  
In fact, one month later on March 6, 1969, the CIA defended the Velasco regimes recent 
formation of relations with members of the Socialist Bloc and argued that Velasco’s regime was 
not communist or impacted by the CP:  
Peru’s recent moves to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S.S.R and 
other European Communist countries, which were begun last year under President 
Belaunde, probably are more a show of independence from the U.S. than a serious 
intention to develop a firm and close relationship…[Velasco’s] personal entourage is 
composed of men whose views cover the political spectrum from extreme right to 
extreme left…There is no evidence so far that advice or support of the Peruvian 
Communist parties have been important to Velasco...[and] the officers in the 
regime…have uniformly anti-Communist backgrounds.477 
 
The same day, a Special National Intelligence Estimate on March 6, 1969 reiterated the CIA’s 
sentiments: 
President Velasco's personal entourage, apart from those in the cabinet who support him, 
is composed of men whose political views cover the spectrum from extreme right to 
extreme left. All appear to be ultra-nationalistic and anti-American. We have no evidence 
to indicate that the advisers on the political left have influence  on Velasco which is 
different from or greater than that of the other ultranationalists.478 
 
Moreover, the CIA, which was exceptionally concerned in the case of Guatemala did not 
view Velasco’s land reform program as a threat whatsoever. For example, in A CIA Intelligence 
                                                 
476 Henry A Kissinger. “National Security Study Memorandum.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 578. 18, February 7, 1969. Web. 5 September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 477 Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru and the U.S: The Implications of the IPC Controversy,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, March 6, 1969, p. 3 and 13-14. 478 “Peru and the U.S: The Implications of the IPC Controversy.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 580.March 6, 1969. Web. 8 September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>.  
 192 
Bulletin, issue on June 26, 1969, the title page listed the contents of the bulletin: 
 
Figure 9: Central Intelligence Bulletin 
Notice how Peru’s agrarian reform law is listed directly under a discussion of South Vietnam, 
which directly cites “communist pressure.” Hence, when read with the entirety of the report, 
communism, although on the mind of CIA officials in the case of Vietnam, was not associated 
with the Peruvian regimes’ land reform program. In fact it, the report positively described: “In 
patriotic and nationalistic tones, Velasco appealed to peasants and students to support the new 
agrarian reform program, which is the military government’s first major step toward “the 
economic and social transformation of the country.”479 
Later that same year on November 13, 1969, National Security staff member Viron Vaky 
summarized a CIA report on President Velasco’s disposition towards the United States, relations 
with the U.S.S.R, and towards communism. Vaky reported that according to the CIA report, 
President Velasco stated: 
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While people believed his regime is anti-U.S., this is not so. He was opposed to the way 
U.S. big business attempts to impose its conditions on Latin American countries, but he 
wants to have good relations with the U.S. He feels that the Nixon Administration desires 
to have good relations with Peru…His regime is not pro-Communist. If the Communists 
tried to exceed their bounds he would round them up and have them shot. He was 
unhappy with the favorable comments being made by Castro about Peru’s revolution. 
The Peruvian revolution is an economic one not a political one. He knows there are 
leftists among his advisors, but he needs their technical expertise. He would accept Soviet 
aid on government projects if no other aid was forthcoming. He is aware of the danger of 
Soviet technicians becoming active in the subversive field.480 
 
Much like Arevalo had done in the early 1950s, Velasco was appealing to the U.S. government 
in defense his regime’s anti-communist stance. But in contrast to the response that Arevalo 
received from the U.S. government, and just as U.S. policy makers had accepted General 
Mercado’s defense of the IPC expropriation and Velasco’s government a year prior, U.S. policy 
makers quickly agreed that Velasco and his regime were anti-communist and no communist 
threat was present in Peru.  
 
Specifically, Velasco found an unexpected ally in Kissinger. Noel Maurer recounts that 
Kissinger “had to work to convince Nixon that Velasco was sincere in his anti-Communism .”481 
In 1970, Kissinger defended Velasco by recounting one of Velasco’s anti-communist speeches. 
In part, it stated, “Intolerance, totalitarianism, bureaucratization are, in the unimpeachable light 
of history, structural failures of Communist societies and not simply secondary deformations. 
Therefore, such societies cannot serve as a model for our Revolution. And, therefore, in regard to 
Communism …we place ourselves in opposition.” Nixon subsequently responded, “makes 
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sense—perhaps we should make a gesture towards him—as we continue our coolness toward 
[Chile’s] Allende.”482  
Later that year, on November 27, 1970, Kissinger similarly appealed to the President, 
arguing, “We may find it possible over time to work with the “new military” in Peru and to 
influence the course of their “revolution” away from Cuban/Chilean patterns and into channels 
that may be more acceptable to us.”483 Most significantly, a meeting memorandum sent to the 
U.S. embassy in Peru referred to a meeting held on September 29, 1971 in Kissinger’s office in 
the White House and reported, in unison with the previous report, that Kissinger was not only 
convinced of Velasco’s anti-communist stance, but that Peru’s revolution could be utilized to 
counterbalance the threat posed by Allende’s Chile. The participants included Kissinger; 
Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, the Peruvian Foreign Minister; Fernando Berckemeyer Pazos, Peruvian 
Ambassador to the United States; Arnold Nachmanoff, National Security Council Staff; and 
Ashley Hewitt, National Security Council Staff:  
Mercado…reviewed the development of the past three years since the inception of the 
Peruvian revolution. He emphasized that the ideological orientation of the revolution is 
nationalist and not Marxist or Communist…The Foreign Minister emphasized that the 
Peruvian experiment is purely national in character with no  desire to either export its own 
practices and precepts or to import those of others.  He repeated that it is anti-
Communist and he said that Peru viewed with concern the  emergence of a Marxist 
regime in Chile arising from outside influences. Mercardo  said that those who seek 
power in Latin America by means of guerilla warfare and  terrorism will fail to achieve 
it, but that coalitions of Leftist forces working through the legal structure were a far 
greater threat. He said that the Popular Front in Chile, if it is successful in socializing a 
country, will have a powerful demonstrated effect in Latin America. Mercado then 
advanced the idea that Peru is of great importance as a demonstration of alternative and 
less violent means…He noted that the success of the revolution certainly should be in our 
interests…[Foreign Minister Mercado] said  he felt strongly that the success of the 
Peruvian experiment was the best defense against the spread of Marxism in Latin 
America. He stated that Peru had recently experienced a wave of strikes, especially in the 
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mining industry, led by Communist  agitators. He said that these strikes demonstrated 
that the Communists themselves were aware of the risks to their program if the Peruvian 
experiment succeeded and were using these means to attack it at its weakest point—the 
economy. He said that at some future time it might be necessary to take strong action to 
get rid of agitators of this kind, but the government took pride in the peaceful nature of 
the Peruvian revolution and wished to put off as long as possible action of this kind.  
 
The report subsequently, and for our purposes, most importantly, summarizes Kissinger’s 
reply to Mercado’s statement:  
Dr. Kissinger replied that domestic policy and decisions were Peru’s own affair and that 
the U.S. had no wish to become involved in them…Dr. Kissinger went on to emphasize 
that, these distractions aside, the Foreign Minister was correct, that we  are interest in 
the success of the Peruvian revolution—both for its own sake and as  a non-Marxist 
alternative to the Chilean experience in Latin America…He repeated our fundamental 
desire for improved relations with Peru and our interest in the success of the Peruvian 
experiment. 484 
 
Several Months later, on February 8, 1972, a memorandum sent from Kissinger to 
President Nixon declared that Velasco, “believes that the U.S. now recognizes that his 
government is non-communist and offers a reasonable alternative to the Communist regimes in 
Cuba and Chile.” The report further stated: “President Velasco noted his concern over the 
implications for Peru should Chile become armed with Soviet military equipment. He suggested 
the importance of increasing cooperation between Peru and the U.S. in the face of our common 
foe, communism.”485 Hence, above all, there is unequivocal evidence that the U.S. supported the 
Velasco regime in the fight against communism in Latin America. 
Although U.S. policy makers had definitively concluded that the Peruvian regime was not 
communist, nor communist inspired, U.S. policy makers were still concerned about the 
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U.S.S.R’s influence. A report prepared the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Latin American 
Affairs, on September 26, 1972, argued:  
Our non-overt economic pressure policy [regarding IPC and Peruvian 
expropriation U.S. business interests] has contributed to an adversary relationship 
between Peru and the U.S., which in turn, has provided opportunities for exploitation by 
the U.S.S.R. There is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union, in working to increase 
its influence in Latin America, desires the loosening of ties between the U.S. and Latin 
America and the creation of an atmosphere of hostility in the region toward the U.S. The 
Soviets pay particular attention to Peru in this regard. U.S. pressure probably has 
contributed to Peruvian assertions of independence.  
 
The report went on to argue:  
Our policy is interpreted in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America as further evidence that 
the defense of IPC is more important to the U.S. than its other interests, including 
peaceful, non-Marxist economic and social reform. This stimulates alienation from the 
U.S. in Peru, tends to strengthen radicals within the Peruvian military and government, 
and provides opportunities to our adversaries. Current policy tends to give the impression 
that we make little distinction in our treatment of Peru and Chile despite the fact that 
Chile’s Marxist government presents a wider threat to a broader range of U.S. interests 
than does the Peruvian military. 486 
 
Although the document affirms that U.S. policy makers were still worried about the possible 
threat of communism and that the U.S.S.R. posed in Peru, the report definitively supports the 
claim that U.S. policy makers did not considered Velasco, his regime, or the variables that were 
considered threatening in Guatemala as communist threats. First, the document affirms that U.S. 
policy makers did not see Velasco’s regime as a “communist threat”; it makes a clear distinction 
between the threat that the U.S.S.R’s potentially posed, and the way U.S. policy makers viewed 
Velasco’s regime (i.e. non-threatening); the report never defines any members within Peru as 
Marxist or communist, which the document highlights, as the main concern regarding the 
U.S.S.R; the report makes a clear distinction between “radicals” in Peru and Marxists; it 
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blatantly affirms that Chile “presents a wider threat to a broader range of U.S. interests” than the 
Peruvian regime; and it finally suggests that the U.S. government was perceived by other nations 
as giving greater attention to the IPC case than other interests such as non-Marxism, peaceful 
revolutions.” Once again, Velasco and his regime were not considered  a threat.  
In summary of the entire U.S. outlook on Peru, Noel Maurer contends, in “Much Ado 
About Nothing: Expropriation and compensation in Peru and Venezuela, 1968-1975,” according 
to President Nixon, “I believe we need to give serious and careful thought to our relation to 
countries in the developing world. I do not believe we understand how our aid programs and our 
policies, in general, actually affect the political and economic development of these countries 
and their orientation on foreign policy matters of concern to us…Our concern, I believe, should 
be primarily with their foreign policies in ways of critical importance to us.” Maurer reflects on 
Nixon’s statement and contends: 
The implications for Peru, and for the rest of the developing world, were obvious. Insofar 
as a nation did not “subordinate itself” to the Soviet bloc or Communist China—eight 
years after the Sino-Soviet Split, Nixon distinguished between the two, but still 
considered both to be enemies—a nation could follow whatever domestic economic 
policies it wanted, whether Socialist, capitalist, or kleptocratic. It could even negotiate 
trade or arms deals with the Soviet Union. But, should the Nixon administration believe a 
nation was subordinating itself to the Communist bloc in its foreign policy, it would not 
matter whether the nation gave ground over American investment disputes or not: the 
nation would be a target. 487 
 
In total, U.S. policy maker’s definition of a communist threat was clearly different than it 
was in the late 1940s and early 1950s and, thus, U.S. policy makers never concluded that 
Velasco’s regime was a “communist threat” because there were no overt evidence that suggested 
Velasco sympathized with communism. Rather, Velasco thoroughly argued that he was anti-
communist and U.S. policy makers quickly agreed with this claim. The case of Peru shows that 
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the variables that once caused concern in Guatemala were no longer as threatening by the 1970s. 
Yet, as Noel Maurer contends, and as the final document has shown, although the IPC case was 
the main concern in Peru, it was still a subsidiary threat to the one posed by communism in Latin 
America. Hence, the variables that had been considered threatening in Guatemala were not 
necessarily discounted because communism was not a threat on a global scale and the 
containment policy was dead. Rather, U.S. policy makers were not as sensitive in the 1970s and, 
thus, no longer considered many variables, that had once been considered as threatening, as 
threatening in the 1970s. Also, as argued, Velasco’s authoritarian regime type may have played a 
large part in quelling U.S. policy maker’s concerns. Kissinger’s belief  that Velasco’s regime 
should have been used as an example of a non-Marxist revolution to counter balance the Marxist 
revolution in Chile also supports the claim that U.S. policy makers were favoring Velsaco’s 
authoritarian regime. 
4.3 CHILE: U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
At the very same time that U.S. policy makers did not consider Velasco’s regime as a threat, 
however, an intensive investigation and effort to combat Allende’s Presidency was underway. 
But, even prior to Allende’s Presidential tenure, U.S. policy makers were fervently convinced 
that Allende was a “communist threat.” As argued, U.S. policy makers considered Allende a 
threat because of his Marxist affiliation and his relations with the international communism, well 
before he ascended the Presidency.   
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Even in 1954, in language characteristic to the 1950’s, the U.S. State Department labeled 
him a “Communist,” “commie-liner,” and “dupe.”488 Over the coming years, the U.S. took 
measures to prevent Allende from succeeding in the Chilean political spectrum. This was 
especially evident in the 1964 Presidential elections. According to Paul Sigmund, “the expansion 
of military ties to Chile in the early 1960s was accompanied by an increase in covert activities of 
the CIA)…Because of the existence of a large Communist Party in Chile, the country had 
already become the object of CIA attention in the 1950s.”489 Sigmund concludes that by, “the 
1964 presidential elections, the CIA was already deeply involved in influencing its outcome.”490 
Specifically, a 1975 report by U.S. Senate Selection Committee on Intelligence, 
concluded that $3 million dollars had been spent during 1962-1964 to “prevent the election of a 
Socialist or Communist candidate.”491 In 1963, Kennedy fully supported Allende’s opposition—
Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democrats. Lubna Qureshi recounts that the CIA, 
“underwrote slightly more than half of the total cost of [Frei’s campaign]” in 1964.492 McGeorge 
Bundy, in a CIA memorandum argued, “We can’t afford to lose this one, so I don’t think there 
should be any economy shaving in this instance. We assume the Commies are pouring in dough; 
we have no proofs. They must assume we are pouring in the dough; they have no proof. Let’s 
pour it on and in.”493 Frei won the 1964 election with 56 percent of the vote, defeating Allende 
who only received 38.9 percent.494 Although the U.S. had prevented Allende from winning the 
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election, U.S. policy makers maintained a close watch on the subsequent congressional elections 
in 1965. Toward this end, a proposed list of favorable candidates was created.495 
Four years later, following Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 Presidential election, 
Lubna Qureshi argues that, “Nixon…dreaded what Allende represented for the rest of Latin 
America, and potentially for the entire world.”496 Thus when, Allende once again was entered on 
presidential ballot for the 1970 elections in 1968, U.S. policy makers took action. Paul Sigmund 
summarizes, “The question of organizing a CIA program in connection with the 1970 
presidential election similar to that of 1964 had been raised with the covert action review group, 
now called the Forty Committee, in April 1969, but no action had been taken.497 
On March 25, 1970, Nixon’s new National Security Advisor Kissinger reported that a 
top-secret “40 committee” concluded that various levels of the U.S. government were opposed to 
Allendes election. The report stated, “The Embassy in Santiago, the Department of State and the 
CIA have agreed that the election of the UP candidate would be detrimental to the U.S. and that 
spoiling operations should be undertaken to influence a portion of the uncommitted vote away 
from UP (Allende’s government coalition).”498 Sigmund argues that as a result of the 
committee’s conclusions, “$135,000 was authorized for an anti-Communist ‘spoiling’ 
campaign.” Later that year, Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, proposed approval of $500,000 
for a “spoiling campaign and to ‘influence’ the likely congressional runoff.’” Sigmund describes 
that, “The State Department opposed the bribery proposal as ‘stupid and immoral,’ and it was 
postponed, but $300,000 was approved for the anti-Communist program.”499 For Kissinger, the 
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U.S. intervention in the Chilean elections was absolutely necessary: “I don’t see why we need to 
stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own 
people.”500 
Despite U.S. intentions, the efforts of U.S. policy makers failed and Allende won the 
presidency with only a third of the votes on September 4, 1970 over the runner up, presidential 
candidate Jorge Alessandri. However, in Chile, the lack of a majority win required Allende to 
gain senate approval, which would later be decided in December. Because of the lack of majority 
vote, Alessandri was still capable of winning the presidential office in the congressional vote; 
however, according to Sigmund, Alessandri denied that he would accept the win, which would 
cause a re-vote, and through a “technicality,” the former president Eduardo Frei would be 
eligible to run. Sigmund argues that if this series of events occurred, “[Frei] would clearly win in 
a two way race against Allende.”501  
The initial U.S. reaction was dramatic. Days after the election, a telegram to the 
Department of State noted:  
It’s a sad fact that Chile has taken the path to Communism with only a little more than a 
third (36 pct) of the nation approving this choice, but it is an immutable fact. Beyond, we 
have suffered a grievous defeat. The consequences will be domestic and international. 
The repercussions will have immediate impact in some lands and delayed effect in others. 
502 
 
Although the State Department “admitted defeat”, the CIA and President Nixon were not 
yet ready to allow Allende to win the presidency. U.S. policy makers were fully aware of the 
coming congressional vote and the technicality that would allow Frei to run.  
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As a result of this understanding, the CIA created a “two track” (i.e. two option) program 
for preventing Allende from winning the congressional vote: (1) organizing a military coup; (2) 
swaying the congressional vote through the bribery of Chilean Senators. Sigmund contends: 
The Forty Committee met to discuss the Chilean situation on September 8, and Richard 
Helms, head of the CIA, reported that the Chilean Congress was likely to  vote for 
Allende and that a military coup ‘would have very little chance of success  unless 
organized soon’…Thus, when the Forty Committee met again on September 14, it 
decided on a massive anti-Allende propaganda campaign and economic  pressure on 
Chile.503 
 
Sigmund summarizes that “both Ambassador Korry and the CIA station cabled that there 
was no possibility of a military coup.” Despite the policy recommendations that a coup would 
not succeed, President Nixon ignored these suggestions and directly supported the coup: “Track 
1.” 
 A private note written on September 15, 1970, by CIA director Richard Helms, reflected 
on a recent meeting Helms had with the President, in which Nixon’s ordered Helms to initiate a 
CIA based coup to unseat Allende: “1 in 10 chances perhaps, but save Chile!; worth spending; 
not concerned; no involvement of embassy; $10,000,000 available, more if necessary; full-time-
job—best men we have; game plan; make the economy scream; 48 hours for plan of action.”504 
The subsequent code name for the project was “FUBELT.”  
A month later, on October 16, 1970, Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans 
for the CIA, reflected on Kissinger’s orders for Henry Hecksher, the CIA station chief in 
Santiago: “It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup…We are going 
to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. 
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It is imperative that these actions are implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG 
and American hand be well hidden.”505  
Two days later, another report categorized weapons shipments from CIA headquarters in 
Langley, VA to the CIA station in Santiago. The weapons were shipped for the purpose of 
kidnapping Chilean General, Rene Schneider, who was seen as a potential opponent of the 
subsequent coup attempt against Allende.506 Remember that Eduardo Frei, the leading Christian 
Democrat and main opposition to the Unidad Popular coalition, was later indicted in Chilean 
courts for knowing of the coup attempt and General Schneider’s assassination. Ironically, Frei 
originally appointed Schneider as the new commander-in-chief in 1968, but Schneider developed 
a policy that later became known as the “Schneider doctrine,” and called for non-intervention by 
the military in the constitutional democracy.507 This naturally went against the U.S.’s goals for a 
military coup. The plan ironically backfired, however, after Schneider’s assassination, which 
caused the military to become unified under the “Schneider Doctrine,” pushing further toward 
the end of non-interference and protection of the constitutional democracy.508   
Allende was approved by the Chilean Congress on October 24, 1970. Sigmund describes 
that, “President Nixon decided on October 21 that there was to be no congratulatory message 
after Allende was elected by the Chilean Congress and that a small, low-key delegation would be 
sent to the inauguration on November 3. In effect, the President Nixon and the U.S. government 
were forced “back to the drawing board.”509 Several options were discussed in a secret paper 
prepared for Kissinger and the National Security Council. The report, titled, “National Security 
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Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97), and dated on November 3, 1970, provided three 
options for future U.S. government perspectives on Allendes Chile. It began by asserting: 
The Allende government will seek to establish in Chile as soon as feasible an 
authoritarian system following Marxist principles. To that end it will move (a) to  bring 
all significant economic activity under state operation including  nationalization of 
basic industries; (b) to gain control over the security and armed  forces; and (c) to 
dominate public information media. 
 
The report then summarized three possible positions for subsequent U.S. action—A, B, 
and C. The first of the three options argued that the U.S. should “Treat Chile as we do 
Communist Nations that seek independence of the U.S.S.R.” The second route contended that 
U.S. policy makers should “Maintain an outwardly correct posture, refrain from initiatives which 
the Allende government could turn to its own political advantage, and act quietly to limit the 
Allende government’s freedom of action.” The last option argued: “Maintain an outwardly 
correct Posture, but making clear our opposition to the emergence of a Communist government 
in South America; act positively to retain the initiative vis-à-vis the Allende government.” In a 
memorandum several days later, Kissinger reviewed the proposed options and discussed the 
changes in Presidential decisions for policy in Chile. Kissinger elaborated that “Option C” would 
be taken. Consequently, the President had declared two main points: First, he stated “(1) The 
public posture of the United States will be correct but cool...(2) The United States will seek to 
maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability 
to implement polices contrary to U.S .and hemisphere interest.” Toward this end, the U.S. 
expected:  
Vigorous efforts be undertaken to assure that other governments in Latin America 
understand fully that U.S. opposes consolidation of communist state in Chile hostile to 
the interest of the United State and other hemisphere nations…Close consultations to be 
established with key governments in Latin America, particularly  Brazil and Argentina, 
to coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean moves which may be contrary to our mutual 
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interests; In pursuit of this objective, efforts should be increased to establish and maintain 
close relations with friendly military leaders in the hemisphere. 
 
In support of my contention that U.S. policy makers favored dictatorships over 
democracy, Kissinger yet again highlights this point. Nevertheless, the report went on to argue:  
This option would be posited on the belief that a satisfactory modus vivendi is ultimately 
impossible; that confrontations are, sooner or later, inevitable; that it is in the U.S. 
interest to make U.S. opposition to a Communist government in South America clear to 
Chile, the rest of Latin America, the U.S.S.R, and the world...This option does not 
recommend that the U.S. take a full range of the courses of action immediately after 
Allende’s inauguration, nor without provocation on his part. It does recommend that U.S. 
initiative be geared to the situation as it develops in Chile.510 
 
Despite a less drastic course of action, the report ominously reported that “confrontation 
[was] inevitable.” 
One year later, President Nixon and Kissinger maintained aggressive stances against 
Allende. Following the murder of a prominent Christian Democrat, the two men expressed their 
views. Nixon argued, “I don’t-I—I don’t—I think this guy has got a stranglehold on that 
country.” Kissinger responded, “Mr. President, that man is heading for a one party government 
as fast as he effectively can. Nixon: “I think this murder proves it.” In reply, Kissinger 
exclaimed: 
Oh, yes. But even before that, when we had that meeting on the Ex-Im Bank, I went 
around the table; I asked everyone, ‘Is Allende moving slower than you expected or 
faster?’ Everyone agreed he’s moving faster. Everyone agreed that he’s heading for a 
one-party state. He’s, he’s getting control of the press. He’s, he’s isolating the 
military…He’s treating the military just like Hitler did…building them up while 
neutralizing them…He’s already taken over the police…They’ll—never be another free 
election in Chile511 
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This conversation occurred on June 11, 1971, two years before Allende’s demise. 
Although Kissinger supported military dictatorships, the idea of an Allende consolidation of a 
one party rule clearly petrified Kissinger. Hence, much like Cuba, U.S. policy makers were 
opposed to any Marxist or communist dictatorship. Although much more can be said about the 
U.S. perspective on Allende’s Chile, but the aforementioned documents portray a general 
consensus among U.S. policy makers: Allende was a Marxist and “communist threat” and he 
needed to be removed.  
4.4 CONCLUDING CHAPTER 3:  
This chapter has shown that U.S. policy makers considered Arevalo and Arbenz’s regime as 
communist threats based upon specific variables that U.S. policy makers considered threatening. 
However, the chapter also shows that U.S. policy makers did not view the variables that were 
considered threatening in Guatemala as threatening in Peru and thus did not view Velasco or his 
regime to be communist threats. Allende’s Chile was still considered as threatening the 1970s, 
and Allende had been considered a threat as early as the 1950s. For Arevalo, Arbenz, and 
Allende, intensive investigations were employed in all three cases, while Velasco and regime 
was not scrutinized to the same extent.  
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
As posited from the outset, the way U.S. policy makers characterized a threat was not always 
consistent, for U.S. policy makers did not always act in similar ways to similar events. I have 
demonstrated how similar variables existed in both the case of Guatemala and the case of Peru 
and how U.S. policy makers considered many of these variables as threatening in Guatemala, but 
did not consider them threatening in Peru. As this paper has demonstrated, I have provided two 
thesis—“a change in policy perspective” and “U.S. policy makers favored dictatorships”—to 
explain the discrepancy in perspective between the U.S. perception of threat in the case of 
Guatemala and the U.S. perception of threat in the case Peru. 
Moreover, I have demonstrated that Allende and his regime in Chile were also considered 
threats in the 1970s. I initially posited why policy makers would continue to view Allende and 
his regime as a threat despite a less charged atmosphere and difference in foreign policy and 
policy perspective by the 1970s. I argued that if Allende was overthrown on similar grounds to 
Arbenz in 1954, my thesis would be called into question because my contention—U.S. policy 
makers reacted differently to similar variables over time— would indeed be refutable. Yet, in 
chapter two, I discounted such a counter example: U.S. policy maker’s perception of threat 
regarding Allende can be explained because he was far more radical and more communist than 
Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco. But also, I show that Allende was investigated by U.S. policy 
makers and considered a threat well before the other variables that were present in the case of 
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Guatemala were in existence in Chile, because Allende was considered a threat before he 
ascended the Presidency.  Hence, the variables that U.S. policy makers considered threatening in 
Guatemala were not the main motivating variables that caused U.S. policy makers to initially 
consider Allende a communist threat.  
Nonetheless, even if I was unequivocally correct and my respective theses sufficiently 
respond to my initial research question— why the case of Peru was not considered a communist 
threat—I contend that this paper has created more questions than it has answered. Indeed, many 
more case studies should be analyzed in light of my findings in this paper to understand how 
they either bolster my findings or contest them, but, more importantly, further investigation 
should be undertaken to understand U.S. foreign policy: how it is created, how it evolves, and 
how it is applied to specific issues.  
For example, the case of Bolivia from 1952 to 1964 creates several compelling questions. 
Like Arevalo regime in 1944, the Revolutionary Workers Party (MRN)—a left-wing political 
party who seized power in April of 1952— initiated sweeping reforms including expropriation of 
businesses, increased workers’ rights, and sought for universal suffrage almost simultaneously to 
the height of Arbenz’s regime. Yet, despite these facts, and despite the leftist nature of the MRN, 
according to James Malloy and Richard Thorn, in Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952, 
U.S. policy makers initially supported the MRN in Bolivia because of the fear of communism.512 
This fact would suggest that a discrepancy in U.S. perspective occurred even in the 1950s 
between the case of Bolivia and Guatemala. 
But, what makes the case even more perplexing is that communists appeared to take a 
significant role in the MRN’s rise to power. According to Malloy, “The Communists also 
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claimed credit for having participated in the April 1952 insurrection. According to a Soviet 
scholar, ‘the Communists took an active part in the April 1952 insurrection distinguishing 
themselves by the seizure of the La Paz arsenal and by distributing captures arms to the 
insurrectionists.”513 Yet, Malloy further argues:  
The political importance of the Communists at this time should not, be exaggerated. The 
U.S. Department of States at this time estimates the number of Communists in all Bolivia 
at less than two thousand. The Communists were not represented in the MNR command 
which led the uprisings, nor did they, while still party members, hold any ministerial or 
comparable posts in the subsequent MNR governments. The party’s candidate received 
only twelve thousand votes in the 1956 presidential election as compared with more than 
three quarters of a million by [the] MNR candidate. 514 
 
Despite, Malloy’s contention that the importance of the communists should not be 
exaggerated, very similar statistics in the case of Arbenz’s regime did not prevent U.S. policy 
makers from believing that a communist threat was present. Although it might be argued that the 
MNR eschewed Marxism and such a stance might quell the concerns of U.S. policy makers, 
Arevalo’s equivalent pro-democratic and anti-communist stance in Guatemala did little to quell 
such concerns. 515 Hence, once again, a discrepancy in perspective was apparent in the 1950s. 
Malloy touches upon the difference in U.S. response toward Arbenz’s regime and the MRN in 
Bolivia: “The flexibility of the United States Bolivian policy made it easier to defend the rigid 
and repressive policy toward Guatemala in the early 1950s.”516 In this light, and with the facts at 
hand, we must question what caused U.S. policy makers to respond differently to Bolivia.  
Perhaps it is obvious that my first thesis does not account for why U.S. policy makers did 
not consider the MNR as a threat in early 1950s. Hence, another explanation is required. For 
example, one explanation might refer to the United Fruit Companies influence in Guatemala as 
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being more influential than I have argued for and, thus, U.S. policy makers responded to a 
greater degree because of this extra variable. But perhaps U.S. policy makers overlooked the 
MRN because it did not rule democratically and U.S. policy makers favored the MRN for this 
very reason. Although democracy and a peaceful transfer of power in Bolivia was not altogether 
vacant, it is important to note that the MRN did “seize” power through force in 1952. 
Furthermore, according to James Malloy and Mitchel Seligson, in Authoritarians and 
Democrats: Regime Transitions in Latin America,  Bolivia from 1950 to the 1964 was not 
necessarily a democracy, but a “populist styled regime” that was controlled predominantly by the 
executive party the MRN. Malloy contends that the state “became associated almost exclusively 
with executive power.”517 Hence, perhaps U.S. policy maker’s response to Bolivia can be 
explained in part because it was less democratic than Arevalo and Arbenz’s regime.  
But, moreover, the Bolivian case offers even further puzzles to solve: U.S. policy makers 
actually turned against the MRN and became increasingly suspicious of communist activity. By 
the late 1950s, U.S. policy makers were concerned the communists had “penetrated” MRN and 
that increased “tension” between MRN and “leftist factions” was probably a result of 
“communist agitation.” In fact, U.S. policy makers intervened in the Bolivian election in 1964 by 
sending covert aid to influence Bolivian politics from 1963 to 1965. In an editorial note on the 
State Departments website in Bolivian document 147 of Foreign relations of the United States 
XXXI: South and Central America; Mexico, the document stated that U.S. covert aid ranged from 
300,000 to 550,000 from 1963 to 1965. The document argued:  
The basic covert action goals in Bolivia are to foster democratic solutions to critical and 
social, economic, and politics problems; to check Communist and Cuban subversion; to 
encourage a stable government favorably inclined toward the United States; and to 
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encourage Bolivian participation in the Alliance for Progress. The main direction and 
emphasis of C[overt] A[ction] operations is to force Communists, leftists, and pro-
Castroites out of influential positions in government, and to try to break Communist and 
ultra-leftist control over certain trade union, student groups, and campesino 
organizations.518 
 
Several questions are raised by this statement, especially in consideration of my findings in this 
paper. For example, was the CP’s control of labor still a major threat for U.S. policy makers in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s? It would appear so, because U.S. policy makers clearly sought to 
“break” the communist control over “certain trade unions” in Bolivia. Thus, in light of the U.S. 
lack of perception of threat in Peru regarding the CP influence in the Peruvian labor force, was 
the case of Peru a fluke or was there a point in time beyond the late 1950s when U.S. policy 
makers decided that the CP’s influence in a given labor movement would no longer be 
considered as threatening? In other words, why was the CP’s influence in the Bolivian labor 
movement considered as a threat in Bolivia, but not in Peru. Perhaps the change in policy 
perception answers this question. But, also, an answer to such a question would surely include a 
comment about how policy is not so “cut and dry.” And, the way U.S. policy makers responded 
to a CP’s influence in labor was relative to a specific case. But, broadly speaking, perhaps U.S. 
policy maker’s policy perspective changed under Alliance for Progress to such a degree that the 
CP’s control of labor would no longer be a concern henceforth. Regardless of the answer, even 
this specific issue—U.S. policy makers perception of threat regarding the CP influence in labor 
in a given country and how the perception of threat changes from country to country—raises 
many compelling questions and difficulties that should be further considered.  
Yet, it is also interesting to note that the covert action described in the aforementioned 
quote did not utilize force, but merely “economic methods” for influencing elections. Was this a 
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reflection of the Alliance for Progress’s renewed economic response to communist threats in the 
Western Hemisphere? Also, why did the U.S. perspective shift away from support of the MRN, 
and why did U.S. policy makers believe that communists wielded greater influence in Bolivia in 
the late 1950s than they had when the MRN initially took power in 1952?  
Although I will not engage in an intensive investigation of such perplexities here, further 
investigation should be undertaken to better understand the discrepancy in perspective between 
the U.S. response toward Bolivian and Guatemalan in the early 1950s and the many other 
interesting questions that the case of Bolivia raises.  Yet, even more questions arise when we 
considered other instances of U.S. foreign policy and possible intervention in Latin and South 
America, say toward the Military Coups in Brazil (April 1964) and Argentina (June 1966). 
Hence, the case of Bolivia, and perhaps many others, reveal how intricate, and perhaps difficult, 
it is to make sense of foreign policy perception and action, especially when U.S. action is not 
uniform for similar events. Nevertheless, the paper has succeeded, to whatever limited extent it 
has, in making sense of the discrepancy in perspective between the case of Guatemala and Peru, 
while also furthering an understanding of how foreign policy is formed and how it evolves over 
time. As a final word, hopefully the findings in this paper can be applied to the present day in 
order to better understand how U.S. policy is formulated and how it is applied to specific issues, 
thus allowing us to gain a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy and action as a whole.  
 213 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Albertus, Michael and Victor A. Menaldo. “If You’re Against Them You’re With Us: The Effect 
of Expropriation on Autocratic Survival.” Social Science Research Network. 25 Sept. 
2010. Web. 15 June, 2011. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601138>. 
“Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. An Interim Report of the United States 
Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations.” New York: W. W. Norton, 
1976. Print. 
AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 257. September 8, 1950.  (Did not have a filing number 
included; check 714.001). University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
American Embassy, Mexico to DOS, no. 210, August 1, 1950. (Did not have a filing number 
included; check roll 714.001). University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: 
Scholarly  Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
Axelrod, Alan. The Real History of the Cold War: A New Look at the Past. London: Sterling 
Publishing Co. Inc., 2009. Print. 
Ayber de Soto, Jose M. Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemalan in 1954. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. Print.  
Balbi, Carmen R. “Politics and Trade Unions in Peru.” The Peruvian Labrynth: Polity, Society, 
Economy. Ed. Cameron, Maxwell A. and Philip Mauceri. University Park,  Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p.134. 
Berrios, Ruben and Cole Blasier. “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989): Distant Partners.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1991.  <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Biles, Roger. “Paul H. Douglas, McCarthyism, and the Senatorial Elections of 1954.” Journal of 
the Illinois State Historical Society, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2002. Web. 24 Oct. 2011 
<http://www.jstor.org/>. 
Blasier, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976. Print. 
 214 
Boeninger, Edgardo. “The Chilean Road to Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, Issue 4, 1968. 
Web. 9 Dec. 2011. <http://www.ebscohost.com/>. 
Bohning, Don. The Castro Obsession. : US Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. Print. 
“Briefing Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for President’s Assistant for 
National Security Affairs (Kissinger).” Foreign Relations of  the United States, 1969-
1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 576. 
January 28, 1969. Web. 5 September, 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
Cameron, Maxwell A. and Philip Mauceri eds. The Peruvian Labrynth: Polity, Society, 
Economy. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 
Print. 
“Capabilities of the Guatemalan Communists to Seriously Challenge the Country’s Armed 
Forces.” (No filing numbers, date, or author, but appears to be embassy correspondence 
to DOS, check roll 714.001). National Security Archives. University  of Pittsburgh 
Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003.  Microfilm.  
 Caute, David. The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Print. 
Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru and the U.S: The Implications of the IPC Controversy,” 
Special National Intelligence Estimate, March 6, 1969. Print.  
 “Central Intelligence Bulletin”. Digital National Security Archive: The Documents that Made 
U.S. History. June 26, 1969. Web.  6  September 2011. 
<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cat/displayItemIdImages.do?queryType=cat&&ItemID
=CPE00006>. 
Churchill, Winston. The Second World War, vi, Triumph and Tragedy. London: Cassell,  1945. 
Print.  
CIA, “Cable Transmissions on Coup Plotting.” Chile and the United States: Declassified 
Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970- 1976. National Security Archives. 
October 18, 1970. Web. 9 September 2011. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>.  
“Communism in Guatemala.” November 27, 1950. AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 538, NA 
714.001/11- 2750. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources  Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
“Conversation Among President Nixon, Gulf-Western Chairman Charles Bluhdorn, the 
President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs  (Ehrlichman), and Secretary of Commerce 
Peterson.” Washington, June 16, 1971. Foreign Relations of the United  States,  1969-
1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 290. 
<http://history.state.gov>. 
 215 
“Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Kissinger).”Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, 
Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 42. June 11, 1971. Web. 10 
September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
“Conversation #462-5.” 8:30a.m.-10:15a.m., Oval Office. March 5, 1971, Nixon Tapes, Nixon 
Presidential Materials Project, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 
“Conversation #497-2.” 11:20a.m.-11:51p.m., Oval Office. May 11, 1971. Nixon Tapes. Nixon 
Presidential Materials Project, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 
Crain, Earl T. “Habana 2194.” (No Date or Filing number: Presumed to occur around January 
1951; Check 714.001). AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. University of Pittsburgh Library. 
Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly  Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
Cullather, Nick. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 
1952-1954. Stanford, California: Stanford  University Press, 1999. Print. 
DeBenedetti, Charles L. “Educators and Armaments in Cold War America.” Peace & Change, 
Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2009. Web. 7 Oct. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Debray, Regis. The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1971. Print. 
Deery, Phillip. “’A blot of liberty’: McCarthyism, Dr. Barsky and the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee.” American Communist History, Vol. 8, Issue 2, 2009. Web. 18 Oct.  2011. 
<http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
“Department of State, U.S. Embassy Cables on the Election of Salvador Allende and Efforts to 
Block his Assumption of the Presidency.” Chile and the United States: Declassified 
Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976. National Security Archives. 
September 5-22, 1970. Web. 7 September 2011. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>. 
Dileo, David L. George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment. London: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Print. 
DOS to Edward W. Clark, Guatemalan Desk Officer. January 22, 1951, NA 714.00/1-2251. 
University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. 
Microfilm. 
Dulles, John F. War or Peace. New York: MacMillan, 1950. Print. 
Dulles, John. “Statement by Secretary Dulles, Caracas, Venezuela (in front of OAS).” March 8, 
1954. Intervention of International  Communism in Guatemala. Washington D.C.: 
Department of State Publication, 1954. Print. 
 216 
Durand, Francisco. “The Growth and Limitations of the Peruvian Right.” The Peruvian 
Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy. Ed. Cameron,  Maxwell A. and Philip Mauceri. 
University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Print. 
Dwight, Eisenhower D. Mandate for Change, The White House Years, 1953-1956. Gaiden City, 
NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963. Print. 
Dwight, Eisenhower.  “Speech by President Eisenhower to the Council of the Organization of 
American States.” April 12, 1953.  
Eckstein, Arthur. “The Hollywood Ten in History and Memory.” Film History, Vol. 16, Issue 4, 
2004. Web. 10 Oct. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXXI, South and 
Central America; Mexico, Document 147. Web. 12 December 2011. 
<http://history.state.gov>. 
Fariello, Griffin. Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition; An Oral History. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. Print. 
Faundez, Julio. Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende. London: 
Yale University Press, 1988. Print. 
Frank Chapin, “Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger: Agenda Items for the 40 Committee Meeting.” 
The White House, Washington. State Department Collection. Freedom of Information 
Act website, U.S. State Department. 25 March 1970. Web. 10 September, 2011. 
<www.foia.state.gov>. 
Franklin, Jane. The Cuban Revolution and the United States: A Chronological History. 
Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1992. Print.  
Frazier, Robert. “Kennan, ‘Universalism,’ and the Truman Doctrine”. Journal of Cold War 
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009.Web. 12 Sept. 2011. <http://www.ebscohost.com/>. 
Fried, Albert. McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. Print. 
Gati, Charles. “What Containment Meant”. Foreign Policy, no. 7, 1972. Web.  7 July 2011. 
<http://www.jstor.org/>. 
Gauger, Michael. “Flickering Images: Live Television Coverage and Viewership of the Army—
McCarthy Hearings.” Historian, Vol. 67, Issue 4, 2005. Web. 24 Nov. 2011. 
<http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Glade, William P. “The Economic Costs of Social Backwardness and the Economic Value of 
Social Reform.” Inter-American Economic  Affairs, Vol. 15, no. 3, 1962. Print.  
 217 
Gorman, Stephen M. ed. Post-revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1982. Print.  
Gormon, Stephen M. “Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political and Economic 
Initiatives.” Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimension. Ed. 
Ferris, Elizabeth B. and Jennie K. Lincoln. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,  1981. 
Print. 
Greenberg, Harold M. “The Doolittle Commission of 1954, Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2005. Web. 21 Oct. 2011.  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684520500428160> 
“Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico Issues Defense of Arevalo Regime.” August 10, 1950. AmEm, 
Guatemala to DOS. NA 714.00/8-1050. University of Pittsburgh Library.  Wilmington, 
Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.  
“Guatemalan History.” Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala. 2009. Web. 9 Sept. 
2011. <http://www.nisgua.org>. 
“Guatemalan Presidential Candidates: Summary of Recent Activities.” September 27, 1950. 
AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 332, NA 714.00/9-2750. University of Pittsburgh 
Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
“Guatemalan Presidential Candidates: Summary of Recent Activities.” October 13, 1950. 
AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 364, NA 714.00/10-1350.  University of Pittsburgh 
 Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
“Guatemalan Presidential Candidates: Summary of Recent Activities.” October 17, 1950. 
AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 410, NA 714.00/10-1350.  University of Pittsburgh 
Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
“Guatemalan Presidential Campaign: Summary of Recent Developments. October 19, 1950. 
EmAm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 410, NA 714.00/10-1950. University of Pittsburgh 
Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
“Guatemalan Presidential Campaign. Summary of Recent Developments.” October 25, 1950. 
AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no 429, NA 714.00/10-2550. University of Pittsburgh 
Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
Halle, Louis Jr. J. “Policy Planning Staff, Memorandum to Director of the Policy Planning Staff 
(May 28, 1954)” in King, John A. and John R. Vile. Presidents from Eisenhower through 
Johnson, 1953-1969: debating the issue in Pro and Con Primary Documents. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2006. Print. 
Hellinger, Daniel. “Electoral Change in the Chilean Countryside: The Presidential Elections of 
1958 and 1970.” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 31, June 1978. Web. 9 Dec. 
<http://www.jstor.org/>. 
 218 
Henry A Kissinger. “National Security Study Memorandum.” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, 
Document 578. 18, February 7, 1969. Web. 5 September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
Hersh, Seymour M. Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit 
Books, 1983. Print.  
"History of Bolivia." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 12 Dec. 2011. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bolivia>. 
Hodgkin, Godfrey. America in Our Time. New York: Random House, 1978. Print. 
Hodak, George. “June 9, 1954: the Army-McCarthy hearings.” ABA Journal, Vol. 96, Issue 6, 
2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2011. <http://go.galegroup.com>. 
Holden, Robert H. “Securing Central America Against Communism: The United States and the 
Modernization of Surveillance in the Cold War.” Journal of Interamerican Studies & 
World Affairs, Vol. 41, Issue 1, 1999. Web. 16 Oct. 2011.  <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Hook, Steven W. and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010. Print. 
Hove, Mark. “The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. 
Intervention of Guatemala”. Diplomatic History, Vol. 31, Issue 4, 2007. Web. 1  Sept. 
2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Hudson, Rex A., ed.  Peru: A Country Study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 
Hunefeldt, Christine. A Brief History of Peru. San Diego: Facts on File, Inc., 2004. Print. 
Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press , 1982. Print. 
“Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President 
Jonson.” Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXX I, October 4, 1968. Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 2004. Print.  
“Information Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to 
President Johnson.” Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXX I, July 30, 1968. 
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004. Print.  
Intelligence Report Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. 
“Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the Communist Party, Guatemala.” 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Retrospective Volume, Guatemala, 
Document 33. January 1, 1953. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-
54Guat/d33>. 
 219 
Ish-Shalom, Piki. “Theory Gets Real, and the Case for a Normative Ethic: Rostow, 
Modernization Theory, and the Alliance for Progress.” International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 50, Issue 2, 2006. Web. 1 Nov. 2011.  <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Jensen, Kenneth M. Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts ‘Long 
Telegrams’ of 1946. Washington DC: United State  Institute of Peace, 1991. Print.  
Johnson, Dale. The Chilean Road to Socialism. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973. 
Print. 
Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt eds. Political Armies: The Military and nation building in the 
age of democracy. London: Zed books, 2002. Print.  
Kennan, George F.  Memoirs, 1952-1950.  Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1967. Print.  
Kennedy, John F. "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms 
Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962 - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum." 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. N.P., n. d. Web. 25 Oct.  2011. 
<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/sUVmCh-sB0moLfrBcaHaSg.aspx>. 
Kennedy, John F. “United States Aid to Latin America: Political Freedom Must be Accompanied 
by Social Change.” Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 27, Issue 12, 1961.  Web. 20 Oct. 
2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. The Origins of the Cold War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Print. 
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics. 
New York: Simon and Schuster Publication, 1982. Print. 
King, John A. and John R. Vile. Presidents from Eisenhower through Johnson, 1953-1969: 
debating the issue in Pro and Con Primary  Documents. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 2006. Print. 
King, Joseph C. “Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemesphere Divison, Central 
Intelligence Agencyto the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.” 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Retrospective Volume, Guatemala, 
Document 2. January 11, 1951. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-
54Guat/d2>. 
King, Joseph C. “Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, 
Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles).” 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Retrospective Volume, Guatemala, 
Document 7. March 17, 1952.<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-
54Guat/d7>. 
Kinzer, Stephen, and Stephen Schlesinger. Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup 
in Guatemala. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1982. Print. 
 220 
Kissinger, Henry. “Reflections on Containment.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3. June 1994. 
Web. 7 July 2011.< http://www.jstor.org.> 
Kovel, Joel. Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America. 
New York: Basic Books, 1994. Print.    
Knight, Jonathan. “George  Frost Kennan and the Study of American Foreign Policy: Some 
Critical Comments”. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1967. Web. 10 July 
2011. <http://www.jstor.org/>. 
Latham, Michael E. “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-
Era Alliance for Progress”.  Diplomatic History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 
1998.<http://web.ebscohost.com> 
Letter to Harry Truman from Carlos Prio Soccarras. Was received by State Dept. on September 
21, 1950. p. 1. Check Roll including NA 714. 001. University of Pittsburgh Library. 
Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
Lindley, Dan and Kevin Clemency. “Low-cost nuclear arms races.” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientist, Vol. 65, Issue 2, April, 2009. Web. 22 Nov. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Lundestad, Geir. Major Developments in International Politics: 1945-1986. Stavanger: 
Norwegian University Press, 1986. Print. 
Malloy, James M. and Mitchell A. Seligson. Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition 
in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. Print. 
Malloy, James M. and Richard Thorn. Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952. Copyright: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971. Print. 
Marett, Sir Robert. Peru. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969. Print. 
Maurer, Noel. Much Ado About Nothing: Expropriation and compensation in Peru 
andVenezuela, 1968-75. Working Paper, Harvard Business School, 2011. Print. 
Mauceri, Philip. State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru. Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1996. Print. 
McCarthy, Joseph. “‘Enemies from Within’: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's Accusations of 
Disloyalty." History Matters: The U.S. Survey Course on the Web. N.p., n. d. Web. 11 
Nov. 2011. <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6456>. 
McWilliams, Cary. “Crisis in the G.O.P.” The Nation, Vol. 178, Issue 12. 20 March 1954. Web. 
20 Oct. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
McWilliams, Wayne C. and Harry Piotrowski. The World Since 1945: A History of International 
Relations. London: Adamantine Press Limited, 1993. Print. 
 221 
Melanson, Richard A. and David Mayers. Reevaluating Eisenhower: American foreign policy in 
the 1950’s. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1989. Print. 
MemoConv. (Antonia Goubaud Carrera, Ambassador to Guatemala, Mr. Thomas Mann, Mr. 
Edward Clark), “Ambassador Goubaud’s Trip to Guatemala,” August 14, 1950.  DOS 
to AmEm, Guatemala. NA 714.00/8-1450. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, 
 Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
MemoConv. (Dr. Rodrigo Gonzalez Allende, Chilean Ambassador to Guatemala), September 6, 
1950, AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 248, NA. University of Pittsburgh Library. 
Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. (Did not have a filing 
number included; check roll 1). 
MemoConv. (Fernando Gallo and John W. Fisher), August 24, 1950. AmEm. Guatemala to 
DOS. no. 201, NA. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. (Did not have a filing number included; check roll 1). 
MemoConv. (Mr. Leo A. Suslow, Mr. Sircusa),“Conversation with Mr. Leo A. Suslow.” 
September 5, 1950. AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. NA 714.00/9-550. University of 
Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
MemoConv. (The Minister of Guatemala to Columbia, Virgilio Rodriguez Betata, The 
Ambassador ), “Guatemala’s Internal Politics,” Aug. 14, 1950, AmEm, Bogata to DOS.  
no. 177, NA. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. (Did not have a filing number included; check roll 1). 
“Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, From Viron P. Vaky. Attitude of Peruvian President  toward 
U.S. and U.S.S.R.”  Foreign Relations of  the United States, 1969-1976,  Volume E-10, 
Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972,Document 611.  November 13, 1969. 
Web. 5 September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
“Memorandum From the President’s Assistance for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon.” Foreign Relations of the United States. 1969-1976, Volume E-10, 
Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 621. November 27, 1970. 
Web. 6 September 2011. < http://history.state.gov>. 
“Memorandum from the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to President Johnson.” Foreign 
Relations, 1964-1968, Volume 31. January 29, 1966. Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2004. Print.  
“Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson.” Foreign Relations,  1964-
1968, Volume XXX I. October 11, 1968. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 2004. Print. 
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson. “The Peruvian Situation,” 11 
October 1968. Foreign Relations: 1964-1968, Volume 31, 1968. Print. 
 222 
“Memorandum From President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), to President 
Nixon.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on 
American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 633. February 8, 1972 . Web. 7 September 
2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
Memorandum of Discussion at the 273th National Security Council Meeting. February 17, 1955, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. VI, 1955-1967. Washington, DC,  1987.  
Print.  
“Memorandum of Meeting.” (Henry A. Kissinger, Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Fernando 
Berckemeyer Pazos, Arnold Nachmanoff, Ahsley  Hewitt).  Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, 
Document 631. September 29, 1971. Web. 6 September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
“Memorandum of October 20, 1950 from Mr. Hasset, Secretary to the President.” October 23, 
1950.  Miller to Webb. NA 714.00/10-2050. University of Pittsburgh Library. 
Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
“Memorandum Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Latin American Affairs.” 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume E-10, Documents on 
American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 638. September 26, 1972. Web. 7 September 
2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
Memo, Walter B. Smith to President Eisenhower, “re: Visit of Gautemalan Ambassador Toriello, 
January 15, 1954” DDE, declassified, MR-76-86, No. 11, (October 19, 1976). 
Milton Eisenhower, “Report on Latin America,” Ann Whitman File, Box 13, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower library. 
Miscamble, Wilson D. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-
1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Print. 
Moss, Robert. Chile’s Marxist Experiment. New York: Halsted Press, 1973. Print. 
National Intelligence Estimate. “Present Political Situation in Guatemala and Possible 
Developments During 1952.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. 
Retrospective Volume, Guatemala, Document 6. March 11, 1952. 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d6>. 
“National Security Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97).” Chile and the United States: 
Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976. National Security 
Archives. November 3, 1970. Web. 7 September 2011. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>. 
Nelson, Keith L. “Nixon, Breshnev, and détente.” Peace & Change, Vol. 16, Issue 2, 1991. Web. 
8 Nov. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Londong: Sidgwick and Jacksen, 1978. Print. 
 223 
Oakley to Miller, November 3, 1949, p. 1, NA 814.00B in Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The 
Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944 to 1954. Princeton New  Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991. Print. 
Office memorandum. September 15, 1950. Clark to Mann, Barber, Siracusa, Barret. NA 
714.001. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources 
Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
"Organizing and Repression: 1944: The October Revolution." AAAS - The World's Largest 
General Scientific Society”. N.P., n.d. Web. 9 Nov. 
2011.<http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ciidh/org_rep/english/part2_3.html>. 
Oshinsky, David. A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy. New York: The Free 
Press, 1983. Print.  
Painter, David S. The Cold War: An international history. London: Routledge, 1999. Print. 
Paterson, Thomas, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. 
Hagan. American Foreign Relations: A History since 1895, Vol. 2, Edition 6. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005. Print. 
“Peru and the U.S: The Implications of the IPC Controversy.” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, 
Document 580.March 6, 1969. Web. 8 September 2011. <http://history.state.gov>. 
Pike, Fredrick B. Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergency of Chile’s Social 
Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1963. Print. 
Pinera, Jose. “How Salvador Allende Destroyed Democracy in Chile”. Society, Vol. 42, Issue 6, 
p. 21, 2005. Web. 28 Sept. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Polley, Michael. A Biography of George F. Kennan: The Education of a Realist. Lewiston: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1990. Print. 
Qureshi, Lubna Z. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile. 
Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2009.  Print. 
Rabe, Stephen G. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. U.S.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988. Print. 
“Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.” 30 September 1954, 
[‘Doolittle Report’], unnumbered folder, record group 263, MMHB. Print.  
Richard Helms, CIA, “Notes on Meeting with the President on Chile.” Chile and the United 
States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976. National 
Security Archives. September 15, 1970. Web. 9 September 2011. 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive>. 
 224 
Riosenkranz-Schikler, Hernan. Political and Social Forces in Peru’s “Revolution of the Armed 
Forces”: A Study of Political and Military Coalitions During the Velasco Regime. Thesis 
for Doctor in Philosophy degree at University of Liverpool, 1980. University of 
Pittsburgh Library, 2 August 2011. Print. 
Roberts, Kenneth M. “Economic Crisis and the Demise of the Legal Left in Peru.” Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, October 1996. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Rosati, Jerel A. and James M. Scott. The Politics of United States Foreign Policy. United States: 
Thomason Wadsworth, 2007. Print. 
Rosenberg, J. Philipp. “Presidential Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Continuity 
during the Cold War Era.” Political  Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4. 1986. Web. 28 June 
2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Sanders, Jerry W. “Breaking Out of the Containment Syndrome.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 1, 
no. 1, 1983. Web. 9 July 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Schmitter, Philippe C. Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences, and 
Perspectives. London: Sage Publications, 1973. Print.   
Schrecker, Ellen. “McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism.” Social 
Research, Vol. 71 Issue 4. 2004. Web. 5 August 2011. <http://www.ebscohost.com/>. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. “Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State.” 
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume 31. November 22, 1967. Washington:  United 
States Government Printing Office, 2004. Print. 
Sewell, Bevan. “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, 
and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America.” Diplomatic  History, Vol. 32, 
Issue 5, 2008. Web. 5 Sept. 2011.  < http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com >. 
Schlesinger, Stephen."Ghosts of Guatemala's Past." New York Times, 4 June 2011: A21(L). 
General One File. Web. 1 Sep. 2011.  <http://go.galegroup.com/>. 
Sigmund, Paul E. The United States and Democracy in Chile. London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993. Print. 
Smith, Peter H. Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print. 
Sobel, Lester A., Ed. Chile & Allende. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1974. Print. 
Starn, Orin, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk. The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics. 
London: Duke University Press, 1995. Print. 
 225 
“Status of Communist Party in Guatemala.” June 6, 1951. AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 1094, 
NA 714.00/6-651. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
Stepan, Alfred. The State and Society: Peruvian Comparative Perspective. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978. Print. 
Streeter, Stephen M. “Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, 
and Postrevisionist Perspectives.” The History Teacher, Vol. 34, No. 1,  June 2000. 
Web. 25 June 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia. Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1955-1957, Volume VII, American Republics: Central and South America, 
Document 274. October 12 1956. Web. 12 Dec. 2011.  <http://history.state.gov>. 
Telegram From the CIA Station to the Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1952-1954. Retrospective Volume, Guatemala, Document 10. June 25, 
1952.<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d10>. 
“Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru.” Foreign Relations, 1964-
1968, Volume XXX I. October 10, 1968. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 2004. Print. 
Thomas Karamessines. CIA, “Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting.” Chile and the 
United States: Declassified  Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976. 
National Security Archives. October 16, 1970. Web. 7 September 2011. 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>. 
“Timeline: U.S.-Vietnam Relations.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International 
& Strategic Affairs, Vol. 32, Issue 3, n.p., 2010. Web. 3 Nov. 2011. 
<http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
“Translated Text of Written Questions Submitted by Lester Velie to President Arevalo, and His 
Replies.” No. 507. 714.001. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: 
Scholarly  Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. 
Truman, Harry S. “American Rhetoric. Harry S. Truman: The Truman Doctrine.” N. d., n. p. 
Web. 8 July 2011.         
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/harrystrumantrumandoctrine.html> 
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs, Volume 1: Year of Decisions. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955. 
Print.  
Truman, Harry. “Public Papers.” 1947. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963. 
Print. 
“United States Objectives and Programs for National Security: NSC 68.” April 14, 1950. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. I, 1950. Print. 
 226 
United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973. Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975. Print. 
Walter, Richard J. “Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed 
Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era.” The American Historical Review, Vol.  116, 
No. 4, October 2011. Web. 15 Nov. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Walter, Richard J. Peru and the United States, 1960-1975. University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. Print. 
"Walt Whitman Rostow." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Oct. 2011. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walt_Whitman_Rostow>. 
Wasserstrom, Robert. “Revolution in Guatemala: Peasants and Politics under the Arbenz 
Government.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1975. 
Web. 15 Sept. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Wells to Clark. January 9, 1951. (No filing numbers, Check roll 714.001). University of 
Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.  
Winn, Peter. “Salvador Allende: His Political Life…and after life”. Socialism and Democracy, 
Volume 19, Issue 3, 2005. Web. 22 Sept. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
Woodward, Ralph L. Jr. “Octubre: Communist Appeal to the Urban Labor Force of Guatemala, 
1950-1953.” Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1962.  Web.  18 Oct. 
2010. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Velasco, Juan. “Speech on Land Reform.” June 24, 1969. 
Ybarra, Michael J. Washington Gone Crazy: Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American 
Communist Hunt. Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2004. Print.  
Zhigniew, Brzezinski. “A Policy of Peaceful Engagement: How We Can Profit from Communist 
Disunity.” New Republic, Vol. 146, Issue 13, March 1962. Web. 7 Dec.  2011. 
<http://web.ebscohost.com>. 
